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n INTRODUCTION
This issue of the Survey marks the first year in which the Law
Review has formally acknowledged that the scope of the Annual
Survey of Labor Relations Law has been expanded to include sig-
nificant developments , in the area of Employment Discrimination.
This is not merely a pro forma acknowledgment, reflecting the fact
that the Survey has in the past included comments on important
developments in Employment Discrimination Law. Rather, by ex-
panding the scope of the Survey, the Law Review recognizes that a
current understanding of the substantive body of Labor Relations
Law requires both the student and practitioner to examine the
complex interplay of individual and collective rights and respon-
sibilities arising under the Labor Management Relations Act and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Supreme Court's
Survey Year decision in Emporium Capwell v. Western Addition
Community Organization vividly demonstrates the importance of
this statutory interplay.
It should be emphasized that under the new title, Annual
Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law,
the authors have merely expanded upon and not changed the exist-
ing Survey format. Like its thirteen predecessors, this year's Survey
reports those decisions, which consolidate, add substance to, expand
upon or depart from prior policy in the application of the Labor-
Management Relations Act, the Norris-LaGuardia Act and other
relevant statutes. In addition, it discusses important discrimination
cases under Title VII, as well as under the Civil Rights Act of 1866
and the Fourteenth Amendment. The subject matter of the Survey
now comprises decisions of the National Labor Relations Board, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the state and
federal courts reported during the Survey year—April 1, 1974 to
March 31, 1975.
I. PREEMPTION
A. Validity of Court 'Jurisdiction over Disputes Affecting Foreign
Commerce: Primary Disputes—Windward Shipping; Secondary
Disputes—Mobile Steamship
In two related Survey year decisions, Windward Shipping Ltd.
v. American Radio Association land Anierican Radio Association v.
Mobile Steamship, Inc., 2 the United States Supreme Court affirmed
state court jurisdiction over certain primary and secondary labor
415 U.S. 104 (1974).
2 419 U.S. 215 (1974).
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disputes involving peaceful informational picketing by domestic
maritime unions of foreign-flag ships in American ports. In each
case the Court ruled that since the labor disputes were not even
"arguably" within the jurisdiction of the NLRB, because the dis-
putes did not involve activity "in commerce" within the meaning of
sections 2(6) 3 and 2(7)4 of the Act, the doctrine of preemption could
not be applied to oust the state court of jurisdiction. 5 In both cases
the unions were picketing to publicize the decrease in available
union jobs caused by what they considered an unfair competitive
advantage enjoyed by the foreign vessels due to wage disparities
between foreign and domestic seamen. 6
In Windward Shipping, the foreign owners of the picketed
ships brought suit in a Texas state court to enjoin the picketing on
the grounds that it constituted tortious interference with pre-existing
contracts with their foreign crews. 7 Basically, the question was
whether the picketing was primary activity protected by section 7 of
the NLRA. 8 The Texas Court of Civil Appeals found that the state
courts lacked jurisdiction over the complaint because the picketing
constituted, "at least arguably, a protected activity under section 7"
of the Act. 9 That court concluded that the dispute was "arguably"
3 29 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1970). Section 2(6) provides:
The term "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or com-
munication among the several States, or between the District of Columbia or any
Territory of the United States and any State or other Territory, or between any
foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or within the
District of Columbia or any Territory, or between points in the same State but through
any other State or any Territory or the District of Columbia or any foreign country.
29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1970). Section 2(7) provides:
The term "affecting commerce" means in commerce, or burdening commerce, or
obstructing the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor
dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce,
' Windward Shipping, 415 U.S. at 105 -06; Mobile Steamship, 419 U.S. at 228.
6 The Court in Mobile Steamship noted;
As in Windward, this case arises from picketing designed to publicize the adverse
impact on American seamen of the operations of foreign-flag carriers which employ
foreign crewmen at wages substantially below those paid to American seamen. As in
Windward, the picketing occurred during 1971, but in this case it took place in
Mobile, Alabama, and was directed against the Aqva Glory, a ship of Liberian
registry. The pickets displayed the same signs and distributed the same literature as
they did in Windward, and they were subject to the same instructions.
The picketing in each case also had similar results. In Windward, we observed
that "The picketing, though neither obstructive nor violent, was not without effect.
Longshoremen and other port workers refused to cross the picket lines to load and
unload . . vessels." 415 U.S., at 108.
419 U.S. at 217-18.
7 See 415 U.S. at 105.
8
 29 U.S.C, § 157 (1970).
9 Windward Shipping Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, 482 5.W.2d 675, 682 (Tex. Ct.
Civ. App. 1972).
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"within commerce,"'° and that the complaint therefore fell within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board
under the doctrine of preemption established by the Supreme Court
in San Diego Building Trades Council,v. Garmon. 1
The United States Supreme Court in 1974 reversed the Texas
court, in a six to three decision written by Justice Rehnquist." The
Court held that the picketing did not constitute activity "in com-
merce" within the meaning of sections 2(6) and 2(7) of the Act, and
therefore could not fall within the jurisdiction of the NLRB." The
Court did not reach the preemption question in Windward Shipping
because it found that the picketing did not meet the threshhold
jurisdictional requirements set out in sections 2(6) and 2(7).' 4 In
deciding the jurisdictional question, the Court examined the effects
of the picketing and the degree of interference that it would have on
the operations of the picketed foreign vessels and on international
trade as a whole." The Court found that the picketing sufficiently
intruded into the affairs of foreign ships to remove it from the scope
of domestic labor-law and the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board,"
and state courts could assume jurisdiction over such complaints by
foreign shipowners."As a result, it is now clear that the Board's
jurisdiction does not extend to labor disputes that affect the internal
operations of foreign;ships, even though the domestic unions may be
employing tactics that would otherwise be protected by the Act if
their activity were "in or affecting commerce" within the meaning of
the NLRA.' 8
 In effect, the Court found that disputes affecting the
internal operation of foreign vessels not employing domestic seamen
were outside the Act's definition of commerce."
The picketing in Mobile Steamship was for all practical pur-
poses identical to the Windward Shipping picketing. 2° However, the
plaintiff in Mobile Steamship was an organization of American
113 Id.
359 U.S. 236 (1959). Under the doctrine of preemption, state and federal courts cannot
exercise jurisdiction over labor disputes that are either "arguably" protected under 7 or
"arguably" prohibited by § 8 of the Act because the NLRB has both primary and exclusive
jurisdiction over the resolutiOn of such disputes. Id. at 244-45. For a more thorough analysis
of Garrnon and the numerous exceptions which have arisen to the doctrine of preemption, see
the discussion of Buckley v. American Fed'n of Television and Radio Artists, 496 F.2d 305,
86 L.R.R.M. 2103 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1975), in 16 B.C. Ind. & Com.
L. Rev. 306 (1975).
12
 415 U.S. at 106.
13 Id. at 115.
14 Id,
's Id. at 113-15.
16 Id .
IT Id. at 115-16.
13 See id. at 110-11.
19
 See id. at 109-16.
See note 6 supra.
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stevedoring and shipping companies, rather than the foreign ship-
owners. 21 As a result of the picketing, American longshoremen and
other workers employed by the member companies of the Mobile
Steamship Association refused to cross the American Radio Associa-
tion member unions' picket lines to service the foreign registered
ship, Aqua Glory, in the port of Mobile, Alabama. 22 The Mobile
Steamship Association obtained an injunction in the Alabama state
courts, contending that the picketing constituted tortious interfer-
ence, unlawful under state law, with its members' rights to conduct
business in Mobile. 23
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the domestic
unions, represented by the American Radio Association, attacked
the injunction on both jurisdictional and First Amendment
grounds. 24 The unions, having failed to persuade the United States
Supreme Court in Windward Shipping that similar picketing against
a foreign vessel owner was activity "in commerce" and protected by
section 7 of the Act, 25 now alleged that their picketing "arguably"
constituted a secondary boycott prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(B) of the
Act26 because it had given rise to a new dispute, between the American
seamen represented by the unions and the contracting stevedores
represented by the plaintiff, which was independent of the primary
dispute between the unions and the foreign vessel owner."
According to the unions, since their picketing now "arguably"
involved an unfair labor practice involving an 8(b) (4) (B) secondary
boycott, the complaint fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Board. 28 Further, the unions noted that since the plaintiff in Mobile
Steamship was not the foreign shipowner, but in fact an organiza-
21 419 U.S. at 219.
12 Id. at 236.
23 Id. at 236-38.
24 See 419 U.S. at 217. While the Court noted that the Alabama Supreme Court had
merely validated a temporary injunction issued by the lower court and had remanded the
First Amendment and tortious interference question to the trial court, the Court upheld the
validity of a permanent injunction after concluding that such an injunction would not violate
either the First or Fourteenth Amendment rights of the picketing union members. Id. at 217
n.1, 228-32. See note 30 infra.
25 415 U.S. at 115.
26 29	 § 158(b)(4)(B) (1970), which is designed "to shield neutral third parties from
the adverse impact of labor disputes in which they are not involved," Mobile Steamship, 419
U.S. at 236-37 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Specifically, this section makes it an unfair labor practice for a union:
to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce
or an industry affecting commerce, to engage in a strike or a refusal in the course of
his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or
work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities .. where . an object
thereof is . . . forcing or requiring any person . . . to cease doing business with any
other person. . .
25 419 U.S. at 220-21.
26 Id. at 220-22.
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tion representing domestic employers, the dispute clearly concerned
activities within the: Act's definitions of "commerce" or "affecting
commerce."29
The United States Supreme Court rejected the unions' argu-
ments and upheld both the jurisdiction and the injunction of the
Alabama state court. 3 ° First, the Court held that a finding that the
Act's jurisdiction extended to this secondary dispute would be
"wholly inconsistent"31
 with its prior holding in Windward Ship-
ping, because it
would result in a rule whereby a state court had jurisdic-
tion over a complaint for injunction filed by a foreign
shipowner claiming that picketing activities of a union
were interfering with his business relationships with a con-
tract stevedore, but that the same court would have no
jurisdiction where the contract stevedore sought an injunc-
tion on precisely the same grounds."
Secondly, the Court held that even if the secondary dispute
between the unions and the domestic stevedoring companies consti-
tuted an independent dispute in "some semantic sense," this dispute,
like the primary dispute, failed to meet the Board's jurisdictional
requirement." The Court found that the secondary effects of the
picketing—the refusal of the longshoremen and the dockworkers to
cross the union's picket line—was integrally related to the internal
maritime operations of the foreign ship and, like the picketing itself,
was not "commerce" and was, therefore, outside the scope of the
Act. 34
In Mobile Steamship the Court did not appear to be concerned
with the domestic status of both parties to the suit; it made the
"commerce" or "affecting commerce" jurisdictional requirement de-
pend entirely upon the jurisdictional status of the union's primary
29 See id. at 220-21.
39
 Id. at 232. The Court reached the First Amendment issue after it concluded that the
state court had jurisdiction to issue the injunction. The unions had argued that their picket-
ing constituted protected expressive conduct. Relying on its decision in Teamsters Local 695
v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957), the Court found that the picketing was not protected. 419
U.S. at 229-30. Since the picketing compromised a valid state policy in insuring freedom of
contract, under the reasoning of Vogt a state "could constitutionally enjoin peaceful picketing
aimed at preventing effectuation of that policy." Id. at 230 quoting Vogt, 354 U.S. at 293.
31 419 U.S. at 224.
32 Id. at 221.
33
 See id. at 221-23. The Court emphasized that no cases have ever held that the Board
can take jurisdiction over an unfair labor practice complaint where the activity disputed does
not "affect commerce" within the meaning of § 2(7) of the Act. Id. at 221. For the text of § 2(7), see
note 4 Supra.
34
 419 U.S. at 224-25.
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activity. 35 The implication of Mobile Steamship is that the Court
will deny the Board jurisdiction over a labor dispute between
domestic unions and employers if the dispute arises in conjunction
with, or "arguably" affects, a primary dispute that falls outside the
scope of the Act as defined by Windward Shipping. In so doing, the
Court will subject union conduct directed against foreign flagships
to the inconsistent and varying laws and remedies of state courts.
In a dissent to Mobile Steamship, Justice Stewart suggested
that:
[t]he Court would thus make the determination whether an
American stevedoring company was "engaged in an indus-
try affecting commerce," the § 8(b) (4) (B) jurisdictional
requirement, depend entirely on whether in a particular
case a primary labor dispute to which the stevedoring
company was not privy was between an American union
and an American-flag shipowner or an American union
and a foreign-flag shipowner. 36
The Court's decision in Mobile Steamship is, nonetheless, a
logical extension of Windward Shipping. Windward Shipping itself
reaffirmed a line of cases, 37
 begining with the Court's 1957 decision
in Benz v. Compania Naviera Hildalgo, S.A., 38 which "recognize [d]
that Congress, when it used the words 'in commerce' in the LMRA
[Labor Management Relations Act],"" simply did not intend the
Act to extend beyond domestic labor disputes or "to erase longstand-
ing principles of comity and accommodation in international maritime
trade."4° In Benz, the Court did uphold federal court jurisdiction
over a damage claim brought by the owner of a foreign-flag ship
against American unions, for picketing in support of striking foreign
crewmen employed under foreign contracts.'" Benz and subsequent
cases held that the history of the NLRA demonstrates that Congress
clearly intended to limit the boundaries of domestic labor law to the
"workingmen of our country and its possessions." 42
In applying Benz, the Court in Windward Shipping measured
the secondary effects of the picketing on the internal operations of
" See id.
36
 Id. at 238 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
37
 See 415 U.S. at 109-15.
33 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
39
 415 U.S. at 112.
4°
 Id. at 112-13.
41 353 U.S. at 139.
42
 415 U.S. at 110, quoting Bens, 353 U.S. at 144. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad
Nacional, 372 U.S. 24 (1963); incres S.S. Co. v. Maritime Workers Union, 372 U.S. 24
(1963).
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the foreign vesse1. 43 The Court disregarded the fact that the al-
ledged purpose of the primary picketing was to protect the jobs of
American workingmen, in its determination of whether the picket-
ing fell within the ambit of the Act. 44 Instead, the Court measured
the amount of interference that the picketing had on the operations
of the foreign vessel, and concluded that the picketing substantially
interfered and therefore fell outside of the protection of the
NLRA. 45
Windward Shipping minimizes the alleged purpose of the pick-
eting; it tests the Board's jurisdiction by weighing the impact of the
union's activity on foreign commerce. In Mobile Steamship, the
Court extended the Windward Shipping "effects test" to a secondary
dispute between two domestic organizations, because the dispute
initially arose as aresult of picketing of a foreign vessel and had an
ultimate, if somewhat tangential effect, on the internal operations of
the picketed foreign vessel.
The Benz-Windward Shipping-Mobile Steamship line of cases
does not exempt all American union activity against a foreign-flag
shipowner from the jurisdiction of the Act." The leading case
affirming Board jurisdiction over such activity, decided in 1974, is
Longshoremen's Local 1416 v. Ariadne Co. 47 There the Court held
that picketing of foreign vessels to protest the lower wages paid by
their respective owners to non-union American longshoremen was
"'in commerce' within the meaning of § 2(6), and thus might have
been subject to the regulatory power of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board."48
The purpose of the primary picketing in both Windward Ship-
ping and Mobile Steamship was to improve indirectly the jobs of
domestic workingmen. The Court might have found that the picket-
ing was at least . "arguably" within the jurisdiction of the Act.
However, by rejecting such an argument, the Court has apparently
limited the Ariadne case to situations where picketing at the foreign
vessel is aimed at gaining wage or organizational benefits directly
for American workingmen employed on the foreign vessel. Neither
Windward Shipping nor Mobile Steamship directly involved the
wage or organizational rights of domestic employees, and the Court
refused to expand the Ariadne doctrine in those cases.
Furthermore, while the Court in both cases emphasized the
adverse effect that the picketing would have on the foreign vessel
43 See 415 U.S. at 113-15.
44
 Id. at 106-07.
43
 Id. at 115.
46 Id. at 112.
47
 397 U.S. 195 (1970).
41I Id. at 200. See discussion at Windward Shipping, 415 U.S. at 112.
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and foreign trade, it deemphasized the possible adverse effects that
conflicting rules of substantive state law might have on the opera-
tions of the foreign ships or international trade. 49
 It is suggested
here that a finding by the NLRB that the secondary effects of the
unions' picketing violated section 8(b) (4) (B) 5 ° would not necessarily
interfere with international maritime trade. Such a finding would
merely result in a Board-ordered injunction against the picketing,
rather than a state court injunction. 51
 Nor would a Board finding
that the picketing did not violate section 8(b) (4) (B) seriously en-
danger the interests of the foreign vessel owners, because Windward
Shipping clearly permits foreign shipowners to seek an injunction in
the state courts. 52
 In short, Mobile Steamship, in circumscribing the
Board's jurisdiction over a secondary labor dispute, did not provide
the foreign vessel owners with any more protection from the adverse
effects of the union picketing than was already available under the
Windward Shipping decision. On the other hand, the Court in
Mobile Steamship has removed both legitimate and illegitimate sec-
ondary activity from the Board's jurisdiction, by using the jurisdic-
tional status of the primary activity to determine the jurisdictional
status of the secondary activity. Under the Mobile Steamship deci-
sion, the secondary dispute may be between domestic unions and
employers, but the Board is denied jurisdiction to protect the union
activity specifically exempted from the Act's proscription, simply
because the primary dispute does not meet the jurisdictional re-
quirements of the Act."
B. State Regulation of Supervisors' Concerted Activities: Beasley
Sections 2(3) and 2(11) of the NLRA, as amended in 1947,
exclude supervisors from the protective scope of the Act.' In addi-
49 See Windward Shipping, 415 U.S. at 109-15; Mobile Steamship, 419 U.S. at 222-28.
5°
 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1970).
51
 419 U.S. at 240-42 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart argued that since Wind-
ward Shipping fully protects that interests of the foreign shipowners in state courts, American
employers who enjoy the protection of § 8(b)(4)(B) should be "limited to securing injunctive
relief through the Board." Id. at 243.
52 415 U.S. at 115. Cf. Mobile Steamship, 419 U.S. at 243 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
53
 See 419 U.S. at 242-44 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
1
 Section 2(11), 29 U.S.C. 
. § 152(11) (1970) defines a "supervisor" as "any individual
having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct
them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action . , ." Section
2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) excludes "supervisors" from the class of employees afforded organiza-
tional rights elsewhere in the Act. Section 14(a), 29 U.S.C. § 164(a), disclaims any prohibition
of supervisors' organizational activities, but provides that "no employer subject to this
subchapter shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors as employees
for the purpose of any law, either national or local; relating to collective bargaining,"
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tion, section 14(a) provides in part that "no employer subject to this
subchapter shall be compelled to deem . . . supervisors as employees
for the purpose of any law, either national or local, relating to
collective bargaining." 2 Whether the limited language of section
14(a) or the statutory scheme of the NLRA as a whole preempts
state attempts to guarantee organizational rights to supervisors was
an unanswered question until the Supreme Court's Survey year
decision, Beasley v. Food Fair of North Carolina, Inc. 3
The petitioners in Beasley were meat department supervisors
who were discharged for their union activities. 4 The Board dis-
missed unfair labor practice complaints filed by the discharged meat
managers on the grounds that, as supervisors, the petitioners were
without federally protected organizational rights. 5 The supervisors
then filed suit in state court seeking damages under the North
Carolina right to work law which prohibits the discharge of any
"person" for membership in a labor organization. 6
In deciding for the employer, the North Carolina Supreme
Court reasoned that federal law preempted state regulation of
employers' labor relations with supervisors where the regulation
frustrated policies established by the NLRA. 7 While organizational
activities by supervisors were neither protected nor prohibited by
federal law, preemption would operate in an area of labor relations
where the NLRA fairly indicated that Congress had "occupied this
field and closed it to state regulation." The state court concluded
that the 1947 amendments to the NLRA evidenced a "congressional
determination to leave [the] weapon of self-help to the employer." 9
Under preemption principles, then, state laws which penalized
employer discrimination against unionized supervisors frustrated
the purposes of federal labor law and were unenforceable." )
The United States Supreme Court agreed that the legislative
history of the 1947 amendments indicated a congressional intent to
relieve employers of any obligation to recognize or to bargain with
2 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1970).
3 416 U.S. 653 (1974).
4 Id. at 655.
5 Id. at 655-56.
6 Beasley v. Food Fiiir of N.C., Inc., 282 N.C. 530, 531, 193 S.E.2d 911 (1973). N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 95-81 (1965) provides that "no person shall be required by an employer to abstain
or refrain from membership in any labor union or labor organization as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-83 (1965) provides that a
person "deprived of continuation of his employment" in violation of § 95-81 may recover
damages from his employer.
7 282 N.C. at 541, 193 S.E.2d at 918.
Id. at 540, 193 S.E.2d at 917, quoting UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 457 (1950).
9 282 N.C. at 541, 193 S.E.2d at 918.
iv Id. at 541-42, 193 S.E.2d at 918.
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unions composed of supervisors." However, the Court did not
adopt the North Carolina court's reasoning 12
 that preemption was
required by the NLRA's evident monopolization of the regulation of
employers' duties toward supervisors. Instead, the Court held that
the limited language of section 14(a), 13 which appears to preempt
local law only with respect to an employer's duty to bargain collec-
tively with supervisors, was to be read broadly so as to shield
employers from any duty to employ or to deal with supervisors
belonging to labor organizations. 14
 Thus, federal preemption was
based on the explicit language of section 14(a) rather than on a
finding of congressional intent drawn from the statute as a whole."
After Beasley, states may not regulate employers' labor rela-
tions with supervisors in a manner inconsistent with the NLRA's
policy of denying organizational protection to supervisors. States
evidently remain free, however, to regulate supervisors' concerted
activities provided the state regulation does not run afoul of the
NLRA's policy of shielding employers from any duty to recognize or
bargain with unionized supervisors. 16
C. Affirmation of Court Jurisdiction over Contractual Unfair
Labor Practices: Arnold Co. v. Carpenters
In William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters District Council,' a
unanimous Supreme Court held that preemption principles do not
oust state courts of jurisdiction to enjoin a union's violation of a
collective bargaining agreement prohibiting jurisdictional strikes,
even though the contractual dispute over work assignments is also
arguably an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(4)(i)(D) 2
 of the
" 416 U.S. at 659-60. See H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1947); S.
Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1947).
12
 282 N.C. at 541-42, 193 S.E.2d at 918.
12
 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1970). See text at note 2 supra.
14
 416 U.S. at 662.
15
 Compare id. with Beasley, 282 N.C. at 541-42, 193 S.E.2d at 918.
14
 See 416 U.S. at 662. See also Hanna Mining Co. v. Marine Engineers District 2, 382
U.S. 181 (1965). In Hanna, the Court held that Congress, in enacting § 14(a)'s provision that
"Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from becoming or
remaining a member of a labor organization . .," did not intend to prohibit state regulation
of supervisory organization. Rather, the section was intended to make it clear that the NLRA
did not bar supervisors' union activities. Id. at 189-90.
417 U.S. 12 (1974).
2
 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)(D) (1970) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents to strike or induce a strike
forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a
particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class rather than to
employees in another labor organization or in another trade, craft, or class, unless
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National Labor Relations Act. 3 The Court rejected a union conten-
tion that state court jurisdiction should be limited to claims for
damages, 4 and held that effective equitable relief in enforcing collec-
tive bargaining agreements should be available in state as well as
in federal courts.'
Arnold involved a jurisdictional (work assignment) dispute at a
Florida hospital construction site. The Carpenters Union struck the
Arnold Company when one of Arnold's subcontractors assigned
work claimed by the Carpenters to a rival union.' The Company
brought suit in a Florida state court to enjoin the strike and to
require the union to submit to contractually agreed-upon arbitration.'
The Florida Supreme Court held that while state courts ordinarily
have jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining agreements, the
NLRA preempts their jurisdiction with respect to contractual dis-
putes which also arguably constitute unfair labor practices.'
In Arnold, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its
position that the doctrine of preemption is "not relevant" 9 to actions
within the purview of section 301 of the Act." The Court therefore
held that the Board does not have exclusive jurisdiction over a
section 8(b)(4)(i)(D) dispute where the union's actions allegedly
violate the collective bargaining agreement." Thus, the fact that the
contractual dispute also arguably constituted an unfair labor prac-
tice does not destroy the jurisdiction of the state court to resolve the
dispute.' 2 The Coiirt in Arnold also emphasized that application of
the doctrine of preemption is particularly inappropriate where the
parties have agreed to submit to arbitration." In such a case, the
Board's policy under the Collyer doctrine is to refrain from exercis-
ing jurisdiction over disputed conduct which is "arguably" both an
unfair labor practice and a contractual violation to be resolved
such employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of the Board
determining the bargaining representative for employees performing such work ... .
Id.
5 417 U.S. at 20.
4 Id. at 18.
5 Id. at 20.
6
 Id. at 14-15.
7
 Id. at 14.
Carpenters District Council v. Waybright, 279 So.2d 300, 302, 83 L.R.R.M. 2033-34
(1973). The doctrine of preemption established in San Diego Bldg. & Trades Council v.
Garman, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), holds that suits involving activities which are either "arguably"
protected or "arguably",prohibited by the NLRA come within the primary and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Board. Id. at 245.
9
 417 U.S. at 16, citing Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 101 n.9
(1962).
" Section 301 is found at 29 U.S.C.	 185(a) (1970).
II 417 U.S. at 16.
12
 See id.
13 See id. at 16-17.
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through arbitration." The Court noted further that the Board's
deferral policy is reinforced in 8(b)(4)(i)(D) jurisdictional disputes
by the explicit congressional policy, set out in section 10(k) of the
Act, 15 of encouraging voluntary settlement of work assignment dis-
putes.' 6
The Court in Arnold does not appear to have limited its ap-
proval of the Board's Collyer doctrine to 8(b)(4)(i)(D) disputes.
Rather, the Court noted that:
[t]he Board's practice and policy of declining to exercise its
concurrent jurisdiction over arguably unfair labor practices
which also violate provisions of collective-bargaining
agreements for voluntary adjustment of disputes, highlight
the congressional purpose that § 301 suits in state and federal
courts should be the primary means for "promoting collective
bargaining that [ends] with agreements not to strike."t 7
As such, Arnold may be read as a specific endorsement of the
Board's prearbitral Collyer doctrine and as an implicit endorsement
of its postarbitral Spielberg" doctrine.
II.
II. ELECTIONS & ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES
A. Organizational Rights—Managerial Employees: Bell Aerospace
The NLRA specifically excludes "supervisors" from its protec-
tions.' Until the Survey year, however, it was unclear whether the
Act also implicitly excluded all other persons in the managerial
hierarchy. In NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 2 a decision with far-
reaching implications, the Supreme Court held that Congress in
1947 intended that the Act exclude not only "supervisors" but all
"managerial" personnel. 3 While the Board must yet determine, on a
14 Id. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 842-43, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931-1937
(1971).
15
 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1970).
16 417 U.S. at 17-18.
12 Id. at 18, quoting Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 453 (1957).
18 Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955).
In Electronic Reproduction Serv, Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 110, 87 L.R.R.M. 1211
(1974), the Board read Arnold as a "specific endorsement" of the Collyer doctrine and argued
that the Arnold decision should be read broadly as an affirmation of the Board's deferral
policies whenever the parties have provided a mandatory contractual settlement procedure for
handling disputes which involve both contractual and statutory issues, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1217.
For a further discussion of Electronic Reproduction see pp. 1041-46 infra.
29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 152(11), 164(a) (1970). See note 1 at p. 973 supra,
2 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
3 Id. at 289.
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case-by-case basis, which classes of employees are "managerial," it
seems clear the Bell Aerospace will result in the exclusion of numer-
ous white-collar workers from the Act's organizational and represen-
tational protections: 5
The events leading up to the Court's decision in Bell Aerospace
are as follows. The United Auto Workers, seeking to represent 25
buyers in Bell Aerospace's purchasing and procurement department,
petitioned the Board for an election. 6 The company opposed the
petition on the ground that the buyers, who execute purchase orders
up to $50,000, 7
 were managerial employees and therefore excluded
from the NLRA's coverage by the 1947 amendments. 8 The Board,
without deciding whether the buyers were managerial employees, 9
rejected the company's contention that the Act's exclusion of
"supervisors"" should be read to divest nonsupervisory managerial
employees of organizational rights." The Board instead perceived a
congressional intent to exclude only those employees whose mem-
bership in a labor organization would create a conflict of interest
with respect to "the formulation and implementation of labor rela-
tions policies." 2
 Finding no such conflict of interest among Bell
Aerospace's buyers," the Board ordered the company to bargain."
The Board's decision was rejected by the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals which held that Congress intended to exclude the entire
See id. at 294-95.
5
 "[T]he managerial class [will] reach not only vertically, but laterally, to deny 'hundreds
of thousands' .
	 . of buyers and other relatively low-level management employees the
organizational benefits and other protections of the Act . .
	 ." Id. at 307 n.3 (White, J.,
dissenting), quoting Bell Aerospace Co. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485, 496, 82 L.R.R.M. 2753,
2761 (2d Cir. 1973).
6
 416 U.S. at 269.
' Id. at 270.
8
 Id. at 269.
9
 Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc., 190 N,L,R.B. 431, 432, 77 L.R.R.M. 1265,
1266 (1971).	 •
I° See 29 U.S.C. $* 152(3), 152(11), 164(a) (1970).
II 190 N.L.R.B. at 432, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1266.
12
 Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 827, 828, 80 L.R.R.M.
1099, 1100 (1972), denying reconsideration of 190 N.L.R. B. 431, 77 L.R.R.M. 1265 (1971).
The employer also contended that the buyers were subject to a conflict of interest in that their
union membership would induce purchase decisions in favor of unionized vendors. The Board
rejected this argument as "unsupported conjecture." 190 N.L.R.B. at 432, 77 L.R.R.M. at
1266.
According to the Board, the "fundamental touchstone" was "whether the duties and
responsibilities of any managerial employee or group of managerial employees do or do not
include determinations which should be made free of any conflict of interest which could arise
if the person involved was a participating member of a labor organization." 196 N.L.R.B. at
828, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1101.
13
 190 N.L.R.B. at 432, 77 L.R.R.M, at 1266.
14
 Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 209, 212, 80 L.R.R.M.
1360, 1361 (1972).
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class of managerial employees from the Act's protections." Accord-
ing to the court, not only supervisors but all those who are "for-
mulating, determining and effectuating [an] employer's policies or
[have] discretion, independent of an employer's established policy,
in the performance of [their] duties" are denied the NLRA's protec-
tions.' 6
The Supreme Court majority's affirmance of the Second Circuit
in Bell Aerospace was based almost entirely on a confused exercise
in statutory interpretation of the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments.
The majority's premise was that Congress did not intend the 1947
amendments to limit the Act's exclusion to the explicitly specified
class of supervisors., 17 Instead, as the Conference Report on the 1947
amendments noted, Congress regarded as already excluded "persons
working in labor relations, personnel and employment departments"
as well as "confidential employees."' From this, the Court in Bell
Aerospace reasoned that "there also were other employees, much
higher in the managerial structure, who [Congress] likewise re-
garded as so clearly outside the Act that no specific exclusionary
provision was thought necessary."S 9 Since the House Report referred
to "executives" as impliedly excluded, 20 the Court reasoned that
"the inference is plain that 'managerial employees' were paramount
among this impliedly excluded group. /)21
While such an inference may possibly be drawn from the House
Report, it is suggested that there is no credible evidence that
Congress addressed itself to the problem of managerial employees'
rights. First, it is difficult to see how the Report's reference to
"executives" can be translated into a sweeping exclusion of all
managerial employees. Certainly, not all managerial employees are
executives. Rather, it appears more logical that executives were
regarded as excluded because they were " 'super' supervisors." 22
Alternatively, executives might have been excluded because their
ability to make independent judgments affecting employees' condi-
tions of employment could be compromised by membership in a
15
 Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485, 494, 82
L.R.R.M. 2753, 2759-60 (2d Cir. 1973).
16 Id., quoting Illinois State Journal-Register, Inc. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 37, 41, 71
L.R.R.M. 2668, 2670 (7th Cir. 1969).
12 416 U.S. at 283.
15 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1947).
19 416 U.S. at 283.
20 H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1947). "Most of the people who would
qualify as 'confidential' employees are executives and are excluded from the act in any event."
Id.
2 ' 416 U.S. at 283-84.
22 Id. at 307 n.3 (White, J., dissenting).
979
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
labor organization. 23 Such an interpretation of the House Report's
reference to "executives" is consistent with the committee reports
which, taken as a whole, reveal that the evil to which Congress was
addressing itself was the threat to employers' retention of "faithful
agents" in labor relations."
Second, the Court's interpretation that all managerial personnel
should be excluded - is questionable in light of the amendments'
inclusion within the Act of time-study personne1 25 whose duties as
efficiency experts would appear to warrant their classification as
managerial employees. Moreover, the Taft-Hartley Act's provision
for separate bargaining units for professional employees 26 supports
the inference that Congress contemplated that at least some of the
professionals would be managerial.
Furthermore, there are no pre-1947 Board decisions construing
the Act as either protecting managerial employees or excluding them
from its guarantees. 27
 Therefore, it cannot be inferred that Congress
23 See Bell Aerospace, 196 N.L.R.B. at 828, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1101.
24
 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1947). The Committee stated
that the purpose of the legislation was to assure management of "faithful agents" who are "not
subject to influence or control of unions, not only to assign people to their work, to see that
they keep at their work and do it well, to correct them when they are at fault, and to settle
their complaints and grievances, but to determine how much work employees should do, what
pay they should receive for it, and to carry on the whole of labor relations." Id.
"[The amendment excludes] the supervisor vested with such genuine management pre-
rogatives as the right to hire or fire, discipline, or make effective recommendations with
respect to such action." S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947).
"It should be noted that.all that the bill does is to leave foremen in the same position in
which they were until the Labor Board reversed the position it had originally taken in 1943 in
the Maryland Drydock case (49 N.L.R.B. 733)." Id. at 5. For a discussion of Maryland
Drydock, see n.27 infra.
25
 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1947) (time study personnel were
to be dealt with as "professional" employees under § 9(b)(1)). See Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at
305 (White, J., dissenting).
26 29 U.S.C. 159(b)(1) (1970).
27
 In the 1940's, the Board routinely excluded managerial employees, such as buyers,
from bargaining units containing rank-and-file workers. E.g., Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B.
1317, 1322, 17 L.R.R.M. 394, 395 (1946). However, apparently because the issue was not
raised, the Board never held before 1947 that managerial employees were without bargaining
and organizational rights under the Wagner Act. See 416 U.S. at 300 (White, J., dissenting).
Rather, the likely reason for the exclusion of managerial employees from the bargaining units
was a lack of community of interest among rank-and-file workers and managerial personnel.
See Hudson Motor Car Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 509, 512 (1944). See also North Ark. Elec. Coop.,
Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 550, 75 L.R.R.M. 1068, 1069 (1970).
With respect to supervisors, however, the Board held in Maryland Drydock Co., 49
N.L.R.B. 733, 12 L.R.R.M. 126 (1943), that foremen, though literally "employees" within the
meaning of the Act, were ineligible for representation in any unit, whether made up exclu-
sively of supervisors or not. iId. at 738, 12 L.R.R.M. at 127. Two years later, in Packard
Motor Car Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 4, 16 L.R.R.M. 43 (1945), the Board reversed its prior policy
holding that an independent unit of foremen was appropriate under the NLRA. Id. at 21, 16
L.R.R.M. at 48. The Supreme Court's affirmance of that Board ruling in Packard Motor Car
Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 493 (1947), was a primary reason for Congress' exclusion of
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in 1947 was tacitly reacting to a putative misreading by the Board of
the Wagner Act's application to managerial employees; there is no
such misreading on record. Logically, the absence of relevant Board
decisions and the congressional silence should lead to the conclusion
that Congress did not address itself to the problems of managerial
personnel.
However, 'the Court in Bell Aerospace" found in the congres-
sional silence a tacit ratification of Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent in
Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB. 29 According to the Court, the
Douglas dissent interpreted the Wagner Act" as excluding all
employees in the "managerial hierarchy." 3 ' And, the Court noted,
"Congress failed to enact the portion of Mr. Justice Douglas' Pac-
kard dissent relating to the organization of executives, not because it
disagreed but because it deemed this unnecessary." 32 However, the
dissenting opinion in Packard, read in its entirety, reveals that
Justice Douglas believed that the NLRA excluded only those man-
agerial employees who "represent or act for management on labor
policy matters."33 Thus, if Congress implicitly "enacted" the Doug-
las opinion, as the Bell Aerospace Court suggested, it excluded from
the Act only supervisors and other managerial employees who loy-
alty to their employer as labor relations representatives would be
jeopardized by their membership in a labor organization. In short,
the Douglas dissent, said to have been adopted by Congress, in-
volved the same conflict of interest test later applied by the Board in
Bell Aerospace. 34
It is submitted that the Court's review of the legislative history
of the 1947 amendments does not support its finding of a congres-
sional purpose to divest all managerial employees of organizational
rights." Given the paucity of congressional references in 1947 to
"supervisors" from the NLRA's protections. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 279. See 29 U.S.C.
§1 152(3), 15201), 164(a) (1970).
28 416 U.S. at 278.
29 330 U.S. 485, 493-501 (1947) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
38 49 Stat. 449.
31 416 U.S. at 281,
32 Id. at 284, quoting Bell Aerospace, 475 F.2d at 492, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2758.
33 330 U.S. at 500 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
34 190 N.L.R.B. at 432, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1266-67. See also North Ark. Elec. Coop., Inc.,
185 N.L.R.B. 550, 550-51, 75 L.R.R.M. 1068, 1068-69 (1970).
35
 In addition, the Court found significance in the Board's 1956 holding in Swift & Co.,
115 N.L.R.B. 752, 753-54, 37 L.R.R.M, 1391, 1392 (1956), that Congress in 1947 had
intended to exclude managerial employees. "And it was this reading which was permitted to
stand when Congress again amended the Act in 1959." 416 U.S. at 288, However, as the
dissent in Bell Aerospace noted, "What the Board now refuses to follow its prior precedents is
no reason to overturn it, for we have frequently sustained Board decisions overruling its prior
interpretations of the Act." Id. at 310 (White, J., dissenting). Furthermore, in the absence of
evidence that Congress addressed itself to the problem of managerial employees, it is too
much to read into the 1959 amendments a tacit ratification of Swift, Id,
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managerial employees, the virtually exclusive concern of the com-
mittee reports with supervisors and other labor relations personnel,
and the amendments' specific reference only to "supervisors," the
Court's reliance on highly arguable inferences drawn sporadically
from the legislative history seems erroneous. In the absence of clear
evidence of a legislative intent to exclude managerial employees
from the Act's coverage, the Bell Aerospace Court has usurped the
congressional function of reconciling the economic and political
interests of employers, employees and unions. If only to insure that
the Court's "legislating" has struck the balance correctly, congres-
sional consideration of Bell Aerospace's result seems desirable.
In the afteri-nath of the Court's decision in Bell Aerospace it
remains for the Board to develop the new managerial exclusion on a
case-by-case basis. 36 It seems clear that the Board will be compelled
to alter its conflict of interest test to include managerial employees
not performing labor relations functions. In this regard, the Board's
criteria in the 1940's and 1950's for determining which employees
were managerial and therefore to be excluded from rank-and-file
units were cited approvingly by the Supreme Court in Bell Aero-
space." For example, in Eastern Camera & Photo Corp. 38 the Board
defined managerial employees as those who exercise "independent
judgment" and who "formulate, determine, and effectuate an
Employer's policies." 39 Moreover, managerial status depended on
the "extent of his discretion, although even the authority to exercise
considerable discretion does not render an employee managerial
where his decision must conform to the employer's established pol-
icy."" Thus, the Court evidently intends that the Board in the
future should exclude as "managerial" those employees whose jobs
entail independence in the creation or application of the employer's
policies.
B. "Savair" Developments—Waiver of Union Dues:
Inland Shoe; Coleman Co.; Scrivner-Boogaart
In NLRB v. Savair Manufacturing Co.,' the Supreme Court
reversed a Board decision which had permitted a union to waive the
36 See 416 U.S,. at 289-95. The Court remanded the case for the Board to determine in an
adjudicatory proceeding whether Bell Aerospace's buyers were "managerial." Id. at 289-90. In
so doing, the Court acknowledged that the contours of the managerial standard should be
developed on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 294.
37 Id. at 290 n.19.
38
 140 N.L.R.B. 569, 52 L.R.R.M. 1068 (1963).
39 Id. at 571, 52 L:R.R.M. at 1069.
49 Id.
414 U.S. 270 (1973). Savair is surveyed and criticized in 1973-74 Annual Survey of
Labor Relations Law, 15 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1105, 1114-17 (1974).
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initiation fees of those employees who had signed union recognition
cards prior to the election, on the ground that such an offer was
contrary to the principle of free and fair elections 2 as embodied in
the NLRA. 3 The Court in Savair reasoned that the terms of such an
offer created an election atmosphere which would undermine the
section 74 rights of employees to refrain from union activity, by
inducing the employees to join the union before the election in
order to gain the financial benefits of the waiver. 5 The Court also
noted that the Board policy sanctioning pre-election waivers in-
creased the possibilities of election unfairness because it allowed the
union to buy election endorsements which misrepresent employee
support during the campaign. 6 The Court further reasoned that the
Board's policy undermined the employees' free choice by creating an
atmosphere in which employees might feel obligated to vote for the
union, though not legally bound to do so, simply because they had
signed a union recognition card in order to receive the benefits of the
union's offer. 7
During the Survey year, the Board refined the 1973 Savair
decision by providing guidelines for situations where the terms of
the offer were ambiguous as to when the offer would lapse—before
or after the election—but the union had attempted to clarify the
ambiguity during its organizational activities. In Serivner-Boogaart,
Inc., 8 the Board interpreted Savair to permit union offers to waive
initiation fees when the offer itself or the circumstances surrounding
the offer unambiguously demonstrate to employees that it does not
lapse until after the election. 9
In Inland Shoe Manufacturing Co., 1 ° the Board held that a
union leaflet offering to waive initiation fees for "charter members"
without further defining what constituted charter membership, vio-
lated the Savair rule because the offer was ambiguous as to
whether it lapsed before or after the election." In setting aside the
election in Inland Shoe, the Board concluded that the offer could be
interpreted by employees as requiring them to recognize or to join
the union prior to the election in order to become charter members
and to receive the benefits of the initiation fee waiver. 12 In order to
2 414 U.S. at 276-81.
3 See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1970).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
5 414 U.S. at 276-81.
6 Id. at 277.
7 Id. at 277-78.
s 214 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 87 L.R.R.M. 1291 (1974).
9
 87 L.R.R.M. at 1291-92, 1293.
is 211 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 86 L.R.R.M. 1498 (1974).
86 L.R.R.M. at 1499-1500.
is Id. at 1500.
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determine whether the union had clarified its ambiguous offer, the
Board examined statements made by union organizers prior to the
election that "all employees working at the time of the election
would be 'charter members.' " 13 The Board found that (1) these
statements were not presented in such a manner as to insure that
they would reach all employees before the election;" and (2) the
statements themselves were equivocal as to the exact duration of the
offer, and thus, an employee could be mislead." Therefore, the
Board set aside the election."
In short, the Inland Shoe doctrine provides that a union offer
to waive fees must explicitly extend beyond the election date or be
shown to have been so understood by employees as a result of union
organizational activity. Inland Shoe is important because it dem-
onstrates that while the Board will look to extrinsic evidence in
determining the proper interpretation to be given an ambiguous
union offer to waive initiation fees, the Board will require the union
to clarify unequivocally the ambiguity.
In a subsequent decision, Coleman Co.," the Board split over
the proper interpretation of a union offer to waive initiation fees
that was almost identical to that made in Inland Shoe. Coleman
involved an offer by the union "to waive initiation fees for
employees who made application for charter membership." 1 ° A
three member majority of the Board set aside the election citing
Savair and Inland Shoe as controlling. 19 The majority held that
where the union's offer is unclear on its face as to whether it
conforms to the Savair rule, the burden is upon the union to "clarify
that ambiguity or suffer whatever consequences might attach to
employees' possible interpretations of the ambiguity." 2 ° The major-
ity noted that the waiver offer in Coleman did not specify the
deadline for applying for charter membership. 21
Dissenting Members Fanning and Jenkins argued that the
union's offer to waive initiation fees for charter members could not
be interpreted as an!inducement to make employees join the union
before the election because the offer explicitly stated that employees
would not have to pay dues until a contract had been signed. 22 The
13
 Id. at 1499.
' 4 See id. at 1500.
" Id.
1°
 Id.
Fr
 212 N.L.R.B. No. 129, 87 L.R.R.M. 1004 (1974).
21
 87 L,R.R.M. at 1004.
19
 Id. at 1005.
2°
 Id., quoting Inland Shoe, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1500.
21
 87 L.R.R.M. at 1005.
U Id. at 1006 (dissenting opinion).
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dissenters concluded that the term "charter membership" was used
merely to indicate that there would be a cutoff date for the initial
offer. 23 Despite the equivocal nature of the union's offer, the dissen-
ters in Coleman appear to have been willing to infer that the
deadline for the union's offer extended beyond the election to the
time when the local was to be formed. 24 It is submitted that the
dissenters would undercut the Savair decision, by creating a rule of
construction which would interpret an ambiguity upon the face of
the offer so that the offer would automatically extend beyond the
election, to conform to Savair. Although the dissent is superficially
appealing, it does not address the fair election considerations which
underlie Savair. The dissenters made extension of the financial
benefits of the waiver, rather than a free and fair election, the
critical factor in resolving waiver of initiation fee cases. 25 It is
suggested that the majority correctly focused upon the question of
whether the union's offer prejudiced a fair election or violated
employees' section 7 rights.
In Scrivner-Boogaart, Inc., 26 the third important Survey year
decision implementing Savair, the full Board examined the question
of whether an oral offer to waive initiation fees occurring prior to an
election27 is grounds for a valid objection to the election. The
Board explicitly created a narrow exception to its Ideal Electric 28
doctrine, which provides that the date of filing the election petition
is the cutoff date for considering pre-election conduct that is alleged
to have interfered with free choice in an election. 29
In Scrivner-Boogaart, the Board held that "a prepetition offer
to waive initiation fees in contravention of Savair . . . is ground for
setting aside an election." 3 ° The Board found:
Since a union must have authorization cards from at
least 30 percent of the employees in the bargaining unit
prior to the filing of the petition, most . solicitations to sign
authorization cards occur prior to the filing of the petition.
Therefore, it would severely circumscribe the doctrine of
23 Id.
24 See id. at 1006. The majority . in Coleman stated that "even assuming that the
requirement of an application for charter membership is susceptible of [the dissent's inter-
pretation] that is not the only construction permissible" from the union's offer. Id. at 1005.
23 See id. at 1006 (dissenting opinion).
26 214 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 87 L.R.R.M. 1291 (1974).
27 87 L.R.R.M. at 1292.
23 Ideal•Elec. & Mfg. Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 1275, 49 L.R.R.M. 1316 (1961). In Scrivner-
Boogaart, the Board noted that the "unique circumstances connected with the prepetition
waivers" and the Supreme Court's holding in Savair necessitated the creation of a limited
exception to its Ideal Electric doctrine. 87 L.R.R.M. at 1293 n.3.
" 134 N.L.R.B. at 1278, 49 L.R.R.M. at 1317.
36 87 L.R.R.M. at 1292.
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Savair to limit [its] application to postpetition waiver of
initiation fees. 31
The Board's finding conformed to Savair, because the Supreme
Court in that case had considered the fact that numerous employees
had signed cards prior to the filing of the election petition. 32
In Scrivner-Boogaart, the Board heard employee testimony that
a union representative had stated, at a meeting prior to the filing of
an election petition, that initiation fees would be waived if
employees signed authorization cards before the election. The union
won the election and the employer raised Savair precertification
objections to the election, alleging that the union official had in-
duced the employees to sign authorization cards prior to the election
in order , to have their initiation fees waived. 33 In dismissing the
employer's objections, the Board noted that it considered a prepeti-
tion offer to waive initiation fees, condemned in Savair, as grounds
for setting aside an election. 34 However, the testimonial and
documentary evidence supported the union's contention that the
waiver offer was not conditioned on pre-election signing of authori-
zation cards." The Board stressed the fact that the testimony favor-
ing the union was supported by documentary evidence that it was
the international union's past practice to waive initiation fees for
everyone who was' employed at the time the initial contract was
signed regardless of whether they had signed an authorization card
or not. The actual wording of the initiation fee waiver certificate
corroborated this fact. 36
Scrivner-Boogaart is important because (1) it makes prepetition
Savair violations grounds for setting aside an election and (2) it
demonstrates that the Board will heavily weigh documented evi-
dence of a union's past practices with regard to initiation fee waiv-
ers in interpreting whether the waiver offer violates Savair. In
conclusion, these Stirvey decisions demonstrate that a majority of the
Board has in good faith undertaken to implement fully the Supreme
Court's Savair policy.
C. Denial of Union Certification for Racial Discrimination:
Bekins; Bell & Howell; Grants Furniture
In Bekins Moving & Storage Co.,' three members of the Board
found that the NLRB is constitutionally required to make a precer-
Id. (footnotes omitted),
32 See 414 U.S. at 277.
33 See 87 L.R.R.M. at 1292.
34
 Id.
Id. at 1293.
36
 Id.
211 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 86 L.R,R.M. 1323 (1974).
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tification examination into employer allegations that a labor organi-
zation discriminates in its recruitment and admissions policies. 2
Chairman Miller and Member Jenkins, supported by Member Ken-
nedy in a concurring opinion, held that the Board would grant a
precertification hearing on the employer's pre-election discrimination
charges if the union subsequently wins the election and the employer
has presented his objections to the Board within five days of the
issuance of the election tally. 3 However, due to the absence of a
majority opinion, the Bekins decision only provides a tentative
framework for future Board decisions in the area of post election
precertification inquiry into employer allegations of union discrimi-
nation.
In Bekins, Chairman Miller and Member Jenkins held that as
an arm of the federal government, the Board could not confer the
benefits of certification upon a labor organization which is guilty of
discrimination, without violating the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. 4 In this respect their decision follows the
rationale of NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management Co., 5 in
which the Eighth Circuit in 1973 held that the Board, as an instru-
mentality of the federal government, was prohibited by the Con-
stitution from directly or indirectly sanctioning discriminational
2 86 L.R.R.M. at 1325 (Chairman Miller and Member Jenkins). Id. at 1330 (Member
Kennedy concurring).
3 86 L.R.R.M. at 1328, Id. at 1330 (Member Kennedy concurring). It is important to
note that objections to Board conducted elections under § 9(c) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(c) (1970) must be made within five days after the tally of ballots has been furnished to the
party objecting to the election or conduct affecting the election, In F.W. Woolworth Co., 214
N,L,R,B. No. 99, 87 L.R.R.M. 1545 (1974), a unanimous Board held that an employer
cannot unilaterally extend the five-day period by arbitrarily refusing to sign or accept the tally
of ballots at the conclusion of the election, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1545. Woolworth overrules the
Board's decision in Jacksonville Journal Co., 117 N,L.R.I3. 360, 39 L.R.R.M. 1229 (1957),
See 87 L.R.R.M. at 1545. Jacksonville Journal had provided that the five-day time period
commenced with actual receipt of the tally results by the objecting party regardless of whether
an agent of that party had refused tender or not. See 117 N.L.R.B. at 361-62, 39 L.R. R.M. at
1230.
According to the new Woolworth rule, when an attempt has been made to tender the tally
results to a party, or his representative, and the party refuses to accept the tally, the Board
will deem the party to have been constructively served with the tally. 87 L.R.R.M. at 1545.
The effect is that the "time for filing objections would therefore begin to run immediately
upon such constructive service." Id. The Board concluded that the five-day period would run
"irrespective of whether the party was later furnished with a tally through the mails or other
means." Id. The rule does not apply where the tally is served to an election observer. The
Board noted that it does not consider an election observer a given party's agent for the
purpose of serving a tally. Id.
86 L.R.R.M. at 1325.
5 473 F.2d 471, 82 L.R.R.M. 2608 (8th Cir. 1973),
6 Id. at 477, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2613. In Mansion House, the employer contended that the
NLRB could not issue a bargaining order because the union practiced racial discrimination.
Id. at 474-75, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2611. The Board issued the order and the Eighth Circuit
reversed. The court established the following rules: (1) an employer's claim that the union
practices racial discrimination is an appropriate, affirmative defense to an employer's refusal
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Although Members Miller and Jenkins did not decide "what
degree or form of invidious discrimination would be sufficient to
warrant disqualification of a union from receiving or retaining cer-
tification," they argued that the Board could not "constitutionally
certify a union which is shown to have a propensity to fail fairly to
represent employees. "8 The propensity test proposed by Miller and
Jenkins has its basis in their conclusion that the union's duty of fair
representation is rooted in the Constitution as well as the NLRA. 9
They found that the constitutional mandate of the Fifth Amendment
compels the Board (1) to investigate allegations that the union
practices discrimination in its recruitment or admissions policies,
and (2) to evaluate the union's ability to fairly represent all the
employees in the unit. 1 °
In a concurring opinion, Member Kennedy agreed with the
Chairman and Member Jenkins that the, Board is constitutionally
"foreclosed" from certifying a union shown to discriminate in its
recruitment or admissions practices." Nevertheless, he disagreed
with their conclusion that the duty of fair representation is grounded
in the Constitution. 12 1ather, he affirmed the traditional view that
the duty of fair representation is imposed upon the union by the
NLRA as a corollary to a union's exclusive bargaining status."
Member Kennedy reasoned that the Board should restrict the scope
of its precertification inquiries to those matters about which the
Board is constitutionally mandated to inquire." He would not "un-
dertake a precertification inquiry with respect to a potential breach
of a union's duty of fair representation,"" nor would he extend the
Board's definition of ,invidious discrimination beyond those clas-
to bargain; (2) a union cannot utilize the remedial machinery of the Taft-Hartley Act where it
is unwilling to correct its own past practices of racial discrimination; and (3) statistical
evidence of racial imbalance in a union is relevant in either corroborating or establishing that
a union is or has been engaged in racially discriminatory practices. Id. at 475-77, 82
L.R.R.M. at 2612-13. See, e.g., Williams Enterprises, Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. No. 132, 87
L.R.R.M. 1044 (1974).
7 86 L.R.R.M. at 1325 n.8.
/1
 Id. at 1326.
9 Id.
I° See id. at 1325-26.
" Id. at 1329 (Member Kennedy concurring).
12
 Id. at 1330.
13 Id. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953), in which the Court stated:
That the authority of bargaining representatives, however, is not absolute is
recognized in Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S, 192, 198-99, in connection
with comparable provisions of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. §§ I51(a)-152
(1970)1. Their statutory obligation to represent all members of an appropriate unit
requires them to make an honest effort to serve the interests of all those members,
without hostility to any.
Id. at 337. See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
' 4 86 L.R.R.M. at 1330 (Member Kennedy concurring).
15
 Id.
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sifications already declared inherently suspect by the United States
Supreme Court. 16
In effect, while Chairman Miller and Member Jenkins would
examine a union's ability to fairly represent all employees before
certification, Member Kennedy would only allow the Board to
examine specific allegations based on race, nationality or alienage. 17
In Bekins it appears that he would defer consideration of sex dis-
crimination and potential breaches of the duty of fair representation
until after certification, because neither inquiry is constitutionally
mandated. 18
Members Fanning and Penello dissented in Bekins on two
grounds. They argued, first, that the terms of the Taft-Hartley Act
prohibit the Board from withholding certification for reasons other
than election irregularities. Second, the Constitution does not re-
quire the Board to withhold certification from a union which prac-
tices invidious discrimination. 19
 In addition, the dissent asserted
that certification would further, rather than frustrate, the constitu-
tional policy of eliminating discrimination by imposing a statutory
duty upon the union to fairly represent all the employees in the
unit." Although the dissenters clearly did not condone discrimina-
tion, 21 they disagreed with the majority as to whether an employer
should be allowed to raise the issue of union discrimination during
the representational proceedings. 22 They contended that a precer-
tification inquiry circumvents the statutory provisions of section 10
of the NLRA, 23
 which allow employees to contest discriminatory
representational and membership policies of a certified union. 24 The
dissenters further suggested that the unfair labor practice provisions
of section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA provide procedures for an employer
to follow if he desires to be relieved of his obligation to bargain with
a union engaged in discriminatory practices. 25 They concluded that
16 See id. at 1331.
15 Id. at 1330.
See id. at 1330-31.
16 Id. at 1332-33 (Members Fanning and Penello dissenting).
20 Id. at 1332.
31 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 1334. Section 10 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1970), the enforcement section
of the Act, empowers the Board to prevent unfair labor practices. In a Survey year decision,
Glass Bottle Blowers Local 106, 210 N,L,R,B. No, 131, 86 L.R.R.M. 1257 (1974), the Board
found that a certified union violated section 8(b)(4)(A) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A)
(1970), when it segregated its members on the basis of sex. 86 L.R.R.M. at 1259. The Board
held that segregation of membership on the basis of sex effectively denied employees a voice in
the resolution of matters affecting working conditions. Denial of full participation in the
affairs of the union constituted a restraint on the exercise of the employees' § 7 rights under
the NLRA. Id. at 1258-59.
24 86 L.R.R.M. at 1334 (Members Fanning and Penello dissenting),
35 Id. at 1334-35. Members Fanning and Penello argued that the employer would not be
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"there is simply no justification for devising a procedure by which
employers opposed to dealing with their employees collectively can
delay and forestall the establishment of the collective bargaining
relationship. ”26
Both Members Fanning and Penello advocated that the Board
should consider an employer allegation of discrimination after cer-
tification. 27
 However, in a note, 28
 they argued that if one assumes,
arguendo, that the majority members' conclusion that "the Board
cannot issue a certification to a union that discriminates in its
membership and representational policies [was correct] . . the
question of the union's qualification to act as a representative should
be litigated before the direction of election" not after the offending
union wins the election as the majority would allow. 29
 Permitting an
election to take place, they reasoned, would be perceived as a Board
ruling that the union in question is qualified for certification and,
therefore, poses as government approval of the offending union's
discriminatory activity. 38
In Bekins the Board attempted to reconcile its congressionally
mandated duty to promote collective bargaining with its broader
responsibility as a federal government agency not to condone, en-
courage or sanction invidious discrimination. Given the important
role that certification plays in federal labor policy under the Act,
denial of certification should only be utilized as an extraordinary
procedure against an otherwise duly elected union. It is suggested
that in Bekins a majority of the Board has explicitly limited the use
of such an extraordinary procedure to situations where after precer-
tification inquiry it is constitutionally mandated 31 because the union
is found to discriminate on the basis of race, alienage or national
origin.
All three members of the Board who were willing to entertain
precertification challenges in the Bekins case predicated their deci-
sions upon constitutional grounds. 32 The permanence of the Bekins
framework will depend upon the correctness of the majority mem-
bers' finding that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
violating § (8)(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) which imposes a duty on the employer to bargain
with the union if the employer demonstrated that the union engaged in discriminatory
practices. Id.
26
 86 L.R.R.M. at 1335 (Members Fanning and Penello dissenting).
27 Id.
28
 Id. at 1335 n.50.
29 Id.
3° Id.
31
 Id. at 1325 (Chairman Miller and Member Jenkins). See id. at 1330 (Member Kennedy
concurring).
32
 See id. at 1325 (Chairman Miller and Member Jenkins). See id. at 1330 (Member
Kennedy concurring).
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requires the Board to deny certification to a union found to be
invidiously discriminating against employees in either its admissions
or recruitment policies.
The Board has been a reluctant tribunal in discrimination
cases;33 its self acknowledged inexperience in this area weighed
heavily in its decision in Bekins not to establish broad guidelines
concerning union discrimination. 34 In addition, Member Kennedy's
refusal to join Chairman Miller and Member Jenkin's conclusion
that the union's duty of fair representation is grounded in the
Constitution restricts Board precertification inquiries solely to
employer allegations of union discriminatory admissions and re-
cruitment practices. 35
In two subsequent Survey year decisions, the Board attempted
to further develop the Bekins framework. In the first case, Bell &
Howell Co., 36 the Board refused to entertain an employer's precer-
tification complaint of union sex discrimination. 37 Like Bekins, the
Bell & Howell decision did not contain a majority opinion. In Bell
& Howell, Members Fanning and Penello were joined by Member
Kennedy in denying a precertification hearing into sex discrimina-
tion allegations against the union." Member Kennedy, reaffirming
his reasoning in Bekins, wrote the pivotal opinion in Bell & Howell
stating that post-election precertification investigation of alleged
union sex discrimination is not constitutionally mandated. 39 He
argued that since the Supreme Court has not found sex, unlike race,
alienage or national origin, to be a suspect classification the Board
should "not view an allegation of unlawful sex discrimination in a
precertification proceeding. "4° In' addition, Member Kennedy
exhibited an unwillingness to convert representational cases into
Title VII lawsuits.'" He apparently rejected the use of employer-
submitted statistical data standing alone as prima facie proof of a
pattern or practice
 of discrimination. 42 Finally, Member Kennedy
33 See id. at 1327-28 (Chairman Miller and Member Jenkins).
34 Id. at 1326-27. Congress has recently expanded the jurisdiction of the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to include the initiation of pattern and practice suits.
42 U.S.C. 4 2000-e et seq. (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-261 (1972). See Member
Kennedy's discussion in Bekins, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1330 (Member Kennedy concurring), where
he admonished that the Board should not undertake the adjudication of discrimination cases
which come within the jurisdiction of other federal agencies unless constitutionally or statutor-
ily required to do so. Cf. id. at 1326 (Chairman Miller and Member Jenkins).
35 86 L.R.R.M. at 1331 (Member Kennedy concurring).
36 213 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 87 L.R.R.M. 1172 (1974).
37 87 L.R.R.M. at 1174 (1974).
3° Id.
39 Id. at 1174-75 (Member Kennedy concurring). See text accompanying note 17 supra.
4 ° 87 L.R.R.M. at 1174 (Member Kennedy concurring).
41 Id. at 1175 (Member Kennedy concurring). Title VII is codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e
et seq. (1970).
42 See id.
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argued that the present claim appeared to be an attempt to "litigate
the lawfulness of an alleged discriminatory hiring hall in a represen-
tational proceeding," which he could not sanction. 43
Member Kennedy's reluctance to convert representational pro-
ceedings into Title VII law suits appears justifiable in light of both
the Board's inexperience in discrimination cases and the extraordi-
nary nature of the decision to deny certification on grounds other
than election irregularity. However, his decision to exclude charges
of sex discrimination from precertification inquiry is questionable.
Although the Supreme Court has not labeled sex as a suspect clas-
sification," the harmful effects of discrimination based upon sex are
no less serious or invidious than other types of discrimination. A
union which is able to discriminate on the basis of sex denies to the
victims of discrimination the right to organize to vote and ultimately
to work within the protections of the NLRA. The issue of whether a
union should be certified is equivalent to whether union members
will be enfranchised. In terms of Board policy, the discouragement
of all union discrimination affecting employees' rights to form or
maintain an effective union appears to be mandated. 45 Therefore, it
is suggested that where an employer charges that a union discrimi-
nates on the basis of sex, the Board should entertain a precertifica-
tion inquiry. If it is subsequently shown that the discrimination does
in fact exist, the Board should refuse to certify the union, as it
would do if the union discriminated on the basis of race.
In a second important Survey year decision, Grants Furniture
Plaza, 46
 the Board 'clarified the quantum of evidence required in
order to deny certification under Bekins. 47 In Grants Furniture, the
Board certified the union despite employer allegations that the union
was engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination based upon
race, sex and national origin. 48 To substantiate its claim the
employer presented the Board with (1) statistical data demonstrating
that the percentage of the union's female and Spanish-surnamed
members was below the percentage of such persons in the popula-
tion of the metropolitan area in which the union was elected and (2)
proof that the United States Justice Department had issued a corn-
4i Id.
44
 Member Kennedy noted that in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), the Court
refused to find legislative classifications based upon sex as an invidiously suspect classifica-
tion. Bell & Howell, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1174-75 (Member Kennedy concurrring). For a discus-
sion of the Aeillo decision see pp. 1063-68 infra.
45
 See Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 272, 272-73, 82 L.R.R.M. 1482, 1484-85 (1973).
See also 1972-73 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1173,
1221-24 (1972).
46
 213 N.L.R.B. No. 80, 87 L.R.R.M. 1175 (1974).
47 87 L.R.R.M. at 1176.
48 Id.
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plaint "which alleged that the . . 	 [union's] international .
perpetuates prior discriminatory practices against blacks and
Spanish-surnamed Americans by requiring them to give up their
seniority for bidding and layoff purposes if they transfer from ser-
vice positions to a higher paying road position."49 Members Miller
and Jenkins found that the mere allegations of union wrongdoing
did not constitute adequate evidence to support precertification ob-
jections. 5 ° In order to persuade the Board to withhold certification,
the employer must present facts in the form of affirmative evidence,
not inferences based upon the complaint of a Federal agency. 51 In
addition, they admonished that the employer must provide prima
facie factual evidence to the regional director in order to have the
Board direct a hearing on the employer precertification complaint. 52
They defined prima facie factual evidence to be that "which would
be admissible into evidence at a hearing and subject to evaluation as
to its weight and probative force."53
Without commenting on the sex discrimination complaint
raised in Grants Furniture, Member Kennedy concurred with
Members Miller and Jenkins. 54 However, he implied that although
the employer's allegations based upon the Justice Department's
complaint would not meet the higher standard of proof required in
a precertification inquiry, the complaint would be "relevant" in a
duty of fair representation proceeding. 55
While Members Miller and Jenkins did not pass upon the
appropriate weight to be given to statistical data reflecting the racial
or ethnic composition of the union's membership in all precertifica-
tion cases, they found that the data presented in Grants Furniture
was inadequate under their prima facia factual evidence tests° It
appears that they will require the employer to present specific and
detailed factual allegations before the Board will entertain the com-
plaint. They suggested the following factors as important in estab-
lishing an employer's prima facie case: (1) the union controls or
substantially influences access to employment; and (2) the union
deliberately restricts access to the membership rolls." Grants Furni-
ture thus requires a higher standard of proof than is ordinarily
49
 Id.
50 Id .
51 Id .
s' Id.
53 Id .
54 Id. at 1177 (Member Kennedy concurring).
55 Id.
" Id. at 1176 (Chairman Miller and Member Jenkins).
57 Id. Member Kennedy agreed with these factors and added that he did not think that a
statistical imbalance, standing alone, could constitute prima facie evidence of unlawful
discrimination for certification purposes. Id. at 1177 (Member Kennedy concurring).
993
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
required in Title VII actions." However, this appears to be justifi-
able in light of the serious ramifications that denial of certification
portends under the NLRA.
Both Bell & Howell and Grants Furniture demonstrate that the
Board is going to require a relatively high degree of proof before it
will conduct any precertificition hearing on an employer's allega-
tions of union discrimination. In light of Chairman Miller's depar-
ture from the Board in December of 1974, the Bekins line of
decisions opens rather than settles the question concerning the shape
of Board policy in hearing invidious discrimination charges in pre-
certification proceedings. Much now will depend on the new Chair-
woman's 59
 position in this area. For the time being it is, however,
clear that the Board will not entertain sex discrimination complaints
under any circumstances in precertification hearings. For a variety
of reasons, not the least of which is the lack of a clear majority, the
Board's policy in this area is highly tentative. It seems probable that
precertification hearings will be restricted to serious and obvious
cases of union discrimination. However, it would be unfortunate if
the Board were to adopt the post certification policy outlined by
Members Fanning and Penello, since it seems clear that the Fifth
Amendment does impose a duty on the Board to deny the benefits of
certification where the union is shown in fact to discriminate on the
basis of race, alienage or national origin. 60 Strict neutrality by the
Board is impossible in light of its statutorily mandated duties under
the NLRA to direct elections and to certify unions. The Board
serves as the trustee of the employees' statutorily protected organiza-
tional rights and should not tolerate even the slightest association
with or encouragement of union discrimination.
M. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Employee Concerted Activities
1. Minority Employee's Circumvention of Collective Bargaining
Agent: Emporium Capwell
In Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community
Organization,' the United States Supreme Court held that concerted
activity by minority employees, designed to induce the employer to
5 ° In Parham v. Southwest Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 2 FEP Cas. 1017 (8th Cir.
1970), the court held that statistics which merely revealed an extraordinarily small percent of
black employees, except for'menial workers, established a prima facie violation of Title VII.
59
 Chairwoman Murphy was appointed by President Ford to replace Chairman Miller.
60
 Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
' 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
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bargain separately with minority employees over the question of
employment discrimination, is not protected activity under section 7
of the NLRA. 2 Thus, an employer did not violate section 8(a)(1) of
the Act3 when he discharged two black employees who rejected
their union's grievance procedures and picketed his store. 4
Emporium involved a series of complaints by minority
employees alleging that their employer discriminated on the basis of
race in making assignments and promotions. After an investigation,
the union concluded that the employer, in violation of the collective
bargaining agreement, was engaging in discriminatory employment
practices. The union thereupon decided to pursue each complaint of
racial discrimination through the contractual grievance procedure. 5
The union rejected a strike proposed by several minority
employees on the grounds that the contract prohibited strikes and
required arbitration. Subsequently, those minority employees
walked off their jobs and picketed the employer's store in an effort
to induce him to bargain separately with them over broad questions
of employment discrimination. After repeated warnings, the
employer discharged two minority employees for picketing. 6
The discharged employees filed a section 8(a)(1) unfair labor
practice complaint against the employer,' alleging that their picket-
ing was protected under section 7 of the Act because it was in
protest of employer discrimination violative of the federal policy
against employment discrimination under both section 704(a) of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 8 and the NLRA. 9 In
deciding against them, the Board reasoned that, while the concerted
activity undertaken by the minority employees represented a good
faith attempt to redress racial discrimination, it was not protected
under section 7 because it undermined the "exclusive representa-
2 420 U.S. at 69-70. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) provides in pertinent part that employees
shall have the right "to engage in . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,"
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer
"to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 157 . . . .
4 See 420 U.S. at 52-56, 70-72.
5 Id. at 52-54.
6 Id. at 56.
7 Id. at 57.
* 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1970) which provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment
agency, to discriminate against any individual; or for a labor organization to dis-
criminate against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in
an investigation, proceeding, or hearing, under this subchapter.
• 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 155(a)(1) (1970). See Emporium, 420 U.S. at 57.
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tion" principle of the NLRA. 1 ° The Board found that the picketing
employees, rather than presenting grievances to the employer,
which conceivably would have been protected activity under the
first proviso of section 9(a)," had attempted to by-pass their union
and circumvent the contractual grievance procedure in order to
bargain directly with the employer.' 2 In effect, the Board concluded
that the minority employees' activity was contrary to the Act, rather
than protected by it.
On appeal the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the deci-
sion of the Board" and found that although the minority employees'
picketing interfered with the "exclusive representation" principle set
out in the Act, it constituted protected activity falling within a
"limited exception" to the principle of exclusive representation
created by the strong federal policy against discrimination in
employment." The court reasoned that the union's efforts to process
racial discrimination complaints on a case-by-case basis were not
"actually remedying the discrimination to the fullest extent possible,
by the most expedient and efficacious means.'"
During the Survey year the Supreme Court, in an 8 to 1
opinion written by Justice Marshall, found that the "limited excep-
tion" fashioned by the circuit court was incompatible with the
principle of exclusive bargaining representation provided in section
9 of the NLRAI 6 because it (1) allowed self-appointed representatives
to displace their statutorily elected representatives in the bargaining
I° The Emporium, 192 N.L.R.B. 173, 185-86, 77 L.R.R.M. 1669, 1671 (1971). See also
J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
11 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970). The proviso states:
That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at
any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances
adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the
adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or
agreement then in effect ... .
12
 192 N.L.R.B. at 185, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1670-71. The Board concluded that protection
of such an attempt to bargain would undermine the statutory system of bargaining through an
exclusive, elected representative, impede elected unions' efforts to better the working condi-
tions of minority employees "and place on the Employer an unreasonable burden of attempt-
ing to placate selfdesignated representatives of minority groups while abiding by the terms of
a valid bargaining agreement and attempting in good faith to meet whatever demands the
bargaining representative put forth under that agreement." Id. at 186, 77 L.R,R.M. at 1671.
' 3
 Western Addition Community Org. v. NLRB (The Emporium), 485 F.2d 917, 83
L.R.R.M. 2738 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The circuit court's decision is surveyed and criticized in
1973-74 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 15 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 1198, 1201-03
(1974).
14 485 F.2d at 931, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2748.
15 Id.
I6
 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970) provides that Irjepresentatives designated or selected for the
purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining . ."
996
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
process;" (2) it dissipated the benefits of organizational strength
encouraged by federal labor policy under the NLRA; 18 and (3) it
created confusion for the employer as to which group of employees
or set of bargaining demands he should recognize. 19
The Court emphasized that even the strong federal policy
against racial discrimination could not justify disruption "of the
orderly collective bargaining process contemplated by the NLRA." 2 °
The Court found that the federal policy against discrimination does
not mandate that employees be given the right to negotiate sepa-
rately with their' employer over employment discrimination, since
the principle of exclusive representation is tempered by safeguards,
such as the duty of fair representation, designed to protect minority
interests. 21 In addition, discriminatory employment practices which
independently violate Title VII may be remedied directly under the
procedures established by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 22 Under the
Court's 1974 decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. , 23 a
union may not contractually circumscribe an employee's right to
seek separate relief under Title VII, since its protection of an indi-
vidual's right to equal employment opportunity stands indepen-
dently of the NLRA's guarantees of the right to organize and bar-
gain collectively. 24
In both Gardner-Denver and Emporium the Court was asked to
determine whether the federal policy against racial discrimination
embodied in Title VII effects changes in the rights of individual
employees under the collective bargaining process provided by the
NLRA. In Gardner-Denver the Court held that an employee may
institute a Title VII suit following an adverse grievance award. 25 As
17
 See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 67-70
(1975),
" See 420 U.S. at 65-70. The Court stated that individual bargaining over employment
discrimination divides employees and issues along racial lines, encouraging, rather than dis-
couraging, industrial strife. Id. at 67-69.
19 See id. at 67-69.
20
 Id, at 69,
2 ' Id. at 64-65, The Court in Emporium listed several of these safeguards: (1) Congress
confined the power of the exclusive representative to the appropriate unit. Id. at 64; see Allied
Chem. Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 171 (1971); (2) the 1959
Landrum-Griffin amendments to the Act, 73 Stat. 519, assured minority employees a voice in
union affairs, Emporium, 420 U.S. at 64; (3) the Court noted in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171,
177 (1967) that a duty of fair representation is imposed upon the union under the Act. 420
U.S. at 64. In addition, the Court in Emporium noted that the Board has found that a union's
refusal to process racial discrimination grievances is a violation of the union's duty a fair
representation. Id. Sec Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1563, 1574, 56 L.R.R.M. 1289, 1292
(1964).
22
 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(a)-(k) (1970). See Emporium, 420 U.S. at 65, 71-72.
23 415 U.S. 36 (1974). Gardner-Denver is surveyed in 1973-74 Annual Survey of Labor
Relations Law, 15 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 1105, 1187 (1974).
24 415 U.S. at 51-52,
25
 Id. at 59-60.
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a result of Gardner
-Denver, employees seeking vindication of
statutorily protected rights under Title VII are not limited solely to
the remedies and procedures of collective bargaining under the
NLRA. 26
 The Court recognized that Title VII provides employees
with an individual right to be free of employment discrimination,"
with the federal courts the final forum for resolving questions con-
cerning racial discrimination. 28 Thus, as the Court noted in Em-
porium, even where a putative discriminatee's complaint has been
denied at the final stage of the contractual arbitration process,
access to a Title VII hearing is not foreclosed. 29
Rather, in Emporium the Court refused to allow the individual
employee's right to act against discrimination to undermine the
collective rights of the other employees. Since the minority
employees were not only protesting the employer's discriminatory
employment practice, but were in fact claiming to represent all
minority employees at the Emporium for purposes of bargaining
over racial discrimination issues, the Court concluded that their
activity was not protected by the NLRA," even though the activity
otherwise might have been protected from employer reprisal by
Title VII."
With respect to the Title VII issue, the Court noted that if it
were later found that the picketing constituted protected activity
under section 704(a), 32 the discharged minority employees in Em-
porium would be entitled to recover their jobs with back pay despite
the absence of NLRA protections." However, in a note to its
opinion, the Court expressed some doubt as to whether the actual
picketing in Emporium was protected under section 704(a), though it
expressly declined to delineate the scope of that section. 34 It is
questionable whether employee activity protesting racially dis-
29 Id.
27
 Id. at .51.
29 Id. at 56.
29
 420 U.S. at 66 n.18.
3° Sec id. at 60-61, 65-68.
31 See id. at 70-72.
22
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1970). For text of statute see note 8 supra.
33
 420 U.S. at 71-72.
34
 Id. n.25. The Court wrote:
The question of whether § 704(a) is applicable to the facts of this case is not as
free from doubt as the respondent and amicus would have it. In its brief the NLRB
argues that § 704(a) is directed at protecting access to the EEOC and federal courts.
. Whether the protection afforded by § 704(a) extends only to the right of access or
well beyond it, however, is not a question properly presented by this case. Nor is it
an appropriate question to be answered in the first instance by the NLRB. Questions
arising under Title VII must be resolved by the means that Congress provided for
that purpose.
Id.
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criminatory employment practices which is unprotected by the
NLRA is protected under Title VII.
In Emporium, the Court emphasized the fact that the
employees were attempting to circumvent their exclusive representa-
tives and to bargain directly with their employer, in finding their
activity unprotected." The Court carefully distinguished the facts in
Emporium from situations in which employees were not attempting
to induce the employer to bargain separately with them. 36 Under the
first proviso of section 9(a) of the NLRA, 37
 employees are given the
right to present individual grievances directly to the employer, so
long as it does not frustrate the contract; Emporium does not appear
to limit this right.
It is suggested that the holding in Emporium is a narrow one:
concerted activity by minority employees is not protected where it
undermines the exclusive representation principle of the Act, by
inducing the employer to by-pass the employees' union and to bar-
gain with individual employees over discriminatory employment
practices. Where the minority group's activity is not directed at
bargaining, but merely constitutes protest activity, Emporium does
not appear to withhold the protection of section 7 of the NLRA."
The Court stressed the importance of maintaining an orderly means
of bargaining, but did not foreclose NLRA protections to minority
group activity that falls short of inducing separate bargaining.
2. Union Representation at Investigatory Interviews: Weingarten
In its 1967 decision, Texaco, Inc., Hodston Producing Divi-
sion,' the Board held that section 8(a)(5) 2 requires an employer to
permit an employee's union representative to accompany an
employee to an interview at which the employer intends to impose
discipline. 3 The Board ruled that employee discipline sufficiently
affects a term or condition of employment to activate the employer's
obligation to consult with the union as bargaining representative. 4
35 Id. at 67-70.
36 Id. at 60-61.
37
 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970). For text of the proviso see note 11 supra.
38 Cf. 420 U.S. at 60-61.
' 168 N.L.R.B. 361, 66 L.R.R.M. 1296 (1967), enforcement denied, 408 F.2d 142, 70
L.R.R.M. 3045 (5th Cir. 1969).
2 29 U.S.. § 158(a)(5) (1970) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer
"to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees , . . ."
3
 168 N.L.R.B. at 362, 66 L.R.R.M. at 1297.
Id. See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 271 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
The Board also found a violation of § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(aX1) (1970), since "the
Respondent's refusal to respect the individual's] request that the bargaining representative be
permitted to represent him at the meeting interfered with and restrained him in the exercise of his
rights guaranteed by section 7 of the Act." 168 N.L.R.B. at 362, 66 L.R.R.M. at 1297.
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However, the Board subsequently declined to extend the bargaining
obligation under section 8(a)(5) to investigatory or fact-finding in-
terviews, evidently on grounds that the threat to employment had
not sufficiently ripened to invoke the employer's duty to deal with
the union over terms or conditions of employment or to justify
infringing management's prerogative of investigating employee mis-
conduct. 5
 Several years later, in 1972, the Board took a different
tack, holding that employer denial of union representation at an
investigatory interview violated section 8(a)(1)'s 6 guarantee of an
individual's section 7 right to engage in "concerted activities" for
"mutual aid or protection." This expansive reading of section 7's
protections was rejected by several courts of appeals. 8  However, in
the Survey year case, NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 9 the Supreme
Court held that the Board's new construction of section 7 was
permissible. 10
According to the Court, the Board-created right of representa-
tion fell within the literal language of section 7 protecting "concerted
activities for ... mutual aid or protection," inasmuch as the right to
be joined by a union representative at an investigatory interview is
rationally related to protecting the individual's interest in job se-
curity and his fellow employees' interest in fair disciplinary proceed-
ings." Furthermore, guaranteeing a right to the presence of a union
representative at such an interview would effectuate the NLRA's
fundamental purpose of righting the "inequality of bargaining power
between employees . .. and employers." 2 In any event, since the
Board's establishment of a right of representation at an investigatory
interview was not beyond the literal or policy parameters of section
7, the Court deferred to the NLRB's expertness in "applying the
general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life."' 3
Mr. Justice Powell, writing for himself and Mr. Justice Stewart
in dissent, argued that the actual limits of section 7 were narrower
5
 See, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 192 N. L.R.B. 834, 836, 78 LR.R.M. 1109, 1110 (1971).
6
 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer
"to intefere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section [7]."
7
 Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052, 80 L.R.R.M. 1188 (1972), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970)
provides that "leimployees shall have the right to ... engage in . . . concerted activities for
the purpose of collective baigaining or other mutual aid or protection . . ."
" NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 485 F.2d 1135, 1138, 84 L.R.R.M. 2436, 2438-39 (5th
Cir. 1973); Mobil Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.2d 842, 847, 83 L.R.R.M. 2823, 2827 (7th Cir.
1973); NLRB v. Quality Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1018, 1024-25, 83 L.R.R.M. 2817, 2822 (4th Cir.
1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 276 (1975).
9 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
16 Id. at 260.
II Id. at 260-61.
17 Id. at 261-62, quoting 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
17
 Id. at 266, quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963).
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than its expansive language would suggest." According to the dis-
sent, the concerted activities which Congress intended to protect
were limited to self-organization and to the exercise of collective
strength in establishing a framework of collective bargaining and in
exacting employer concessions. 15 Therefore, the scope of section 7
did not extend to a right to union representation at an investigatory
interview. 16 Rather, the dissent inferred that Congress intended to
leave the problem of securing due process in industrial relations to
collective bargaining.' 7
Weingarten's significance lies both in its precedential value and
in its substantive impact on employer-union relations. First, the
Supreme Court appears, albeit obliquely, to have defined the limita-
tions on the Board's discretion in applying section 7: the protections
of section 7 may be extended to any "concerted activities" directed
at employee self-protection provided the NLRB does not run afoul
of countervailing policies found in the Act, such as preservation of
management prerogatives." Second, the Court has approved the
extension of the Act's guarantees to the area of industrial due
process. It is doubtful, however, that Weingarten will either impose
a substantial burden on employers or extend meaningful protections
to employees summoned to investigatory interviews. An employee's
right to the presence of a union steward arises only where he
"reasonably believes the investigation will result in disciplinary ac-
tion."" Furthermore, an employer unwilling to permit a union
representative at the interview may conduct his investigation with-
out interviewing the employee, "and thus leave to the employee the
choice between having an interview unaccompanied by his represen-
tative, or having no interview and forgoing any benefits that might
be derived from one." 2° The employer, therefore, has considerable
leverage to induce an employee to waive his right to union represen-
tation. Finally, the role played by the union representative at the
interview is almost entirely within the employer's control: the
14 See 420 U.S. at 272-73 (Powell, J., dissenting). Mr. Chief Justice Burger dissented
separately on grounds that the "spectacular evolution" of the new § 7 right was not accom-
panied by a "reasoned Board opinion" below. Id. at 268 (Burger, J., dissenting).
15
 Id. at 273 (Powell, J., dissenting).
16
 Id. at 275.
17
 Id. "The power to discipline or discharge employees has been recognized uniformly as
one of the elemental prerogatives of management. Absent specific limitations imposed by
statute or through the process of collective bargaining, management remains free to discharge
employees at will." Id. at 273-74, citing Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S.
574, 583 (1960).
19 See 420 U.S. at 258, 265-67.
19
 Id. at 257. The reasonableness of the employee's fears are to be measured by an
objective "reasonable man" test. See id. at 257 n.5.
20
 Id. at 258.
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employer has no duty to bargain with the steward and may limit the
interview to hearing the employee's side of the story. 2 I
3. Neutral Employer Interference with Concerted
Activities: Hudgens
In a significant Survey year decision, Hudgens v. NLRB, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a neutral shopping
mall owner's property right to exclude strikers picketing a store
within the mall must yield to the strikers' section 7 rights, 2 where
the intended audience of the picketing cannot be effectively reached
outside the confines of the shopping center. 3 Hudgens, which will be
reviewed by the Supreme Court during the 1975 October Term, 4
represents an extension to economic picketing of the balancing tests
developed by the Supreme Court in cases where union organizers
and non labor-related pamphleteers sought to "trespass" on corpo-
rate property. In NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 5 the Supreme
Court held that an employer's right to exclude nonemployee union
organizers from his property must yield where employees' section 7
right to receive union information could not effectively be vindi-
cated by organizational efforts away from the employer's premises. 6
In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 7 the Court ruled that the First Amend-
ment would permit the exclusion of anti-Vietnam War pamphleteers
from a shopping mall only where the protest was unrelated to the
mall and businesses within it, and where "other reasonable oppor-
tunities for the pickets to convey their message to their intended
audience were available."8 It seems likely that the Supreme Court in
Hudgens will agree with the Fifth Circuit 9 that, as with organiza-
tional rights in Babcock & Wilcox and First Amendment rights in
Lloyd Corp., section 7 of the NLRA requires that private property
rights yield where economic strikers cannot, without trespassing,
effectively inform those doing business with the struck employer of
the dispute.
21 Id. at 260. "The new right thus appears restricted to the privilege to insist on mute
and inactive presence of a fellow employee for a union representative; a witness to the
interview, perhaps." Id. at 274 n.5 (Powell, J., dissenting).
501 F.2d 161, 87 L.R.R.M, 2289 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 971 (1975).
2 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
3 501 F.2d at 166-67, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2293.
4 Cert. granted, 420 U.S. 971 (1975).
5 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
6 Id. at 113.
7 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
▪ Id. at 563. See also Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308; 320 n.9 (1968).
• 501 F.2d at 166-67, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2293.
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The facts in Hudgens are fairly simple. Striking warehouse
employees picketed one of their employer's retail outlets located in a
shopping mall." After the manager of the shopping center
threatened the pickets with arrest for trespassing, the Board found
an unlawful interference with the employees' section 7 rights in
violation of section 8(a)(1)." According to the Board, the pickets
were within the class of invitees to the shopping mall." Their
exclusion was attributable, therefore, not to a neutral exercise of the
mall owner's property rights, but rather only to intentional interfer-
ence with their participation in concerted activities." Before the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the NLRB shifted the basis of its
finding of a section 8(a)(1) violation. The Board analogized" the
case to Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB," in which the Supreme
Court affirmed" a Board ruling that an employer may not enforce a
no solicitation rule against employee organizers on its property
without a showing of need for the rule in order to maintain produc-
tion or discipline. 16
The court of appeals rejected the Board's rationale stating that
Republic Aviation was inapposite, inasmuch as the pickets in
Hudgens were not the mall owner's employees." Moreover, economic
picketing constituted a substantial interference with the neutral
Hudgens' property rights, in contrast with the negligible impact of
the Republic Aviation organilational activities pursued by
employees lawfully on the premises. )8
Nevertheless, the court of appeals enforced the Board's order
on the basis of a two-part test drawn largely from the Supreme
Court's 1972 case, Lloyd Corp. 19 First, the protest activities must be
related to the use to which the property is put. 2° In a labor context,
therefore, the picketing must be aimed at an audience doing busi-
ness with the employer with whom the pickets have a dispute."
" Id. at 163, 87 L.R.R.M at 2290.
1 Scott Hudgens, 205 N.L.R.B. 628, 84 L.R.R.M. 1008, 1009 (1973). See 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1).
12 Id., 84 L.R.R.M. at 1009.
II See id.
14 See 501 F.2d at 165, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2292.
18 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
18
 Id. at 805.
17 501 F.2d at 166, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2292.
18 Id. The Court also rejected the mall owner's argument that Babcock & Wilcox
controlled. Id., 87 L.R.R.M. at 2293. "There, the property rights were those of the employer,
not a third party; and the labor rights involved were organizational rights, not consumer
picketing rights." Id. It is suggested, however, that the test adapted by the court of appeals
does not differ significantly from the Babcock & Wilcox test. See text at notes 21-23 infra.
19 See text at notes 7-8 supra.
" 501 F.2d at 166, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2293.
21 See id. at 167, 87 L. R. R. M. at 2293. In Lloyd Corp. the Supreme Court indicated that
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Second, the court ruled that the picketing was lawful if the General
Counsel of the NLRB could show that alternatives less intrusive on
Hudgens' property rights did not exist. 22 As in Babcock & Wilcox, 23
such an inquiry is aimed at preserving employees' section 7 rights
with the least impact on private property rights. Hudgens, however,
required a different factual inquiry to strike the balance. In Babcock
& Wilcox the employees to be organized constituted a finite, easily
identifiable group., Union organizers might easily reach such
employees by means other than trespass on the employer's prop-
erty. 24
 The Hudgens pickets, on the other hand, could identify their
intended audience only as it approached the picketed store. Alterna-
tives such as advertising in the mass media were clearly impractical,
and picketing at shopping mall entrances might have undesirable
secondary effects. 25 Therefore, picketing within Hudgens' mall was
the only realistic means of informing the retail outlet's employees
and customers of the dispute. 26
It is submitted that the Fifth Circuit's resolution of Hudgens is
correct. The court's development of a balancing test, permitting
trespasses where strikers have no alternative means of informing the
customers and employees of the struck employer of the dispute,
appears necessary to preserve the pickets' section 7 right to engage
in economic picketing. As such, the Fifth Circuit's decision is consis-
tent with the Supreme Court's previous rulings that the NLRA
imposes a servitude on corporate real property where necessary to
the preservation of .section 7 rights. 27 Without such a servitude in
the circumstances of the Hudgens case, employers, in league with
"neutral" mall owners, might effectively frustrate picketing by
isolating themselves within the confines of a shopping center. 28
Furthermore, the economic relationship between the lessor mall
owner and the struck employer makes it equitable to extend the
Act's restraints from the regulated employer to the lessor attempting
to shield the employer from economic picketing.
a shopping mall having the attributes of a public business block is subject to a First
Amendment requirement that pamphleteers be permitted access, provided their activities
were related to an enterprise within the mall and that reasonable alternative opportunities for
reaching the intended audience did not exist. See 407 U.S. at 563. See also Food Employees
Local 590 v. Logan Valley, Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 320 n.9 (1968).
22
 501 F.2d at 169, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2295.
	 '
" See 351 U.S. at 112,
Hudgens, 501 F.2d at 168, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2294.
25 Id. at 169, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2295.
26 Id.
27 See Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 544-45 (1972); NLRB v. Babcock
& Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
26 See Hudgens, 501 F.2d at 168, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2294.
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B. Union Discipline of Supervisors
1. Florida Power & Light
The 1947 amendments to the National Labor Relations Act
divested supervisory personnel of their statutory rights to organize
and to bargain collectively) Employers therefore commit no unfair
labor practice by firing, refusing to hire or refusing to bargain with
unionized supervisors. 2 An employer, however, remains free to rec-
ognize and to bargain with labor organizations representing super-
visors. 3 Unionized supervisors are commonly subject to divided
loyalities and are liable to union discipline if they adhere to man-
agement's interests in a union-employer dispute. 4
Since 1968 the Board has applied section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act, 5
which prohibits union coercion of "an employer in the selection of
his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the
adjustment of grievances," 6 so as to delimit the permissible scope of
union discipline of supervisors. In the seminal case, San
Francisco-Oakland Mailers' Local 18, (Northwest Publications,
Inc.)' the Board held that the language of section 8(b)(1)(B) prohibit-
ing coercion of an employer in the selection of his bargaining and
grievance adjustment representatives also covers union discipline
penalizing a supervisor for performance of his duties in applying the
collective bargaining contracts In Oakland Mailers the Board ex-
panded the application of section 8(b)(1)(B) to prevent the union
from doing indirectly, through pressure on the supervisor, what it
could not do directly through coercion of the employer. 9 In sub-
sequent decisions the Board has applied section 8(b)(1)(B) to bar
union discipline for the performance of managerial duties which
were, at best, arguably related to the application of the collective
bargaining agreement.") Other decisions indicate that the Board
29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 152(11) (1970). See note 1 at p. 973 supra.
2
 Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, 417 U.S. 790, 808 (1974).
3 See 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1970).
	 •
See Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, 417 U.S. 790, 793-94, 796-97 (1974).
5
 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1970).
(' Id.
7 172 N.L.R,B. 2173, 69 L.R.R.M. 1157 (1968).
° Id., 69 L.R.R.M, at 1158.
9
 See id. "[M]anagement's right to a free selection would be hollow indeed if the union could
dictate the manner in which the selected representative performed his collective bargaining and
grievance adjustment duties." IBEW v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1143, 1154, 83 L.R.R.M. 2582,
2588-89 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane).
E.g., Meat Cutters Local 81 (Safeway Stores, Inc.), 185 N. L.R.B. 884, 75 L.R.R.M.
1247 (1970), enforced, 458 F.2d 794, 79 L.R.R.M. 2309 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (exercise of employer's
purchasing policy in derogation of the union's work-preservation interest); Sheet Metal Workers
Local 49 (General Metal Products, Inc.), 178 N.L.R. B. 139, 72 L.R.R.M, 1070 (1969), enforced,
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regarded section 8(b)(1)(B) as protecting all supervisory or manage-
rial functions whether or not they could be termed "collective bar-
gaining" or "grievance adjustment.""
Recently, the Board expanded its interpretation of section
8(b)(1)(B) to prohibit 'union discipline of those supervisor-members
whose duties included grievance adjustment or collective bargain-
ing, for their performance of non-supervisory functions, i.e., rank-
and-file work done during an economic strike.' 2 In a significant
Survey year decision, Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, 13 the
Supreme Court rejected this latest expansive reading of section
8(b)(1)(B). 14
Florida Power & Light was a consolidated appeal of two board
decisions." In both cases some of the supervisors who crossed the
unions' picket lines were beneficiaries of the union's collective bar-
gaining agreements with the employers. The others retained nomi-
nal union membership enabling them to enjoy union-sponsored pen-
sion plans and other benefits.' 6 All supervisors who performed
rank-and-file work during the strike were fined by their unions and,
in some instances, expelled from membership." The Board ruled
that the union discipline in both cases violated section 8(b)(1)(B)."
According to the Board's reasoning, section 8(b)(1)(B) is violated
where the underlyinglreason for the union's discipline of supervisors
is a dispute "between the employer and the union rather than
between the union and the supervisor." 19 Thus, any discipline
430 F.2d 1348, 75 L. R.R.M. 2062 (10th Cir. 1970) (supervisor fined for performance of work
arguably reserved for the rank-and-file under the collective agreement).
'' Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, 417 U.S. 790, 801-02 (1974). See Lithographers
Locals 15-P & 272 (Toledo Blade Co), 175 N.L.R.B. 1072, 71 L.R. R.M. 1467 (1969), enforced,
437 F.2d 55, 76 L.R.R.M. 2422 (6th Cir. 1971).
12
 Local 2150, IBEW (Wisconsin Elec. Power Co.), 192 N.L.R.B. 77, 78, 77 L.R.R.M.
1607, 1609 (1971), enforced, 486 F.2d 602, 83 L.R.R.M. 2827 (7th Cir. 1973).
" 417 U.S. 790 (1974).
14 Id. at 804-05, 813.
15
 Local 134, MEW (Illinois Bell Tel. Co.), 192 N.L.R.B. 85, 77 L.R.R.M. 1610 (1971),
enforcement denied, 487 F.2d 1143, 83 L.R.R.M. 2582 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en Banc), rev'g on
rehearing 487 F.2d 1113, 81'L.R.R.M. 2257 (D.C. Cir. 1972); System Council U-4, IBEW
(Florida Power & Light Co.), 193 N.L.R.B. 30, 78 L.R.R.M. 1065 (1971), enforcement denied,
487 F.2d 1143, 83 L.R.R.M. 2582 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane).
16
 417 U.S. at 792-93, 795.
17 Id. at 793-94, 796-97.
16
 Local 134, IBEW (Illinois Bell Tel. Co.), 192 N.L.R.B. 85, 86, 77 L.R.R.M. 1610, 1612
(1971); System Council U-4, IBEW (Florida Power & Light Co.), 193 N.L.R.B. 30, 31, 78
L.R.R.M. 1065, 1066 (1971):
19
 Local 2150, IBEW (Wisconsin Elec. Power Co.), 192 N.L.R. B. 77, 78, 77 L.R.R.M.
1607, 1609(1971), enforced, 486 F.2d 602, 83 L.R.R.M. 2827 (7th Cir. 1973). Wisconsin Electric
was decided by the Board on the same day as Illinois Bell. The Board's opinion in Wisconsin
Electric sets forth the Board's interpretation of § 8(bX IX B). The Board has not sought to apply
§ 8(b)(1)(B) to discipline arising from a purely intra-union dispute unrelated to a supervisor's
duties to his employer. See Painters Local 453 (Syd Gough & Sons), 183 N.L.R.B. 187, 74
L.R.R.M. 1539, 1540 (1970).
1006
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
which resolved a supervisor's conflicting loyalties in favor of his
union and against his employer was an unfair labor practice. 2°
The Supreme Court rejected the Board's broad application of
section 8(b)(1)(B) and held that union discipline of supervisor-
members violated section 8(b)(1)(B) only where it penalized "the
supervisor's conduct in performing the duties of, and acting in his
capacity as, grievance adjuster or collective bargainer on behalf of
the employer." 21 Discipline for performing rank-and-file struck
work therefore does not violate section 8(b)(1)(B). 22 However, the
Court failed to provide a definition of grievance adjustment or
collective bargaining for application in future cases concerning the
permissible scope of union discipline of supervisors.
The Supreme Court distinguished the policy bases of section
8(b)(1)(B) from the policies underlying those sections of the Act
enabling employers to exclude supervisors from labor organizations.
According to the Court, sections 2(3) and 14(a) 23 were enacted to
enable employers to demand the undivided loyalty of supervisors by
prohibiting their membership in unions. 24 Section 8(b)(1)(B), on the
other hand, was not intended to be "any part of the solution to the
generalized problem of supervisor-[union] member conflict of loyal-
ties."25 Rather, the Court viewed the legislative history as revealing
that the evils to be remedied were "union attempts to dictate to
employers who would represent them in collective bargaining and
grievance adjustment." 26 More specifically, Congress intended to
outlaw union coercion with respect to an employer's participation in
a multi-employer bargaining unit and union pressure on an
employer to replace foremen whose performance as supervisors was
offensive to the union. 27
In the Court's opinion, the Board had extended section
8(b)(1)(B) to insulate virtually all employer demands for supervisors'
loyalty from union interference, thereby rendering the scope of the
section coterminous with sections 2(3) and 14(a). 25 Unless section
8(b)(1)(B) were read more narrowly, the Court concluded, the "op-
See Illinois Bell Tel., 192 N.L.R.B. at 86, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1612. Member Fanning,
dissenting, noted the absence of causal relationship between discipline penalizing the perfor-
mance of struck rank-and-file work and the statutorily proscribed restraint of an employer's
freedom in collective bargaining and grievance adjustment. Id. at 88, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1614
(Member Fanning dissenting).
21 417 U.S. at 804-05.
22
 Id. at 805, 813.
23 29 U.S.C. § 152(3), 164(a) (1970). See note 1 supra.
24 417 U.S. at 808.
35
 Id. at 813.
26 Id. at 803.
27
 Id. at 803-04.
2! See id. at 806-08.
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tion"29
 provided by Congress, which permits employers to exclude
supervisors from unions, would be illusory. 30 An employer, who
had waived his statutory rights to exclude supervisors from labor
organizations, would be able to reclaim a supervisor's undivided
loyalty in a section 8(b)(1)(B) proceeding. 31 To avoid such an ano-
maly, the Court found that 8(b)(1)(B) is to be construed as literally
as practicable in accordance with the congressional intent to protect
only grievance adjustment and collective bargaining functions. 32
Conflict of loyalties problems arising in areas unprotected by section
8(b)(1)(B) are to be left to union-employer resolution in collective
bargaining. 33
In a brief dissent, Justice White, writing for four justices of the
Court, 34 argued that supervisors' performance of rank-and-file
struck work "is part and parcel of the process of collective bargain-
ing," and therefore, union interference with such a function falls
within the scope of section 8(b)(1)(B). 35 The minority's willingness to
refer to an employer's economic self-defense during a strike as
"collective bargaining" within the meaning of section 8(b)(1)(B) ap-
pears to stretch that phrase beyond its commonly accepted meaning.
Ordinarily, collective bargaining is understood to include only con-
tract negotiations, administration of an existing agreement and in-
formal union-employer consultations. 36 In light of the phrase's lim-
ited meaning, performance of struck work can hardly be regarded
as "collective bargaining." Moreover, the Court's identification of
Congress' limited purpose in enacting section 8(b)(1)(B) as the pres-
ervation of employers' freedom of choice with respect to multi-
employer collective bargaining, 37 militates against a liberal applica-
tion of the phrase "collective bargaining" to all aspects of labor-
management relations.
The Board's sweeping application of section 8(b)(1)(B) had in-
sured employers of supervisors' undivided loyalties in all areas of
union-management relations. Thus, employers were vested with
29 Id. at 812.
3 ° See id. at 812-13.
31 See id.
57
 Id. at 804-05.
33 Id. at 813. While holding that the union's discipline for performance of rank-and-file
struck work was not prohibited by § 8(b)(1)(B), the Court also noted that it was unprotected
under § 8(b)(1)(A)'s, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970), proviso permitting union discipline not
violative of employees' right under § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). Since supervisors are not
employees for purposes of the Act, § 8(b)(1)(A)'s delineation of permissible and impermissible
union discipline of employees is inapplicable to discipline of supervisors. 417 U.S. at 805 n.16.
34 Id. at 813 (Justice White, dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Blackmun and Rehnquist).
35 Id. at 814, quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 . U.S. 477, 495 (1960).
3 ° D. Bok & J. Dunlop, Labor and the American Community 217 (1970).
37
 417 U.S. at 803.
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rights that they had ostensibly waived when the employers failed to
exclude supervisors from labor organizations, as permitted by sec-
tions 2(3) 38 and 14(a). 39 The unfairness of this Board construction of
section 8(b)(1)(B) is apparent upon examination of employers'
economic motives for waiving their exclusionary rights under the
Act. Employers often permit workers who are promoted to super-
visory positions to retain union membership in order to avoid the
expense of providing pension and other benefits which would be
terminated upon withdrawal from union membership." The
Board's application of section 8(b)(1)(B), however, would enable
employers to continue reaping the financial advantages of super-
visors' continued membership while denying the union, which pro-
vides the benefits, any claim to the supervisors' support during a
strike. In contrast, the Court's decision that unions and employers
should resolve their competing claims to supervisors' loyalties
through the give-and-take of collective bargaining appears better
advised. Furthermore, in those instances where the supervisors are
beneficiaries of the collective bargaining agreement which is the
subject of the strike, the Court is clearly justified in recognizing the
union's interest in preventing the supervisors from performing
rank-and-file work in derogation of that strike.
While the Supreme Court's decision represents the reversal of a
line of Board decisions relating to discipline for the performance of
rank-and-file struck work,'" the impact of Florida Power & Light
on other Board interpretations of section 8(b)(1)(B) is unclear.
Florida Power & Light teaches that discipline for performance of
unit work during a strike cannot be held to affect adversely a
supervisor's performance of his grievance adjustment or collective
bargaining duties. 42 However, the Court did not indicate whether a
union might lawfully discipline a supervisor who performs both
managerial and rank-and-file work during a strike. Nor did the
Court rule on the correctness of the Board's extension of section
8(b)(1)(B) to protect all managerial functions, whether or not they
are classifiable as "collective bargaining" or "grievance adjust-
ment."43 The Board's application of section 8(b)(1)(B) to all manage-
rial and supervisory activities, on grounds that such discipline has a
coercive carry-over effect on collective bargaining or grievance ad-
justment duties, avoids the practical difficulty of determining, on a
38
 29 U.S.C.
	
152(3) (1970). See note 1 at p. 973 supra.
39 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1970), See note 1 at p. 973 supra.
4 ° 1BEW v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1148, 1169, 83 L.R.R.M. 2582, 2601 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
41 E.g., Local 2150, SKEW (Wisconsin Elec. Power Co.), 192 N.L.R.B. 77, 77
L.R.R.M. 1607 (1971).
43 417 U.S. at 804-05.
43 See id. at 801-02.
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case-by-case basis, which supervisory functions constitute, for
example, administration of the collective bargaining agreement and
which do not. However, the Supreme Court's admonition that sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(B) is to be narrowly read" may necessitate such a
case-by-case approach or at least a clearer showing of an adverse
carryover effect of the discipline on collective bargaining or griev-
ance adjustment duties.
2. Hammond Publishers; Triangle Publications
In Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW' the Supreme Court
found union discipline of foremen permissible under section
8(b)(1)(B) 2
 where the supervisors had ostensibly3 performed only
rank-and-file work during a strike. The Court did not rule on the
legality of penalties assessed against supervisors who performed
both managerial and rank-and-file work during a strike. Several
months after Florida Power & Light, the Board, in Typographical
Local 16 (Hammond Publishers, Inc.) ,4 held that a union violated
section 8(b)(1)(B) when it disciplined supervisors who crossed a
picket line to perform mainly supervisory functions as well as a
"minimal amount" of rank-and-file struck works According to the
Board's interpretation of Florida Power & Light, the existence of a
section 8(b)(1)(B) violation turns on whether the "reasonable effect"
of union discipline is to inhibit a supervisor's future execution of
collective bargaining or grievance adjustment duties. 6 Applying this
test in Hammond Publishers, the Board, without further explana-
tion, found it "reasonably likely" that union discipline of the super-
visors would adversely affect their future performance of section
8(b)(1)(B) duties.' The Board majority implied strongly that it re-
garded Florida Power & Light to be limited to situations where
supervisors "substitute their services for those of the rank-and-file
44
 Id. at 804-05.
1 417 U.S. 790 (1974).
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(3) (1970) outlaws coercion or restraint of "an employer in the
selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of
grievances."
3
 See 417 U.S. at 79192, 793, 796.
4 216 N.L.R.B. No. 149, 88 L.R.R.M. 1378 (1975).
88 L.R.R.M. at 1381.
6
 Id. at 1379. The Board's "reasonable effect" test is based on the following language
from Florida Power & Light:
The condusion is thus inescapable that a union's discipline of ... a supervisory employee
can constitute a violation of §8(b)(1)(B) only when that discipline may adversely affect
the supervisor's conduct in performing the duties of, and acting in his capacity as,
grievance adjuster or collective bargainer on behalf of the employer.
417 U.S. at 804-05.
7 88 L.R.R.M. at 1381.
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employees." The Board, therefore, believes that section 8(b)(I)(B).
absolutely protects the performance by unionized supervisors of
predominantly managerial tasks behind a picket line.
In a companion case, Typographical Local 6 (Triangle Publica-
tions, Inc.), 9 the NLRB held that union discipline of strikebreaking
supervisors who performed only managerial functions during the
strike violated section 8(b)(1)(B)." In Triangle Publications, the
Board rejected contentions that union discipline motivated by-
"strikebreaking" rather than by the quality of the supervisor's man-
agerial activities was permissible since such discipline would be
unlikely to affect the future performance of section 8(b)(1)(B)
duties." Rather, the Board concluded that discipline for perfor-
mance of any supervisory duties, whether carried out during a strike
or not, would inevitably have an adverse influence on the super-
visor's future collective bargaining and grievance adjustment func-
tions."
Member Fanning, in lengthy dissents, took issue with the
majority's reasoning. Hammond Publishers, he argued, presented
essentially the same facts as Florida Power & Light. 13 Although the
Supreme Court in that case addressed itself explicitly only to the
rank-and-file work performed by the disciplined supervisors, the
record below revealed that the foremen had performed both super-
visory and unit work during the strikes." Therefore, Member Fan-
ning argued, the Supreme Court had tacitly approved union disci-
pline focused on the performance of struck work despite the super-
visor's simultaneous performance of managerial duties. 15
In his Triangle Publications dissent, Member Fanning agreed
with the majority's premise that section 8(b)(1)(B) is violated where
the "reasonable effect" of union discipline is to inhibit a supervisor's
future performance of collective bargaining and grievance adjust-
ment duties. 16 However, he felt that Florida Power & Light re-
quired a more persuasive showing of a causal relationship between
union discipline and coercion with respect to section 8(b)(1)(B) duties
than had been shown in Triangle Publications. First, Member Fan-
ning noted, the forbidden coercion would likely result where the
union discipline was directed at influencing the supervisor's perfor-
2 Id.
9 216 N.L.R.B. No. 147, 88 L.R.R.M. 1384 (1975).
12 88 L.R.R.M. at 1386.
' 1 Id. at 1385.
12 Id. at 1386.
13 88 L.R.R.M. at 1382-83 (Member Fanning dissenting).
14 Id.
13 Id. at 1383 & n.19, 1384.
16 88 L.R.R.M. at 1389 (Member Fanning dissenting).
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mance of protected aCtivities. 17 In Triangle Publications, however,
the union was concerned only with strikebreaking,' not with the
nature of the work performed behind the picket line." Second, if,
regardless of the union's motivation, the impact of the discipline on
the supervisor were likely to deter him from faithful performance of
his section 8(b)(1)(B) obligations in the future, a violation could be
found." The discipline in Triangle Publications, however, would
not reasonably affect a supervisor's performance of section 8(b)(1)(B)
duties, since the supervisor would relate the punishment to working
during a strike rather than to the manner in which he had per-
formed his managerial duties:
[Wjhen the supervisor fined for crossing a picket line is
adjusting a grievance several weeks later he is not perform-
ing the Same function for which he was previously fined
because he was not fined for adjusting a grievance or anything
related thereto. He was fined for crossing the picket line. The
reasonable conclusion for the supervisor to draw is that if,
once again in the future, he crosses a lawful picket line, he
will, once again, be disciplined. 20
Therefore, according to Member Fanning, discipline imposed to
punish strikebreaking rather than the manner in which section
8(b)(1)(B) duties are performed is never violative of the Act. 2 '
It is suggested that Member Fanning's interpretation of section
8(b)(1)(B) is correct. First, the Supreme Court in Florida Power &
Light indicated that the scope of section 8(b)(1)(B) is little broader
than its literal concern with coercion with respect to the "selection"
of collective bargaining and grievance adjustment agents: only inter-
ference with the supervisor's performance of his section 8(b)(1)(B)
duties is prohibited. 22 Furthermore, the Court recognized that
unions have a legitimate interest in the loyalty of unionized super-
visors. 23
 In light of the Court's admonition that section 8(b)(1)(B) be
narrowly read, and its approval of unions' conflicting claims to
17
 Id. at 1388.
IS
 Id.
19 See id. at 1389.
29 Id. at 1389-90.
21
 Id. at 1390.
22 See 417 U.S. at 804-05.
Nowhere in the legislative history is there to be found any implication that Congress
sought to extend protection to the employer from union restraint or coercion when
engaged in any activity other than the selection of its representatives for the purposes of
collective bargaining and grievance adjustment.
Id. at 804. See id. at 804-05, quoted at note 6 supra.
23 417 U.S. at 812 n.22.
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foremen's loyalty, Member Fanning's narrow application of section
8(b)(1)(B) seems preferable.
C. Duty to Bargain—Narrowing Gissel:
Linden Lumber
It is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to
bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees . . .
designated or selected ... by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes . . . ."' In the landmark 1969 case,
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 2 the Supreme Court held that the duty
to bargain collectively under section 8(a)(5) 3 was not restricted
"solely to those unions whose representative status is certified after a
Board election."4 In Gissel the Court upheld bargaining orders
directed at employers who had rejected union demands to bargain
based on authorization cards signed by a majority of employees and
had engaged in contemporaneous unfair labor practices likely "to
undermine majority strength and impede the election processes." 5 In
addition, the Court approved the Board's practice of allowing an
employer, who was confronted with evidence of majority support for
the union, to refuse to bargain with the union and to petition for an
election irrespective of his beliefs concerning the union's majority
status. 6 However, the Court did not decide whether section 8(a)(5)
required an employer who committed no unfair labor practices
interfering with the Board's election machinery and who refused to
petition for an election, to bargain with a union presenting evidence of
majority support.? The Supreme Court resolved that question in the
employer's favor in the Survey year case, Linden Lumber Division,
Summer & Co. v. NLRB , 8 holding that an employer, who refrains
from interfering with a fair election, has an absolute right to refuse to
bargain or to petition for an election. 9
In Linden Lumber, several employers, confronted with bargain-
ing demands based on authorization cards signed by a majority in
each of the proposed units, refused to negotiate with the unions or to
petition for elections." The Board found that the employers corn-
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 159(a) (1970).
2 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
3
 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
• 395 U.S. at 600.
5 Id. at 614.
6
 Id. at 594.
• See id. at 595, 601 n.18.
ti 419 U.S. 301 (1974).
9 Id, at 310.
10 Id. at 302.
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mitted no unfair labor practices. Instead, the Board adopted "a
`voluntarist' view of the duty to bargain. Absent unfair labor prac-
tices or an agreement to determine majority status through means
other than an election, such as a poll, the employer has no duty to
recognize the union."' In Linden Lumber the Board overruled prior
decisions authorizing the issuance of a bargaining order where an
employer, in "bad faith"" or without a "reasonable doubt" 13 of a
union's majority status, refused to bargain with a union presenting
evidence of majority support and failed to protect himself by peti-
tioning for an election. In the Board's view, testing an employer's
motivation or knowledge was hopelessly subjective and therefore
unworkable." Moreover, a union could easily invoke the Board's
election machinery:
In that manner:, if there is indeed majority support, it will be
evidenced in clear and unmistakable fashion within a matter
of a few weeks. Surely that is a far better basis for the
bargaining relationship than a decision in litigation which
would take us 'nearly a year to reach and which, even then,
may be subject to debate as to the soundness of its evidentiary
base and to further contest in the courts."
A divided Supreme Court upheld the Board's new policy an-
nounced in Linden Lumber of granting employers, who commit no
unfair labor practiCes which impair the electoral process, an abso-
lute right to refuse to bargain or to petition for an election. 16 The
Court held that "a union with authorization cards purporting to
Truck Drivers Local 413 v. NLRB, 487 F,2d 1099, 1106, 84 L.R.R.M. 2177, 2181
(D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'g Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 718, 77
L.R.R.M. 1305 (1971); Wilder Mfg. Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 81 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1972).
Truck Drivers Local 413, in turn, was reversed sub nom. Linden Lumber Div., Summer &
Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974).
12
 E.g., Aaron Bros., Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1078-79, 62 L.R.R.M. 1160, 1161 (1966).
"Absent an affirmative showing of bad faith, an employer, presented with a majority card
showing and a bargaining request, will not be held to have violated his bargaining obligation
under the law simply because he refuses to rely upon cards rather than an election, as the
method for determining the union's majority." Id. at 1078, 62 L.R.R.M. at 1161. At oral
argument in Gissel, the Board announced a new policy of abandoning "good faith" inquiries
where an employer, confronted with a bargaining demand, petitioned for an election. 395
U.S. at 594. "Thus, an employer can insist that a union subject itself to an election, regardless
of his subjective motivation, so long as he is not guilty of misconduct. . . ." Id.
13 See Snow & Sons,' 134 N.L.R.B. 709, 710, 49 L.R.R.M. 1228, 1229 (1961), enforced,
308 F.2d 687, 51 L.R.R.M. 2199 (9th Cir. 1962).
14
 Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B, 718, 720-21, 77 L.R.R.M. 1305,
1309 (1971); Wilder Mfg. Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 81 L.R.R.M. 1039, 1039-40 (1972).
Linden Lumber and Wilder were consolidated for review in Linden Lumber, 419 U.S. 301
(1974).
15 Wilder, 81 L.R.R.M. at 1041.
16
 419 U.S, at 310.
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represent a majority of the employees, which is refused recognition,
has the burden of taking the next step in invoking the Board's
election procedure." 17
In its decision the majority first noted the preferred status of an
election as a reliable vehicle for testing employee sentiment." In
contrast, since authorization cards or a recognitional strike do not
conclusively establish the existence of a union majority, an employer
may entertain a good-faith doubt as to the union's status." The
Court also noted approvingly the Board's retreat from the subjectiv-
ity of "good faith" inquiries, 20 and further reasoned that the short
period of time consumed by an election, in contrast to an unfair
labor practice proceeding, supported the Board's preference for rec-
ognition based on certification rather than on a bargaining order. 21
Finally, the majority cited "practical administrative procedural
questions" in support of its decision: 22 an employer, desiring to
avoid a bargaining obligation could petition for an election in a unit
unsatisfactory to the union. Under current Board procedure, such
an employer petition would not be deemed to raise a "question of
representation" within the meaning of section 9(c)(1)(B) 23 and would
be dismissed. 24 The burden of petitioning for an election would then
be shifted to the union, a result identical to the Board's practice
pursuant to Linden Lumber. 25 Since the employer could thus nullify
a section 8(a)(5) obligation to petition for an election, the Court saw
little sense in creating a duty which was at best illusory. 26
Linden Lumber is the culmination of the Board's efforts to
narrow the scope of section 8(a)(5). Initially, the Board would inves-
tigate an employer's "good faith" in refusing to bargain, whether or
not he simultaneously petitioned for an election. 27 Under Gissel, the
Board would investigate only where the employer had refused to
petition for an election when faced with a bargaining demand. 28
17 Id.
's Id, at 306.
19 Id. But compare the Court's recognition in Gissel of authorization cards and recogni-
tional strikes as reliable indicia of majority support. 395 U.S. at 601-09.
" 419 U.S. at 306.
11 Id. at 306-07.
21
 Id. at 309.
13 29 U.S.C. 9 159(c) (1) (B) (1970) provides in pertinent part that an employer faced with
a bargaining demand might petition for an election. Thereafter, "the Board shall investigate
such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation
affecting commerce exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice."
14
 419 U.S. at 308-09. See William Wood Bakery, Inc., 97 N.L.R.B. 122, 123, 29
L.R.R.M. 1066 (1951).
15 419 U.S. at 309.
26 See id.
17
 See, e.g., Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263, 1264, 24 L.R.R.M. 1548, 1550
(1949).
3$ See 395 U.S. at 591.
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With Linden Lumber, the Board has abandoned "good faith" inves-
tigations altogether. 29 A section 8(a)(5) duty to bargain with an
uncertified union will arise only where the employer has agreed with
the union to be bound by means other than an election, 30 or where
the employer has engaged in unfair labor practices which dissipate a
union's majority support and interfere with a fair election. 3 '
It is suggested that the Court erred in approving the Board's
narrowing of an employer's section 8(a)(5) duty to bargain. First, the
virtual nullification of a duty to bargain with an uncertified union is
inconsistent with the legislative history of section 8(a)(5). As the
Court in Gissel noted, "it was early recognized that an employer had
a duty to bargain whenever the union representative presented
'convincing evidence of majority support.' " 32 And, as the Board
stated in 1947, "[title obligation imposed by the Act is to bargain
with the representatives of a majority of the employees. If
the majority is present, the obligation exists, subject to the possibil-
ity that a particular employer may, in good faith, ask for reasona-
ble proof of the representative's asserted majority status." 33 At the
time of the Taft-Hartley amendments, therefore, it was settled that
evidence of majority support "could establish majority status and
thereby impose a bargaining obligation on an unwilling employer by
means other than . . . a Board-supervised election." 34 This interpre-
tation of the duty to bargain was explicitly affirmed by the House
Conference Report accompanying the Taft-Hartley Act, which
stated that the reenacted section 8(a)(5) was intended to follow the
provisions of "existing law."35 In addition, the conferees rejected a
proposal to limit the duty to bargain to unions "currently recognized
. . . or certified,"36 further evidencing a congressional intent to leave
the scope of the duty to bargain as it was prior to 1947. 37 Finally,
both the Board38 and the Supreme Court39 indicated shortly after
the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments that "[On the absence of any
bona fide dispute as to the existence of the required majority of
29
 190 N.L.R.B. at 720-21, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1369.
3 ° See Linden Lumber, 419 U.S. at 310 n.10. See also Gissel, 395 U.S. at 591.
31 See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 600.
32
 Id. at 596, quoting NLRB v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 112 F.2d 756, 757, 6
L.R.R.M. 746, 747 (2d Cir. 1940).
33 Roanoke Pub. Warehouse, 72 N.L.R.B. 1281, 1282 n.3, 19 L.R.R.M. 1267, 1268
(1947).
34 419 U.S. at 312 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
35 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1947). See 419 U.S. at 312 (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
36
 H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., let Sess. § 8(a)(5) (1947).
37 419 U.S. at 312 (Stewart, J., dissenting),
3 ° See Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263, 1264, 24 L.R.R.M. 1548, 1550 (1949).
39 UMW V. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62, 69 (1956).
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eligible employees, the employer's denial of recognition of the union
[violates] § 8(a)(5) of the Act."4 ° According to principles of statutory
construction, 41 it appears clear that the 1947 amendments reenacted
section 8(a)(5) with judicial and administrative gloss intact, impos-
ing a duty to bargain on employers confronted with convincing
evidence of majority support. While the Board might justifiably
exercise discretion in developing tests for determining when "con-
vincing evidence of majority support" or employer "good faith" had
been exhibited, the Board certainly does not have discretion to
eliminate statutorily created duties. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court in Linden Lumber, without reference to the congressionally
defined scope of section 8(0(5), approved the Board's narrowed
construction of the duty to bargain. 42
Linden Lumber's abandonment of the section 8(a)(5) duty to
bargain with a union evidencing majority support was
foreshadowed by Gissel. In that case the Court unquestioningly
approved the Board's retreat from inquiries into the "good faith" of
an employer who petitioned for an election in response to a union's
demand to bargain. 43 The Court perhaps assumed that the filing of
the petition evidenced good faith and that a union victory would
result in prompt bargaining." However, in Linden Lumber the
Court discovered, apparently for the first time, that an employer
could easily avoid a prompt resolution of the bargaining obligation
dispute by petitioning for an election in a unit unacceptable to the
union, thereby bringing about the petition's automatic dismissal. 45
Furthermore, where an election was held, the employer could con-
tinue to refuse to bargain, forcing the initiation of a lengthy section
8(a)(5) proceeding. At least where a defiant employer was concerned,
the election option approved in Gissel guaranteed as much delay in
securing employees' collective bargaining rights as the pre-Gissel
"good faith" investigations.
The Court in Gissel approved a loophole allowing employers to
escape their bargaining obligations by designating an unacceptable
unit or by refusing to bargain after an election had been held. The
4a Id .
41 See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 289 (1974).
42 Truck Drivers Local 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099, 84 L.R.R. M. 2177 (D.C. Cir.
1973) where the court stated:
It is one thing to abandon a subjective standard used to determine when employers are
required to recognize on the basis of cards and replace it by the alternative, and
arguably more objective, standard of "independent knowledge." That was the Supreme
Court's understanding in Gessel [sic]. It is another thing to abandon any standard.
Id. at 1108 n,36, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2183 n.36.
43 See 395 U.S. at 591, 600.
44 See id. at 600.
45 419 U.S. at 308-09. See text at notes 19-22 supra.
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Court in Linden Lumber, instead of closing the loophole in order to
protect employees' section 8(a)(5) rights, ruled, in effect, that the
loophole required extinction of the rights." As a result, only an
election petition filed by a union can now create a bargaining
obligation.'"
Curiously, the coup de grace administered by Linden Lumber to
an employer's pre-election duty to bargain appears likely to have
little impact on the balance of union and employer power. An
election, not a pre-election bargaining demand, is now virtually the
only means of triggering an employer's bargaining obligation. How-
ever, where the union does have majority support and where the
employer acts in good faith, reliance on an election rather than on a
bargaining demand will delay recognition for only a few weeks." On
the other hand, where an employer refuses recognition after an
election, the resulting delay should not be much greater than that
attending a Joy Silk unfair labor practice proceeding seeking to
enforce a pre-election duty to bargain. 49
Employers are, nonetheless, advantaged in two ways by Linden
Lumber. First, the delay attending an election might result in an
erosion of the union strength which existed at the time of the initial
bargaining demand. Second, employers are relieved of the legal, if
not practicably enforceable, burden of bargaining as soon as credi-
ble evidence of majority support is presented. On the union-
employer battleground, Linden Lumber results in an immeasurable
psychological advantage for employers.
IV. SUCCESSOR EMPLOYERS
A. Introduction
The Survey year saw further judicial and administrative de-
velopment of the law governing a "successor" employer's obligations
to arbitrate and bargain with his predecessor's employees. In How-
ard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Board,' the
Supreme Court held that a successor corporation which purchased
the assets of its predecessor and continued to employ only a fraction
of the predecessor's work force had no duty under the predecessor's
collective bargaining agreement to arbitrate the claims of the dis-
charged employees. 2 The union representing the predecessor's
46 See 419 U.S. at 308-09.
47 See id. at 310.
48 See id. at 306-07, citing 37 NLRB Ann. Rep. 13 (1972).
49 See id.
' 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
2 Id. at 264-65.
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employees had failed to satisfy the threshold requirement of showing
continuity in the work force. Its claims, therefore, did not warrant
invocation of the labor law policy considerations which, in prior
cases, had given rise to successors' duties to arbitrate, 3 bargain, 4 or
remedy a predecessor's unfair labor practices. 5 In contrast, during
the Survey year the Fifth Circuit in Steelworkers v. United States
Gypsum Co. 6 held that a duty to arbitrate would survive the sale of
a business where the requirement of continuity of the work force in
a substantially unchanged working environment was met. 7
The NLRB, in 1974, failed to develop clear standards for
determining successorship obligations where the corporate transition
results in retention of some of the predecessor's employees in an
expanded bargaining unit. In Spruce Up Corp.,8 the Board split
three ways in formulating tests for determining the number of
employees from the predecessor's work force which must be retained
in a new, expanded unit before a sucessor's duty to bargain arises.
In a separate section of its Spruce Up opinion, 9 the Board addressed
itself to the application of dicta in NLRB v. Burns Interna-
tional Security Services, Inc." which indicated that where
"it is perfectly clear that the new employer plans to retain all of the
employees in the unit [he must] initially consult with the employees'
bargaining representative before he fixes terms."" The Board
applied this language very narrowly in Spruce Up, holding that the
employer who intends to retain all or most of his predecessor's
employees has no duty to bargain with their representative about
initial terms of employment, unless he has unconditionally offered
them re-employment. 12 As a result of the current Board policy, a
"successor" employer evidently may bargain individually with the
employees whom he intends to retain, with his collective bargaining
obligation arising only after a majority of employees have been hired
under the individually negotiated terms."
The impact of these court and Board decisions on the develop-
' John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
4
 NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972). For a discussion of
Burns see 1972-73 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev.
1173, 1209-16 (1973).
5
 Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973). For a discussion of Golden
State, see 1973-74 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 15 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev.
1105, 1160-63 (1974).
6
 492 F.2d 713, 85 L.R.R,M. 2962 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974).
492 F.2d at 726, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2971.
5 209 N.L.R.E. No. 19, 85 L.R.R.M. 1426 (1974).
9
 85 L.R.R.M. at 1426-28.
406 U.S. 272 (1972).
" Id. at 294-95.
12 85 L.R.R.M. at 1428.
" Sec id.
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ing law of "successorship" is best understood in light of earlier
Supreme Court decisions defining the duties of successor employees.
In its first encounter with the successorship problem in 1964, the
Court held in John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston" that a corporation
which had absorbed its predecessor through a merger, and had
continued the employment of all of its predecessor's employees,
must arbitrate with their union representative under the predeces-
sor's collective bargaining agreement." In Wiley the Court stressed
the central role which arbitration plays in effectuating national labor
policy. 16 However, the Court stated that the duty to arbitrate would
be imposed only where there was a "continuity of identity in the
business enterprise," 17 a condition interpreted in the Survey year in
Howard Johnson to include the retention of a substantial portion of
the predecessor's employees.'s The duty to arbitrate, therefore, ap-
peared to stem from the need to avoid industrial strife through
affording retained employees a degree of protection against sudden
changes in their conditions of employment." However, Wiley in-
volved a merger in which the predecessor corporation dis-
appeared. 20 The Supreme Court has subsequently attached consid-
erable significance to this fact, indicating that Wiley might be read
as having turned in large part on a factual finding or a legal
conclusion under state law that the successor impliedly assumed the
labor relations obligations of its predecessor." In its next successor-
ship decision, NLRB v. Burns International Security Services,
Inc., 22
 the Supreme Court refused to enforce a Board order that a
successor employer adhere to the substantive terms of the predeces-
sor's collective bargaining agreement. 23 The Court noted that the
compelling national policy favoring arbitration, stressed in Wiley, 24
was inapplicable in Burns, where the Board, rather than an arbi-
trator, was imposing the contract terms on the successor employer."
Furthermore, Wiley was inapposite insofar as its finding of a duty to
bargain was based on the successor's implied assumption, in the
14
 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
13 Id. at 548.
IS Id. at 549.
17 Id. at 551.
18 417 U.S. at 258-59.
19 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 549.
20 Id. at 544-45.
" Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257; Burns, 406 U.S. at 286. See Wiley, 376 U.S. at
547-48. More likely, the Supreme Court has narrowed retroactively Wiley's basis of decision.
22 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
23 Id. at 291.
24 376 U.S. at 549.
25 406 U.S. at 286.
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merger, of the predecessor's labor relations obligations. 26 Burns had
merely outbid its predecessor for a security services contract and
retained its predecessor's employees without purchasing any of the
predecessor's assets or assuming its obligations. 27 In addition, the
Court in Burns based its denial of enforcement of the Board's order
on the NLRA's command that the parties be free from governmen-
tally imposed substantive contract terms. 28
Finding no basis in law for requiring Burns to honor its pre-
decessor's contract, the Court also noted. that the automatic imposi-
tion of the predecessor's labor relations obligations would hamper
the free transfer of capital. 29 Moreover, binding a union to the old
contract would prevent it from seeking more favorable terms than
were available from the putatively less prosperous predecessor. 3 °
Thus, the Court's holding was based both on policy considerations
favoring maximization of successor employer and union freedom
and on an absence of federal labor law policies requiring survival of
the predecessor's contract terms. 3 '
The Burns decision, in turn, must be read in light of the
Court's 1973 opinion in Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB. 32 In
that case, the interest of a successor employer in freedom from the
predecessor's labor relations obligations was held subordinate to
labor law policies requiring the remedying of an unfair labor prac-
tice committed by the predecessor." The purchasing corporation,
which retained most of the predecessor's employees and which had
26 Id. at 286-87. See Wiley, 376 U.S. at 547-48.
27 406 U.S. at 286-87. The Court stated:
Burns purchased nothing from Wackenhut and became liable for none of its finan-
cial obligations. Burns merely hired enough of Wackenhut's employees to require it
to bargain with the union as commanded by § 8(a}(5), [29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970)i
and § 9(a) [29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970)]. But this consideration is a wholly insufficient
basis for implying either in fact or in law that Burns had agreed or must be held to
have agreed to honor Wackenhut's collective-bargaining contract.
Id.
23 Id. at 281-84. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970) provides that the obligation to bargain in good
faith "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession."
29 406 U.S. at 287-88.
39 Id. at 288.
The Court also held in Burns that a successor employer would be required to bargain
"where the bargaining unit remains unchanged and a majority of the employees hired by the
new employer are represented by a recently certified bargaining agent . . ." Id. at 281. In
such a case, the union is presumed to have retained its majority status, see id., and the duty
to bargain arises from the command of § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970), that an
employer "bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees . . . ." See 406 U.S.
at 281. In addition, the Court held that the duty to bargain would mature only when the new
employer had hired an apparent majority of employees from the old unit. Id. at 295.
32 414 U.S. 168 (1973).
33
 Id. at 184-85 .
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notice of the predecessor's outstanding obligation to remedy the
unfair labor practice. , 34 was required to reinstate and to provide
back pay to an unlawfully discharged employee. 35
In Golden State the Supreme Court balanced successor
employers' interests in the free transfer of capital and freedom in
initiating the enterprise against the policies of the NLRA. On bal-
ance, the discharged employee's right to reinstatement and back
pay was found to merit greater recognition. 36 Furthermore, the
retained employees would be likely to view the successor's failure to
remedy the unfair labor practice as a continuation of the predeces-
sor's labor policies, with resulting labor unrest. 37 Alternatively, the
unremedied unfair labor practice might deter protected organiza-
tional activities, further frustrating the purposes of the NLRA. 38 In
comparison the burden placed on successor employers would be
minimal. Notice to the successor of the outstanding duty to remedy
the unfair labor practice is necessary before liability may be im-
posed. 39 The purchaLsing corporation, therefore, may protect itself
through a reduction in the sales price or an indemnification clause in
the contract of sale. 4 °
After Golden State it appears that a successor employer's in-
terest in freedom from the predecessor's labor relations commit-
ments, emphasized in Burns,'" is not always paramount. Rather,
the vindication of important national labor policies may burden the
corporate transition. And, in contrast to the Court's narrow reading
in Burns of Wiley as a case involving a merger, 42 Golden State
appears to teach that Wiley's command" to balance the interests of
retained employees against those of the purchasing corporation re-
mains 'viable in the developing law of successorship.
B. Duty to Arbitrate
1. Howard Johnson
Against this background, the Supreme Court decided Howard
Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Board.' The
34 Id. at 171.
38 Id. at 171-72.
36 Id. at 181.
37
 Id. at 184.
38 Id.
38 Perma Vinyl Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. 968, 969, 65 L.R.R.M. 1168, 1169 (1967), enforced
sub nom. United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 544, 68 L.R.R.M. 2913 (5th Cir.
1968).
48 Golden State, 414 U.S. at t85.
41 See 406 U.S. at 287-88.
42 See 406 U.S. at 286. See text at notes 20-21 supra.
43
 376 U.S. at 549.
417 U.S. 249 (1974).
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petitioner in Howard Johnson had purchased the assets of a corpo-
ration which operated a motel and restaurant and which had en-
tered into a collective bargaining agreement with its employees. In
the contract of sale, Howard Johnson expressly disclaimed its pre-
decessor's contractual labor obligations, which included a duty to
arbitrate. 2
 The successor corporation then recruited its own 45
member labor force, hiring only 9 of the predecessor's employees. 3
The union representing the predecessor's employees sued How-
ard Johnson under section 301 4
 to compel arbitrations According to
the union, the successor was bound by the contract provisions
requiring continuation of the old work force except in cases of "just
cause" dismissal. 6
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court, which had relied
on John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston"' in ordering arbitration. 8 In
the Court's view, Howard Johnson's similarity to Wiley ended with
the nature of the remedy sought. 9 First, Howard Johnson involved
no merger whereby the predecessor employer disappeared. Instead,
the predecessor remained a viable entity to which the union could
turn for damages." Furthermore, the Court perceived in the Wiley
merger an implied assumption of the predecessor's contractual labor
relations commitments; in Howard Johnson, the successor merely
purchased some assets and expressly disclaimed the predecessor's
contractual duties to its employees."
Secondly, the Court also interpreted the successor's obligation
in Wiley as deriving in part from the retained employees' need for
protection from sudden changes in the conditions of their employ-
ment and arbitration's therapeutic effect in avoiding industrial
2 Id. at 251-52.
Id. at 252.
4 Section 301(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970), provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce , .. may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties . .. .
5 417 U.S. at 253.
° Id. at 260.
7
 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
8
 417 U.S. at 255-56. See Detroit Joint Bd. v. Howard Johnson Co., 81 L.R.R.M. 2329
(E.D. Mich. 1972), affd, 482 F.2d 489, 83 L:R.R.M. 2804 (6th Cir. 1973).
9 417 U.S. at 255, The Court rejected the notion that § 301 suits to compel arbitration
might succeed where, in similar circumstances, national labor policies would prevent the
Board from finding an unfair labor practice. Thus, it cannot be said "that the basic policies
found controlling in an unfair labor practice context may be disregarded by the courts in a suit
under § 301, and thus . . permit the rights enjoyed by the new employer in a successorship
context to depend upon the forum in which the union presses its claims." Id. at 256.
1 ° Id. at 257. In view of the Court's apparent emphasis on the need for continued
viability of the predecessor corporation, it may be argued that, as a matter of federal common
law, a merger will create a duty in the surviving corporation to honor the predecessor's labor
relations commitments, irrespective of the duties imposed by state law in a merger situation.
ti See id. at 257.
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strife. 12
 Such policy considerations were absent in Howard Johnson
where the successor replaced most of the work force. Moreover,
since NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc.' 3 pro-
vided that the successor had no duty as a:matter of law to retain any
of the predecessor's employees," it would be anomalous to enable a
union, through a suit to compel arbitration, to defeat an employer's
right under Burns to,replace the work force.' 5 In the absence of the
requisite continuity in the work force creating a duty to arbitrate,
the union's argument that the successor was obliged to arbitrate the
absence of continuity was pure bootstrap. 16
Although the federal common law of "successorship" is far from
fully developed, several general principles are evident in light of
Howard Johnson, Burns and Wiley. First, successor employers'
duties to the predecessor's employees to arbitrate, bargain or remedy
unfair labor practices do not mature until a majority in the pre-
decessor's bargaining iunit are hired." Thus, a successor may avoid
such obligations by recruiting its own work force except to the
extent that section 8(a)(3)" prohibits discrimination based on anti-
union animus." Successor employers, then, have maximum free-
dom in determining whether obligations to predecessor employees
will be honored. Employees such as those replaced by Howard
Johnson are virtually at the mercy of the marketplace.
This state of the law may prove harsh for employees nondis-
criminatorily discharged by the successor. However, the Court
seems correct in its finding that nothing in the NLRA, save its
condemnation of anti-union discrimination, requires the continua-
tion of predeccessor employees' jobs. 2° Moreover, except where an
assumption of the predecessor corporation's obligations in a merger
is implied as a matter of state law, "the principles of law governing
" Id. at 264.
13 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
14 See id. at 287-88.
15
 417 U.S. at 262.
16
 See id. at 262-63.
17
 Burns, 406 U.S. at 281.
" 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970) outlaws discrimination by an employer "in regard to hire
or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization."
l9
Of course, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in hiring
or retention of employees on the basis of union membership or activity under
§ 8(a)(3) . . . Thus, a new owner could not refuse to hire the employees of his
predecessor solely because they were union members or to avoid having to recognize
the union.
Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 262 n.8. See also Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. No. 53,
88 L.R.R.M. 1196 (1974); Creengate Mall, Inc., 209 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 85 L.R.R.M. 1303
(1974).
20 See Burns, 406 U.S. at 280 n.5.
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ordinary contracts would not bind to a contract an unconsenting
successor . . . ." 21 The Supreme Court's unwillingness to depart
from such contract principles in developing the common law of
successorship is the resolution of several policy considerations. Rec-
ognition of the survival of employees' contractual rights to continued
employment would certainly deter purchasing entrepreneurs who
are anxious to reorganize an enterprise which in many instances
may be failing. 22 Moreover, if all substantive contract rights were
held to survive the sale to the successor, the unforeseeability of the
scope of assumed obligations might have an even greater deterrent
effect on successors. 23 On the other hand, it is suggested that unions
might mitigate the harshness of a lack of enforceable rights against
successors by securing in the predecessor's collective bargaining
agreement a liquidated damages clause or other provision protecting
employees discharged as a result of sale of the business.
In the event the successor employer retains a majority of the
predecessor's bargaining unit, the extent of his obligations is deter-
mined by a balancing of such factors as maximization of the free
transfer of capital, deterrence of, industrial unrest stemming from
frustration of reasonable employee expectations, and vindication of
the other policies of the NLRA. 24 A duty to bargain25 or to arbi-
trate 26 might survive a sale of assets to, or merger with, a successor
because of the relatively minor inconvenience to the successor, the
retained employees' interest in job security, and the national interest
in industrial peace. For similar reasons, the duty to remedy a
predecessor's unfair labor practices may survive. 27 However, suc-
cessors' interests in initiating their enterprises unimpeded by the
predecessor's contractual labor obligations, and union's parallel in-
terests in bargaining from scratch with successors, militate against
the survival of substantive contract terms. 28
2. United States Gypsum
In Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive
Board, 1
 the Court did not decide whether an employer who pur-
chases the assets of his predecessor and retains most of the employees
in an unchanged working environment will be required to arbitrate
21 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 550.
22 See Burns, 406 U.S. at 287-88.
23 See id. at 288-90.
24 See, e.g., Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 184-85 (1973).
25 See Burns, 406 U.S. 272,
26 See Wiley, 376 U.S. 543.
27 Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 184-85 (1973).
28 Burns, 406 U.S. at 287-88.
417 U.S. 249 (1974).
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grievances under the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. 2
Resolution of this question entails a difficult reconciliation of the
sometimes conflicting language and policy considerations found in
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston3 and NLRB v. Burns Inter-
national Security Services, Inc. 4 For example, in Wiley, the Court
stated:
The objectives of national labor policy, reflected in estab-
lished principles of federal law, require that the rightful
prerogative of owners independently to rearrange their
businesses . . . be balanced by some protection to the
employees from a sudden change in the employment relation-
ship. The transition from one corporate organization to
another will in most cases be eased and industrial strife
avoided if employees' claims continued to be resolved by
arbitration . . . . 5
On the other hand, the Court in Burns held that the successor
employer's interest in freedom to reorganize the enterprise unham-
pered by the predecessor's labor relations commitments outweighed
retained employees' interests in the carry-over of substantive provi-
sions of the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. 6
Moreover, in the absence of labor law policies suggesting an as-
sumption of the predecessor's contractual obligations as a matter of
law, the NLRA's guarantee of governmental abstention from the
imposition of contract terms 7 prevented the Board from binding
Burns to its predecessor's contract. 8
However, the Burns decision leaves open the possibility that a
Wiley duty to arbitrate grievances under the predecessor's contract
may survive in a successorship situation even though the entire
contract will not. In a significant Survey year decision, Steelworkers
v. United States Gypsum Co., 9 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
2 Id. at 256.
3 376 U.S. 549 (1964). See pp. 1020-21 supra.
• 406 U.S. 272, 287-88 (1972). See pp. 1020-21 supra.
5 376 U.S. at 549. The holding in Wiley, however, was much narrower:
We hold that the disappearance by merger of a corporate employer which has
entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a union does not automatically
terminate all rights of the employees covered by the agreement, and that, in appro-
priate circumstances, present here, the successor employer may be required to arbi-
trate with the union under the agreement.
Id. at 548.
6 406 U.S. at 287-88.
▪ "[AIBowing the Board to compel agreement when the parties themselves are unable to
agree would violate the fundamental premise on which the Act is based—private bargaining
under governmental supervision of the procedure alone, without any official compulsion over
the actual terms of the contract." H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970).
• 406 U.S. at 287.
9 492 F.2d 713, 85 L.R.R.M. 2962 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974).
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Circuit held that the principles enunciated in Wiley retained
sufficient vitality to require an unconsenting successor, who pur-
chased the predecessor's physical plant and employed nearly all of the
predecessor's employees, to arbitrate under the predecessor's collective
bargaining agreement.!°
In United States Gypsum, the Steelworkers Union was certified
as bargaining representative of the production and maintenance
employees of the predecessor corporation." Subsequently, United
States Gypsum purchased the predecessor's physical plant and re-
nounced the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement with the
Steelworkers." However, the Company retained all but three of the
predecessor's employees and operated the plant substantially as be-
fore." After a successful section 301 action to compel arbitration
under the predecessor's contract," the arbitrator ordered the com-
pany to recognize the union as bargaining representative," to com-
pensate the employees for a wage increase delayed by the employer's
refusal to bargain, 16 and to compensate the union for dues not
checked off."
In upholding the arbitrator's award, the Fifth Circuit distin-
guished Burns on several grounds. First, United States Gypsum was
"an example of an almost uninterrupted continuation of the same
labor environment as existed with the previous employer . . .""
Thus, employees' legitimate expectations of continuity in both work-
ing conditions and their employer's labor relations policies where the
successor left the predecessor's business operations substantially un-
changed,' 9 favored survival of a duty to arbitrate in a case such as
United States Gypsum where little more than title to the corporate
assets had been altered. 2° Furthermore, in the absence of arbitra-
tion, the frustration of employee expectations might undermine the
union's prestige or encourage industrial unrest, consequences con-
trary to the purposes of the NLRA. 21 In addition, arbitration pro-
vided a measure of stability for employees during a critical period in
their employment, an interest which Wiley found worthy of protec-
tion. 22
10
 492 F.2d at 725-27, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2970-72.
11
 Id. at 716, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2963.
12 Id., 85 L.R.R.M. at 2963-64.
13 Id., 85 L.R.R.M. at 2964.
14 Id. at 718, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2965.
Ls Id.
16 Id,
17 Id. at 719, 85 L.R.R.M, at 2966.
IR Id. at 726, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2971.
19 Id., quoting Burns, 406 U.S. at 304 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
26 See 492 F.2d at 726, 85 L.R,II.M. at 2971.
21 See id.
22
 376 U.S. at 549.
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Secondly, the Fifth Circuit attached significance to the fact that
in United States Gypsum an arbitrator would have the freedom to
determine which contract provisions would survive. 23 In Burns, on
the other hand, the Board purported to bind the successor to all the
terms of the predecessor's contract. 24 This distinction is important
since:
an arbitrator's acknowledged expertise in contract interpre-
tation permit[s] ,him to evaluate the collective bargaining
agreement sought to be carried over in light of the condi-
tions existing after the change and against the backdrop
of the predecessor's relationship with the union in order
to determine the extent to which the predecessor's labor
agreement should be deemed binding on the successor. 25
The Board, on the other hand, in enforcing an alleged obligation
of Burns under sections 8(a)(1) 26 and 8(a)(5)27 "followed an all or
nothing approach, thus introducing an undesirably rigid analysis to
the resolution of successorship problems." 28
Nevertheless, it should be noted that, because United States
Gypsum preceded the Supreme Court's decision in Howard Johnson,
the Fifth Circuit could not directly address itself to dicta in Howard
Johnson which suggegted that a duty to arbitrate under section 301 was
subject to the same constraints as a Board order to adhere to a
predecessor's substantive contract terms in a section 8(a)(5) or 8(a)(1)
proceeding:
[In Burns] we emphasized that freedom of collective bargain-
ing ... was a "fundamental premise" of the federal labor laws
. . . and that it was therefore improper to hold Burns to the
substantive terms of a collective-bargaining agreement
which it had neither expressly nor impliedly assumed. 29
In addition, the Court in Howard Johnson noted that the section 8(d)36
prohibition against Board imposition of substantive contract terms
in an unfair labor practice proceeding should similarly re-
strain the federal courts in a section 301 action to compel arbitration
under the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement, both to
23
 492 F.2d at 726-27, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2971-72.
24
 Id. at 727, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2972. See Burns, 406 U.S. at 276 & n.2.
25 United States Gypsum, 492 F.2d at 727, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2972.
26
 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1),(1970).
27
 Id. § 158(a)(5).
2g
 492 F.2d at 727, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2972.
29 Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 254-55, quoting Burns, 406 U.S. at 287.
3° 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970) provides in pertinent part that the duty to bargain "does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession."
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discourage forum-shopping and to insure substantive consistency in
federal labor law as developed by the Board and the courts. 3 ' In light
of the emphasis in Howard Johnson 32 and Burns33 on insuring free
collective bargaining unfettered by the terms of a predecessor's labor
contract, it may be argued that the federal policy against binding an
employer and a union to contract terms prohibits the survival of the
contractual duty to arbitrate in a successorship situation as in United
States Gypsum. Such an approach, however, assumes that the contract
terms are being imposed from without by judicial or administrative
fiat, as in the case of a Board order to agree to a contract term. On the
other hand, such an argument against the result in United States
Gypsum Co. might be countered by recognizing that, as a matter of
federal common law, the substantial continuity of the identity of the
employing industry, the need to afford the retained work force a degree
of protection, and the labor law policies favoring prevention of
industrial unrest create an implied contractual assumption of the
predecessor's duty to arbitrate. 34 Thus a successor's duty to arbitrate
would arise from his own contractual undertaking and not from a court
or Board order that all contract terms survive."
31 417 U.S. at 255-56. Both Burns, 406 U.S. at 283-84, 287, and Howard Johnson, 417
U.S. at 254-55, relied heavily on H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970), in extending
the doctrine of governmental abstention from imposition of a predecessor's substantive con-
tract terms in a successorship situation.
32 417 U.S. at 254-55.
33 406 U.S. at 287.
' See Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973).
[T]he general rule of corporate liability is that when a corporation sells all of its
assets to another, the latter is not responsible for the seller's debts or liabilities,
except where (1) the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume the obliga-
tions; (2) the purchaser is merely a continuation of the selling corporation; or (3) the
transaction is entered into to escape liability. .. The perimeters of the labor-law
doctrine of successorship, however, have not been so narrowly confined. . .
Successorship has been found "where the new employer purchases a part or all of the
assets of the predecessor employer ... [and] where the entire business is purchased
by the new employer . . ." The refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the
Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets is
attributable to the fact that, so long as there is a continuity in the 'employing
industry," the public policies underlying the doctrine will be served by its broad
application.
Id. at 182 n.5, quoting Burns, 406 U.S. at 306 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
But see Burns, 406 U.S. at 291. A duty to observe the pre-existing contract does not
"ensue as a matter of law from the mere fact that an employer is doing the same work in the
same place with the same employees as his predecessor .. . ." Id. The Court, however, did not
address itself to the question whether the duty to arbitrate might be implied where the employer
had not merely outbid its predecessor, see id. at 274-75, but had purchased the enterprise and had
continued operations substantially as before. See also Wiley, 376 U.S. at 551.
35 See Wiley, 376 U.S. at 550-51.
Central to the peculiar status and function of a collective bargaining agreement is the
fact, dictated both by circumstance . . . and by the requirements of the National
Labor Relations Act, that it is not in any real sense the simple product of a
consensual relationship. Therefore, although the duty to arbitrate . . . must be
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Recognizing the survival of a duty to arbitrate in a situation where
the transfer of corporate assets results in few or no changes in the work
environment would impose less of a burden on successor employers
than recognition of full contract survival. 36 The more limited burden
of arbitration would logically reduce inhibitions on free transfer of
capital and freedom in initiating the new enterprise, interests recog-
nized as compelling in Burns." Moreover, a union desiring to bargain
from scratch with the successor could waive arbitration." Further-
more, the survival of a duty to arbitrate would be consistent with the
Court's repeated recognition of "the central role of arbitration in
effectuating national labor policy."39 Because of arbitration's arguably
less inhibiting effect on the free transfer of capital and because of its
unique role in alleviating employer/employee strife, the balance struck
by the court in United States Gypsum in favor of survival of duty to
arbitrate appears correct.
C. Duty to Bargain: Spruce Up
1. Expanded Bargaining Unit
In NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc.,' the
Court held that "where the bargaining unit remains unchanged and
a majority of the employees hired by the new employer are rep-
resented by a recently certified bargaining agent" the Board may
order the successor to bargain.' However, the Court did not address
itself to the question of whether a duty to bargain may be imposed
upon a successor where the bargaining unit is changed in the corpo-
rate transition, or where a majority of employees in the new unit
founded on a contract, the impressive policy considerations favoring arbitration are
not wholly overborne by the fact that Wiley did not sign the contract being
construed. . . . There was a contract, and Interscience, Wiley's predecessor, was
party to it. We thus find Wiley's obligation to arbitrate this dispute in the Intersci-
ence contract construed in the context of a national labor policy.
Id.
26 United States Gypsum; 492 F.2d at 727, 85 L.R.R,M. at 2972.
27 406 U.S. at 287-88. Cf. Golden State Bottling Co. v, NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 185
(1973). In binding a successor to remedy the predecessor's unfair labor practice, laivoidance
of labor strife, prevention of a deterrent effect on the exercise of rights guaranteed employees
by § 7 ... and protection for the victimized employee . . . are achieved at a relatively minimal cost
to the bona fide successor." Id.
28 See Burns, 406 U.S. at 288 (survival of all contract terms rejected as unnecessarily
inhibiting a union desiring to bargain from scratch with a successor employer).
39 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 549. "It would derogate from 'the federal policy of settling
labor disputes by arbitration' . . if a change in the corporate structure or ownership of a
business enterprise had the automatic consequence of removing a duty to arbitrate previously
established . . ." Id., quoting Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
596 (1960).
I 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
2 Id. at 281.
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were not represented by the union certified to represent the old unit.
In Spruce Up Corp., 3 the Board split three ways in attempting to
decide what number of employees in an old unit must be carried
over in a new, expanded unit before a successor has a duty to
bargain. In Spruce Up, a union was certified as bargaining represen-
tative for barbers employed in 19 shops on a military base. Before
the end of the certification year, a new concessionaire submitted a
winning bid to operate the 19 unionized barbershops as well as 8
non-union shops on the base. 4 When the shops began operation
under new management a majority of barbers from the old unit had
been hired; however, the unionized barbers did not represent a
majority in the new unit of 27 shops. 5
On these facts, four of the five Board members agreed that the
successor employer had a duty to bargain with the union. 6 How-
ever, the Board was divided in identifying the number of retained
employees which will give rise to a successorship duty to bargain.
Three members of the Board agreed that employees from the former
unit must form a "majority" of employees in the new appropriate
unit within the successor's operation before the new employer must
bargain.? However, these members disagreed among themselves in
deciding how majority status would be shown. Member Kennedy,
noting in dissent that the appropriate unit had been expanded in the
corporate transition from 19 to 27 barbershops, argued that the
union's continued majority status should be found only where
employees from the certified unit represented a majority in the new
unit. 8 Members Jenkins and Miller, on the other hand, would first
determine whether a majority of employees from the certified unit
had been retained in the transition. Then, if, as in Spruce Up, the
expansion of the unit were no greater than that which would consti-
tute an accretion had the original employer retained ownership, they
would find a duty to bargain since there was no "substantial altera-
tion in the basic character of the [original] unit." 9
3 209 N.L.R.B. No. 19, 85 L.R.R.M. 1426 (1974),
85 L.R.R.M. at 1427.
5 See id. at 1428.
6 Id, at 1428 (Members Jenkins and Miller). Id. at 1437-38 (Member Fanning concur-
ring). Id. at 1441 & n.48 (Member Penello concurring).
See id. at 1429 (Members Jenkins and Miller); id, at 1432 (Member Kennedy dissent-
ing).
'3 Id. at 1434 (Member Kennedy dissenting).
9 Id. at 1429 (Members Jenkins and Miller).
This addition of a few more shops does not destroy the basic continuituf the
employing industry, which is the keystone of our successorship doctrine. . . . [H]ad
the predecessor acquired the contract to operate these eight additional shops, we
would have treated the addition of these like facilities and similarly classified
employees as an accretion to the certified unit. . . .
Such an accretion would have given the predecessor no right to question the
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In contrast, Members Fanning and Penello argued that the
duty to bargain "does not depend on the employment of a majority
of the predecessor's employees, but on whether a legally significant
portion of the successor's employment .force consists of employees
previously employed in the bargaining unit."'° These Members
defined "legally significant portion" no more precisely than as the
"stable nucleus" of the employment force."
Three distinct views may be identified in Spruce Up. Members
Fanning and Penello would tie a successor's bargaining obligation to
retention of a nebulously defined, "legally significant" portion of the
predecessor's employees. 12 Members Jenkins and Miller would find
a duty to bargain only where a majority from the certified unit was
retained, provided that the old unit is not substantially altered."
Member Kennedy Would require the "successor" to bargain only
where a majority of the new unit was employed in the certified
unit." The situation,is further confused by the retirement of Chair-
man Miller, leaving the Fanning-Penello position the only one re-
taining the expressed support of more than one Board member.
It is suggested that Member Kennedy's view—that majority
status must be measured in the context of the new unit—is the most
defensible. In such cases, where the attitudes of new employees are
unknown and the retained employees' support for the union can
only be inferred from the results of a past election in which many of
those employees may well have opposed the union, a presumption of
continued majority status for the union is logically unsupportable.
The imposition in Burns of a duty to bargain where the unit re-
mained unchanged and a bare majority of employees from the
certified unit were retained represented a difficult accommodation of
the conflicting policies of the NLRA favoring both a continued
presumption of a union's majority status's and employ6es' rights to
continuing majority status of the Union. Neither, then, do we understand why the
successor to the bargaining obligation should be permitted to do so, if it becomes
clear on the record evidence that his hires [sic] from the predecessor's work force
meet the test announced ,by the Supreme Court—i.e., that the majority status of the
Union in the preexisting unit has been reestablished.
Id. at 1428-29,
" Id. at 1437 (Membei Fanning concurring). See id. at 1441 n.48 (Member Penello
concurring).
Id, at 1437 (Member Fanning concurring). Id. at 1441 n.48 (Member Penello concur-
ring).
12
 Id.
13 See id. at 1429 (Members Jenkins and Miller).
14
 Id. at 1432 (Member Kennedy dissenting).
15
 See 29 U.S.C. § 159(0(3) (1970), which provides in relevant part that "[n]o election
shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any subdivision within which in the preceding
twelve-month period, a valid election shall have been held." See also Burns, 406 U.S. at 279
n.3.
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a free selection or rejection of a bargaining representative.' 6 Where
the new unit consists mostly of new employees it would seem that
the old unit has been sufficiently drastically altered to tip the bal-
ance in favor of recognition of employees' right to a new selection.
Furthermore, where the union has no relationship to a majority of
employees in the new unit its interest in an assured status as bar-
gaining representative seems less compelling than the employees'
right to a new election.
In Spruce Up, Members Jenkins and Miller justified a presump-
tion of the union's continued majority status by analogizing to the
presumption accorded a union in an accretion situation. 17 In such a
case, the addition of a few employees to an established bargaining
unit does not disturb the union's presumed continued majority
status. However, the Jenkins-Miller analogy is inaccurate insofar as
it ignores the fact that the corporate transition in Spruce Up had
resulted in a majority of newly hired, non-union employees, a situa-
tion quite different from a typical accretion where the nucleus of the
unit remains unchanged as the unit size is slightly increased. In such
a situation, where the majority from the old unit has chosen a
union, the labor law policies favoring a continued presumption of
majority status's should not be overrides by the mathematical pos-
sibility that the addition of new employees might reverse the election
result.
2. Date when Duty Arises
In Spruce Up, the Board also dealt with the separate problem
of determining when a successor, who intends to retain all or most
of his predecessor's employees, must bargain with their union rep-
resentative. The Supreme Court, in dicta in NLRB v. Burns Inter-
national Security Services, Inc. noted that "a successor employer is
ordinarily free to set initial terms on which it will hire the employees
of a predecessor . . ." 1
 However, the Court also stated that "there
will be instances in which it is perfectly clear that the new employer
plans to retain all of the employees in the unit and in which it will
be appropriate to have him initially consult with the employees'
bargaining representative before he fixes terms." 2 In Spruce Up a
16
 See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970), which provides that "[rlepresentatives designated or
selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes shall be the exclusive representatives . . . for the purposes of
collective bargaining . . . ."
12 85 L,R.R.M. at 1429.
II
 See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 99-100 (1954).
' 406 U.S. 272, 294 (1972),
2 Id. at 294-95.
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divided Board construed this exception very narrowly, holding that
a successor must consult3 with the union before establishing initial
terms of employment in the new enterprise only where he (1) "misled
employees into believing they would all be retained without change
in their wages, hours, or conditions of employment" or (2) "failed to
clearly announce [his] intent to establish a new set of conditions
prior to inviting former employees to accept employment." Thus,
an employer intending to retain all or a majority of his predecessor's
employees may bargain individually with the employees about their
conditions of employment under the new ownership provided that
he has not unconditionally offered re-employment. 5
In Spruce Up, the employer took over a barbershop concession
at a military base. 6 Before commencing operations, the new
employer "expressed a general willingness to hire the barbers
employed by the former employer," 7 all of whom were unionized, 8
but added that he would be offering less favorable terms of
employment. Thereafter, the employer refused to bargain with the
union representative about those initial conditions of employment. 9
The employer's, general offer of re-employment did not precede
his announcement of less favorable terms of employment. The
Board found no unfair labor practice since his intent to hire the
barbers was conditioned on their acceptance of the new employment
terms:
When an employer who has not yet commenced operations
announces new terms prior to or simultaneously with his
invitation to the previous work force to accept employment
under those terms, we do not think it can fairly be said
that the new employer "plans to retain all of the employees
in the unit," as that phrase was intended by the Supreme
Court. The possibility that the old employees may not
enter into an' employment relationship with the new
employer is a real one . . .”10
According to the Board, an employer forfeits his Burns right to
set unilaterally initial conditions of employment only where he uncon-
3 In Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 205 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 84 L.R.R.M. 1052, 1054 (1973),
the Board held that the duty to consult entailed the full statutory duty to bargain.
85 L.R.R.M. at 1428.
See id.
6 Id. at 1427.
7
 Id. at 1428. The employer testified that he had told the employees' bargaining represen-
tative that "all the barber's who are working will work." Id. at 1427.
Id. at 1427.
9 Id.
1 ° Id. at 1428.
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ditionally offers re-employment to the predecessor's employees before
fixing those terms."
The Board justified its narrow reading of the "perfectly clear"
exception set out in Burns 12 on the ground that a rule more protective
of employees' bargaining, rights would deter a successor "from com-
menting favorably at all upon employment prospects of old employees
for fear he would thereby forfeit his right to unilaterally set initial terms
. . . "" Moreover, employers might refuse to hire some of the old
employees in order to avoid a bargaining obligation. 14 According to the
Board, a different interpretation of Burns would be "subject to abuse"
and would "encourage employer action contrary to the purposes" of the
NLRA. 15
It is submitted that the majority's reading of Burns is erroneous.
First, as noted by Member Fanning in his dissent, the Spruce Up rule
leads to the anomalous, if not absurd, result that a bar-
gaining obligation . .. arises when the successor plans to
retain the former employees at the terms their union had
already established through collective bargaining with the
predecessor employer but not when he plans to retain them
at terms different from those previously established."
Thus, the Burns exception announced by the Supreme Court has
been reduced by the Board to a virtual nullity since bargaining
would be required only where there exists no union-employer dis-
pute as to the terms of employment. ' 7
The majority also ignored dicta in Burns which indicated that
the successor employer in that case would have been required to
bargain with retained employees' union representative about initial
" Id. In deciding Spruce Up, the majority decision inexplicably ignored its unanimous
holding in Howard Johnson Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 98, 80 L.R.R.M. 1769 (1972). (This
Board decision is unrelated to the 1974-75 Survey year case, Howard Johnson Co, v. Detroit
Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974). See text at pp. 1022-25 supra.) In Howard John-
son Co,, the Board found that . a successor employer had a duty to bargain under the Burns
exception where the successor's manager "held group meetings with the motel employees in
which he . . . reassured the employees of their jobs, and advised them of the wages and
employee benefits which they would receive from Respondent, comparing them to those they
had been receiving pursuant to the predecessor's union contracts." 80 L.R.R.M. at 1770. The
relevant facts of Howard Johnson thus appear indistinguishable from Spruce Up, where the
Board found offers of employment coupled with differing terms of employment to be condi-
tional offers of employment which do not create a bargaining obligation, See 85 L.R.R.M. at
1428.
IS See text at notes 1-2 supra.
85 L.R.R.M. at 1428.
14 Id, Discrimination in hiring based on union membership, however, violates § 8(a)(3),
29 U.S.C. §158(a)(3) (1970). See Burns, 406 U.S. at 280 n.5.
15 85 L.R.R.M. at 1428.
16 Id. at 1439 (Member Fanning dissenting).
17 Id. See also id. at 1440 (Member Penello dissenting).
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terms of employment as soon as he had hired the employees under
those terms but before the commencement of business operations."
It should be "the successor's intention to hire, not its determination
of the terms under which it will hire, that determines whether or not
he must honor a timely demand for bargaining prior to the com-
mencement of operations. " 19
Moreover, the Spruce Up rule, which enables a new employer
who intends to hire all or most of the predecessor's work force to
bargain individually with the employees, needlessly subordinates the
employees' section 7 rights to bargain collectively. The Supreme
Court has explicity recognized that in a successorship situation
retained employees need protection from sudden changes in
employment conditions. 2° Indeed, the purpose of the Burns ex-
ception is to protect such employees by affording them the right to
deal collectively with the successor where "it is perfectly clear that
the new employer plans to retain all of the employees in the unit
. . . ."21 It appears illogical to conclude that the Court intended that the
duty to bargain about changes in employment conditions could be
avoided by changing employment conditions, the very subject of the
bargaining duty.
Finally, the Board majority's fear that a rule affording
employees' bargaining rights would encourage dismissals by a suc-
cessor or needless uncertainty in employment continuity 22 seems
exaggerated. In many businesses "purchasers as a practical matter
need the experienced employees of their predecessor to continue the
business successfully."23 It is further suggested that an employer
seeking to avoid bargaining obligations altogether would exercise his
Burns right24 to refuse to hire a majority of the predecessor's
employees. It is unlikely that an employer who waived this Burns
18 [There is no evidence that Burns ever unilaterally changed the terms and condi-
tions of employement it had offered to potential employees in June after its obliga-
tion to bargain with the union became apparent. If the union had made a request to
bargain after Burns had completed its hiring and if Burns had negotiated in good
faith and had made offers to the union which the union rejected, Burns could have
unilaterally initiated such proposals as the opening terms and conditions of employ-
ment on July 1 without committing an unfair labor practice.
Burns, 406 U.S. at 295. See Spruce Up, 85 L.R.R.M. at 1438 (Member Fanning dissenting).
19 85 L.R.R.M. at 1438 (Member Fanning dissenting).
20
 John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964). See also Howard Johnson
Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 263-64 (1974).
21 Burns, 406 U.S. at 294-95.
22 85 L.R.R.M. at 1428.
21
 Id. at 1440 (Member Penello dissenting).
24
 See Burns, 406 U.S. at 280 n.5. See also Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint
Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 261 (1974). However, such an avoidance of bargaining obligations
violates § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. .$ 158(a)(3) (1970), if it is motivated by antiunion animus. See
Burns, 406 U.S. at 280 n.5. See also Bausch & Lomb, 214 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 88 L.R.R.M.
1196 (1974); Greengate Mall, Inc., 209 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 85 L.R.R.M. 1303 (1974).
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right and was willing to enter a long-term bargaining relationship
with retained employees would engage in dilatory or evasive tactics
to avoid a short-term bargaining duty concerning initial terms of
employment. Moreover, since the successor employer would only be
required to deal collectively instead of individually with employees
and would retain his freedom to institute unilaterally determined
conditions of employment after an impasse is reached, 25 the imposi-
tion of a bargaining duty would be of minimal inconvenience to the
employer.
The Board's Spruce Up rule unnecessarily divests employees of
collective rights at a crucial period of their employment. It is to be
hoped that the narrow Board majority in Spruce Up will reconsider
the wisdom of its holding. In the absence of overruling by the
Board, judicial review of the Spruce Up rule appears desirable.
V. ARBITRATION
A. Post-arbitral Deferral—Board and Courts in Conflict:
Banyard; Electronic Reproduction
The NLRB has generally been successful in winning federal
appellate court approval of its deferral to arbitration policies.'
However, recent decisions of the District of Columbia Circuit have
held that the Board's Spielberg 2
 standards for post-arbitral deferral
are inadequate.'
In an early Survey year decision, Local 715, IBEW v. NLRB
(Matrite of Wisconsin), 4 the D.C. Circuit ruled that the Board had
improperly applied the Spielberg doctrine by abstaining from hear-
ing unfair labor practice complaints which arose after the arbitra-
tion hearing. 5 The court noted that deferral on an issue not con-
sidered by the arbitrator cannot be justified by the underlying
rationale of the Spielberg doctrine. 6 Later in the Survey year, the
23 85 L.R.R.M. at 1440 (Member Pencilo dissenting).
Local 2188, IBEW v. NLRB (Western Elec. Co.), 494 F.2d 1087, 1090-91, 85
L.R.R.M. 2576, 2578-79 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Associated Press v. NLRB, 492 F.2d 662, 667-68,
85 L.R.R.M. 2440, 2444-45 (D.C. Cir. 1974), See William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist.
Council, 417 U.S. 12, 16-17 (1974).
Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N. L. R. B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955). In Spielberg, the
Board established its policy of dismissing unfair labor practice complaints where the issues
involved had been previously resolved by an arbitration award. Id. at 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. at
1153.
3 Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F,2d 342, 346-47, 87 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2003-05 (D.C.Cir. 1974).
See Local 715, IBEW v. NLRB (Malrite of Wise.), 494 F.2d 1136, 1139-40, 85 L.R.R.M.
2823, 2825-26 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Cf. Local 2188, IBEW v. NLRB (Western Elec. Co.), 494
F.2d 1087, 1091, 85 L.R.R.M. 2576, 2579 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
4 494 F.2d 1136, 85 L.R.R.M. 2823 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Id. at 1139-40, 85 L.R.R.M, at 2825-26.
6 Id.
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same circuit in Banyard v. NLRB,' while generally reaffirming its
approval of the Board's deferral policies, 8 held that its continued
approval would be "conditioned  upon the resolution by the arbitral
tribunal of congruent statutory and contractual issues." 9
The court in Banyard consolidated two separate Board orders
for review purposes. 1 ° The Board had dismissed unfair labor prac-
tice complaints by two employees who were discharged by their
respective employers for refusing to drive vehicles which they al-
leged were unsafe." In the first case, John Banyard, an employee of
McLean Trucking Co., was discharged when he refused to drive a
truck that was overloaded in violation of an Ohio road safety
statute. 12
 Although Banyard's union commenced grievance proceed-
ings under the contract, Banyard filed an unfair labor practice com-
plaint with the Board.' 3
 He alleged that the company had used his
refusal to drive the truck as a pretext for discharging him because of
union activities." Before the Board had the opportunity to consider
the section 8(a)(1) and (3) charges raised by Banyard's complaint, his
claim was denied by the arbitrator at the final stage of the contrac-
tual grievance procedure."
Applying its Spielberg doctrine, the NLRB dismissed Banyard's
complaint. 16
 On review, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the Board's
deferral was inappropriate because (1) the resolution of the question
of whether an employee had been discharged for union activity was
not within the "special competence" of an arbitrator; 17
 and (2) the
record of the arbitration proceeding and the award failed to dem-
onstrate whether the grievance committee had considered Banyard's
claim in light of the company's violation of the Ohio safety statute."
Banyard establishes two additional prerequisites that must be
met before the Board can abstain from hearing unfair labor practice
complaints under the.Spielberg doctrine.I 9
 First, the court stated
7
 505 F.2d 342, 87 L.R.R.M. 2001 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
3
 Id, at 345-46, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2003.
9
 Id. at 348, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2005.
i° Id. at 342, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2001.
11
 Id. at 343-45, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2001-03.
12
 Id. at 343-44, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2001-02.
13
 Id. at 344, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2002.
14 Id.
's Id. The Board announced its decision in Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837,
77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971), during the period in which Banyard's claim was being considered
by the grievance committee. Under Collyer, the Board would have abstained from hearing
unfair labor practice charges pending the arbitrator's decision. Id. at 840, 77 L.R.R.M. at
1936.
16
 McLean Trucking Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 710, 712, 82 L.R.R.M. 1652, 1654 (1973),
17
 505 F.2d at 346, 87, L.R.R.M. at 2003-04.
13
 Id. at 346-47, 87 L.R.R.M, at 2004.
19
 Id. at 347, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2004-05. In Malrite, the court noted the three prerequisites
to Board abstention under Spielberg. (1) fair and regular arbitral proceedings, (2) parties who
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that Spielberg only applies if the grievance or arbitration panel
"clearly decided the issue on which it is later urged that the Board
should give deferrence." 2 ° Secondly, the issue decided must be
within the "special competence" of the arbitration or grievance
pane1. 21
The court in its discussion of Banyard's case did not explicitly
define arbitral competence, but the definition appears to be implicit
in its holding that continued approval of the Board's deferral to
arbitration policies is "conditioned upon the resolution by the arbi-
tral tribunal of congruent statutory and contractual issues." 22 It is
submitted that arbitral competence is a corollary of the court's
deferral requirement of statutory and contractual congruence.
Congruence denotes a significant interrelationship between con-
tractual and statutory issues. The issues are congruent when the
bases of the statutory claim and the contractual dispute are so
intertwined that the resolution of the contractual issue by the arbi-
trator disposes of the statutory unfair labor practice question. 23
In Banyard, it is submitted, the court appears to be referring to
arbitral competence in a jurisdictional sense. The resolution of
statutory questions concerning concerted or union activity is, ac-
cording to congressional mandate, within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the NLRB. 24 An employee alleging that he was discharged be-
cause of concerted or union activity should be accorded the statutory
right to have the Board and not an arbitrator decide the question 25
unless the parties demonstrate that the statutory and contractual
issues presented to the arbitrator are congruent. Where those issues
are not congruent, it follows that the arbitrator is not competent, in
a jurisdictional sense, to hear the complaint. The Board must,
therefore, be precluded from deferring to an arbitration award when
the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to decide the statutory issue in the
first place.
The Banyard decision does not, however, appear to require
that the Board give de novo consideration to every unfair labor
practice issue that an arbitrator might decide. 26 Rather, the Board
can defer to an arbitration award in those instances where the
have agreed to be bound by the arbitral award, and (3) a decision which is not clearly
repugnant to the purposes and policies of the NLRA. 494 F.2d at 1133, 85 L,R, R.M. at 2824.
20 505 F.2d at 347, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2004-05.
21 Id. at 347, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2005.
22 Id. at 348, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2005,
23 Id.; Malrite, 494 F.2d at 1138, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2824.
24 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957). See generally 29
U.S.C. § 160 (1970).
23 See International Great Lakes Shipping Co., 215 N.L.R. B. No, 121, 88 L.R.R.M. 1070,
1071 (1974) (Members Fanning and Jenkins concurring).
26 See 505 F.2d at 345, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2003.
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resolution of the contractual issue is congruent with the resolution of
the statutory issue.? '
The court's discussion of the second discharge case appears to
shed some light on its definition of arbitral competence. In that case,
the employee, Clay D. Ferguson, did not allege that he was fired
under a pretext, but contended that in refusing to drive a tractor
which he considered unsafe, he was engaged in a concerted activity
under section 7 of the NLRA. 28 He claimed that his protest against
an alleged abnormally dangerous working condition was protected
under section 502 of the Act. 29
 At the time of his discharge, Article
16 of the collective bargaining agreement between his union and the
employer, Roadway Express, Inc., provided that an employee
"would not be required to operate vehicles not in safe operating
condition."3° To the degree that both the contractual and statutory
issues turned on the question of safety, Ferguson's complaint ap-
pears to have presented a situation within the D.C. Circuit's defini-
tion of congruence.
The Board dismissed Ferguson's unfair labor practice com-
plaint,'" deferring instead to an arbitration award which stated in
its entirety: "Claim of Union Denied." 32 The Board considered its
abstention proper because "the statutory question—whether in all
circumstances Ferguson was justified in refusing to operate the
tractor because of unsafe operating conditions—" was identical to
the contractual issue under Article 16, which prohibited discharge
unless the refusal to drive was "unjustified." 33
On review, the D.C. Circuit indicated that the statutory and
contractual issues relating to the Ferguson case met its standard of
congruence. Nevertheless, it concluded that the Board may have
erroneously characterized the issues as "identical."34 While the is-
sues may be congruent, the standards for deciding those issues
under the statute and under the contract may be different. The
Board's deferral was inappropriate because the arbitration award
did not demonstrate the standard that the arbitrator utilized in
deciding the congruent safety issues. The court implied that since
the statutory and contractual issues were congruent the arbitrator
27 Id. at 345-46, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2003.
29 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). See 505 F.2d at 347-48, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2005-06.
29 Section 502, 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1970) provides in part that "the quitting of labor by an
employee or employees in good faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work
at the place of employment ... [shall not] be deemed a strike under this chapter." See 505
F.2d at 347, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2005.
3° 505 F.2d at 344, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2002. For the text of Article 16 see id. n.7.
505 F.2d at 345, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2003.
32 See Id. at 349, 87 ,L.R.R.M. at 2006.
" Id. at 348, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2005.
34 See id.
1040
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
had the competence to decide both issues. 35 However, the arbitrator
must have demonstrated in a written opinion, not only that he
recognized the statutory standard, but that he applied it correctly. 36
In the instant case, the court stated that since Ferguson had
based his statutory claim on section 502, the standards set out in
Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW37 governed. 38 Since the exceedingly
brief arbitration award did not demonstrate whether the grievance
committee had applied the Gateway standard to Ferguson's unfair
labor practice complaint, the court remanded the issue to the
Board. 39 In dicta the court stated:
If in the present case the Joint Committee applied to the
issue before it a standard correct under the contract but
not under the judicial interpretation of section 502, then it
cannot be said that the statutory issue was decided by the
Joint Committee. In that event the Board's abstention goes
beyond deferral and approaches abdication [of its statutor-
ily mandated duties]."
Subsequent to both the Malrite" and Banyard42 decisions, the
NLRB, in an attempt to discouiage issue-splitting and forum-
shopping between the Board and arbitrators, issued its decision in
Electronic Reprduction Service Corp. 43 The decision- expands the
scope of the Board's Spielberg doctrine in discharge and discipline
cases. In contrast to the restrictive prerequisites placed on Spielberg
deferral by the D.C. Circuit in Banyard, 44 the NLRB in Electronic
Reproduction extended its deferral doctrine to give full effect to an
arbitration award even though the award did not explicitly indicate
that the related unfair labor practice issue was presented to or even
considered by the arbitrator. 45 In Electronic Reproduction, a di-
vided Board found that a union's refusal to raise unfair labor prac-
tice issues in an arbitration proceeding acted as a form of estoppel
against the union in any subsequent Board hearing on the unfair
35 Id.
36 Id. at 349, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2006.
" 414 U.S. 368 (1974). Gateway Coal requires "that a union seeking to justify a contrac-
tually prohibited work stoppage under § 502 must present ascertainable, objective evidence
supporting its conclusion that an abnormally dangerous condition for work exists." Id. at
386-87.
39 See 505 F.2d at 348, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2005.
39
 Id. at 349, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2006.
49 Id. at 348, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2005.
41
 Local 715, IBEW v. NLRB (Ma!rite of Wisconsin), 494 F.2d 1136, 85 L.R.R.M. 2823
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
42 505 F.2d 342, 87 L.R.R.M. 2001 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
41
 213 N.L.R.B. No. 110, 87 L.R.R.M. 1211 (1974).
44 See note 19 and text at notes 19-21 supra.
45 See 87 L.R.R.M. at 1213-14, 1218.
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labor practice issue's which could have or should have been pre-
sented to the arbitrator in the initial contractual grievance proceed-
ng . 46
In Electronic Reproduction the Board explicity overruled its
previous decisions in Yourga Trucking, Inc.'" and Airco Industrial
Gases." Prior to Electronic Reproduction, the Board interpreted
Spielberg to allow deferral to an arbitration award that resolved a
statutory issue only when the award demonstrated that the statutory
issue had been considered and decided correctly in light of Board or
court precedent." In reversing its Yourga-Airco policy, the Board
noted that
in discharge and discipline cases the basic contractual issue
is whether or not the grievant has been disciplined or
discharged for just cause. It is of course obvious that "just
cause" does not include illegal or discriminatory reasons.
Indeed, a showing that the true reason for the discipline or
discharge was a discriminatory one negates any employer
claim that the discharge or discipline was ‘.`for just
cause.""
The Board acknowledged that arbitrators have a clearly recognized
duty to take into consideration illegal and discriminatory reasons in
determining a discipline or discharge case "for just cause."" As an
example, the Board quoted from Arbitrator Saul Wallen:
Thus this Board policy, known as the Spielberg doc-
trine, places on arbitrators an especial responsibility, in a
case where an allegation of discrimination appears to be
other than wholly capricious, to make certain that Man-
agement's actions are completely free of discriminatory
taint and, it seems to us, to resolve doubts on this score in
favor of upholding the purposes of the Act. 52
Thus, in Electronic Reproduction, the Board refused to over-
turn the arbitrator's decision 53 even though the award was silent as
46 See id. at 1219 (dissenting opinion).
47 197 N.L.R.B. 928, 80 L.R.R.M. 1498 (1972) (party seeking deferral has burden of
demonstrating that the statutory issues of either antiunion discrimination or pretext had been
presented in the initial arbitration proceeding).
46 195 N.L.R.B. 676, 79 L.R.R.M. 1467 (1972) (Board will not defer where award gave
no indication whether arbitrator had considered the related unfair labor practice).
49 E.g., Yourga Trucking, 197 N.L.R.B. at 928, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1499; Airco, 195
N.L.R.B. at 676, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1468.
5° 87 L.R.R.M. at 1215.
" Id.
52 Id., quoting from 48 LA 19 (1967).
53 87 L.R.R.M. at 1218.
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to whether the parties had apprised the arbitrator of, or the arbi-
trator had considered the question of, pretext or anti-union discrimi-
nation in the discharge and discipline cases. 54 The Board will now
conclude that arbitrators have considered the unfair labor practice
issues even if the award is silent as to whether the arbitrator has
either been apprised of or considered a related unfair labor practice
issue unless it is evident that the arbitrator did not in fact consider
the unfair labor practice issue. 55 Electronic Reproduction puts the
burden on the party asserting that the Board should not defer to an
arbitration award to demonstrate that there are "unusual cir-
cumstances," not including the desire to have the statutory issue
considered by the Board, which prevented the arbitrator from con-
sidering and resolving the statutory issue in question. 56
The Electronic Reproduction decision, though silent on the
D.C. Circuit's standards of "competence" and "congruence," 57 ap-
pears to tacitly reject the first new prerequisite to Spielberg set out
by the D.C. Circuit in the Banyard decision, i.e., Spielberg only
applies if the grievance or arbitration panel "clearly decided the
issue on which it is later urged that the Board should give defer-
rence."58
In Electronic Reproduction the majority appears to have con-
cluded that arbitrators will be both willing and able to consider and
decide the statutory issues. 59 However, since arbitrators have not
always agreed on the scope of their duties and obligations to con-
sider related statutory issues in the course of interpreting a collective
bargaining contract, the Board's decision may precipitate summary
actions and decisions by arbitrators who are unwilling to undertake
the added responsibility of resolving statutory questions. 6 ° For
example, this situation arose in Monsanto Chemical Co.," where
the arbitrator specifically refused to pass on the statutory discrimi-
nation issue presented in a discharge case. 62
However, the Board in Electronic Reproduction apparently
does not believe that Monsanto reflects the normal and usual prac-
tice of arbitrators." It is clear that the "unusual circumstances"
exception set out in Electronic Reproduction would not only include
situations like Monsanto, but cases where the parties have con-
54 Id. at 1213.
51 See id.
56 Id. at 1216.
57 See text at notes 22-23 supra.
56 See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
39 See 87 L.R.R.M. at 1216.
6° Id.
61 130 N.L.R.13. 1097, 47 L.R.R.M. 1451 (1961).
62 Id. at 1098-99, 47 L.R.R.M. at 1452.
63 See 87 L.R.R.M. at 1216.
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tracted to exclude specific statutory issues from the arbitrator's
consideration. 64 The Board noted in support of its decision that it
considered that
the usual and normal practice of parties • to collective a-
greements is to submit to the arbitrator the central issues of
the justness or unjustness of the discipline or discharge and
that it is the normal practice of parties to submit, and
arbitrators to consider as relevant . . . evidence of unfair-
ness or unjustness arising out of antiunion discrimination
of the type which we [the Board] consider in cases arising
under section 8(a)(3) of our Act. 65
The Board has defined the arbitrator's duty in considering the
statutory issues of discrimination or pretext as coextensive with his
contractual duties of determining "just cause" in a discharge or
discipline case." If the Board has correctly defined the relationship
between the contractual issue of "just cause" and the unfair labor
practice issues of pretext or discrimination, it is submitted that the
factual situation presented in Electronic Reproduction put the reso-
lution of the statutory and contractual issues within the Banyard
congruence standard." Therefore, although the Board did not ad-
dress the question of congruence in Electronic Reproduction, the
case falls within the D.C. Circuit's definition. The arbitrator in
Electronic Reproduction by definition possessed the "competence"
under the Banyard standard to resolve both the statutory and con-
tractual issues raised in the case, since resolution of a discharge for
just cause necessarily encompasses a determination of discharge for
antiunion animus.
Preventing an arbitrator from considering statutory issues of
discrimination or pretext would emasculate the policy and purpose
behind the arbitration doctrines set out in both Collyer and Spiel-
berg. 68
 The Supreme Court has recently endorsed these doctrines in
William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters District Council. 69 In Arnold
the Court quoted approvingly from the Collyer decision:
We believe it to be consistent with the fundamental objec-
64 Id.
65 87 L.R.R.M. at 1216.
66 Id. at 1215.
67
 Cf. 195 N.L,R.B. 676, 678, 79 L.R.R.M. 1467, 1469-70 (Member Kennedy dissent-
ing).
66
 See William E..Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 417 U.S. 12, 16-18 (1974).
See also the Steelworkers Trilogy: United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); and United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Co., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
69
 417 U.S. 12, 16-18 (1974). For a discussion of Arnold, see pp. 975-77 supra.
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tives of Federal Law to require parties . . . to honor their
contractual obligations rather than, by casting [their] dis-
pute in statutory terms, to ignore their agreed-upon proce-
dures."
The underlying conflict between the Banyard decision and the
Board's Electronic Reproduction doctrine lies in the question of the
review of the arbitrator's reasoning and decisions when a statutory
issue is presented along with a contractual issue. In Banyard the
court's primary concern appears to be protection and vindication of
statutory rights, and the means by which a reviewing court can
determine whether the arbitrator has applied the correct statutory
standard in light of prior Board or court precedent. 71 For the
Board, the resolution of the statutory issue is secondary to the policy
of having the parties resolve their own problems in the manner that
they provided by their own contractual agreement. The Board ap-
pears to have evaluated the resolution of the statutory issues within
the context of an integrated whole, The Board's evaluation takes
into consideration the variety of statutory and contractual factors
which will eventually form the basis of the arbitrator's decision, not
the least of which is the parties' trust in the work of the arbitrator
whom they have contractually agreed to have resolve their dis-
putes. 72
Therefore, the Board's decision is consistent with the recent
trend of cases which encourage parties to provide adequate and
acceptable procedures for resolving their own disputes. 73 In view of
the broad federal policies favoring arbitration, 74 it appears that the
Board's decision is a prudent one where the resolution of the statu-
tory and contractual issues are congruent or where, as in Electronic
Reproduction, they are coextensive. Deferral to an arbitrator's deci-
sion which does not demonstrate that the arbitrator either consid-
ered or correctly resolved the statutory issue, when the issues are
not congruent may indeed be detrimental to statutorily protected
rights under the NLRA.
However, it is submitted that where the issues are congruent,
Electronic Reproduction requires the parties to acknowledge and
define the role that they want arbitration to play in their relation-
ship. Otherwise, the Board will assume that the arbitrator has
correctly taken into consideration the statutory issue in his determi-
7° Id. at 17.
71 See 505 F.2d 342, 348, 87 L.R.,R.M. 2001, 2005 (1974),
72
 Cf. Steelworkers Trilogy, note 67 supra.
/3 See 417 U.S. at 12 and cases cited at note 3 supra.
74
 See note 67 supra.
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nation of the contractual issue. The doctrine set out in Electronic
Reproduction does not force parties to submit or arbitrators to
consider statutory issues which they wish to reserve to the Board. It
does require that if the parties wish to reserve these issues to the
Board they cannot do so unilaterally; Electronic Reproduction re-
quires that they contractually limit the scope of arbitration in their
disputes." Thus, parties can agree to exclude issues from arbitra-
tion and arbitrators can refuse to consider them. 76 The Board's
"unusual circumstances" exception appears to acknowledge a free-
dom of contract philosophy. 77 Secondly, it discourages the parties
from attempting to get "two bites of the apple" in a subsequent
Board hearing by withholding an issue from the arbitrator. 78 This
will insure stability and finality for arbitrators' decisions.
In contrast, in light of the D.C. Circuit's Banyard decision the
Board should not 'attempt to extend Electronic Reproduction to
include situations without statutory and contractual congruence.
The lack of congruence could imply that the parties had failed to
reach a contractual resolution as to the arbitrability of the statutory
issue in question. It is inherent in the Board's reasoning in Elec-
tronic Reproduction that the issue before the arbitrator be within
the contractually agreed upon scope of arbitration as defined in their
collective bargaining agreement. 79
B. Judicial Expansion of Boys Markets:
Inland Steel
During the SUrvey year, the United States Supreme Court
refused to review a series of circuit court decisions which broadened
the power of federal courts to enjoin labor activity under the Boys
Markets rule.' The Supreme Court in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Local 770 2 created a narrow exception to section 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. 3
 The Court held that under limited cir-
cumstances4
 a federal court has jurisdiction under section 301 5 to
enjoin violations of a union's contractual duty not to strike. 6
75 Id. at 12 1 6.
76 Id.
77 Cf. 87 L.R.R.M. at 1216.
76 See 87 L.R.R.M. at 1215.
79
 Id. at 1213.
1
 NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 87 L.R.R.M. 2044 (3d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1975); Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters
Union, 497 F,2d 311, 86 ,L.R.R.M. 2337 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 369 (1974).
2 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970).
' Before a federal court Can enjoin a strike or a lock-out under Boys Markets, it must
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Currently there is sharp disagreement among the circuits con-
cerning both the proper interpretation of Boys Markets and the
scope of its application to sympathy strike activity.? The juxtaposi-
tion of two strong federal policies—one encouraging arbitration and
the other limiting the injunctive powers of federal courts in labor
disputes—has generated this disagreement. During the Survey year
the Third,' Fourth 9 and Seventh Circuits," in disagreement with
an earlier decision of the Fifth Circuit," affirmed the issuance of
Boys Markets injunctions where the unions were engaging in sym-
pathy strike activity. In Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW, 12
the court affirmed the issuance of a Boys Markets injunction against
union members participating in a sympathy strike, even though the
contract lacked an express no-strike clause. 13 The collective bargain-
ing agreement included a mandatory grievance procedure and a
broadly worded miscellaneous clause which provided that matters
not specifically mentioned in the agreement were to be governed by
the grievance procedure." The agreement also incorporated the
ascertain: (1) whether the strike is a breach of a no-strike obligation under an effective
agreement; (2) whether the strike is over an arbitrable grievance; (3) whether both parties are
contractually bound to arbitrate the underlying grievance which caused the strike; and (4)
whether the injunction is proper under traditional, equitable considerations. See 398 U.S. at
253-55; Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372, 1373, 81 L.R.R.M.
2644, 2645 (5th Cir. 1972). See also North America Coal Co. v. UMW, 497 F.2d 459, 464, 86
L.R.R.M. 2339, 2342 (6th Cir. 1974), finding that Boys Markets requires "that where a
collective bargaining agreement contained a mandatory arbitration clause, injunctive relief
may be appropriate regardless of the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act," id., but where
the district court had failed to consider ordinary principles of equity, issuance of an injunction
was not valid. Id.
5 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), which confers jurisdiction on district courts in "[s]uits for violation
of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees . ."
6 398 U.S. at 25344.
/ A sympathy strike, the right of a union employee to honor a stranger union picket line,
is a protected activity. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co,, 345 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1953). A
comprehensive list of the conflicting circuit court cases on sympathy strikes can be found in
Judge Fairchild's dissenting opinion in Inland Steel Co. v. UMW, 505 F.2d 293, 301, n.2, 87
L.R.R.M. 2733, 2739, n.2 (7th Cir. 1974) (dissenting opinion). See also cases cited at note 1
supra.
Island Creek Coal Co. v. UMW, 507 F.2d 650, 653-54, 88 L.R.R.M. 2364, 2366-67 (3d
Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3675 (U.S. June 13, 1975); NAPA Pittsburgh,
Inc. v. Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 324, 87 L.R.R.M. 2044, 2046 (3d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1975).
Wilmington Shipping Co. v. Longshoremen Local 1426, 86 L.R.R.M. 2846, 2847 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974); Pilot Freight Carriers v. Teamsters Union, 497 F.2d
311, 312, 86 L.R.R.M. 2337 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 369 (1974).
10 Inland Steel Co. v. UMW, 505 F.2d 293, 299-300, 87 L.R.R.M. 2733, 2738 (7th Cir.
1974).
Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372, 81 L. R. R.M. 2644, 2645
(5th Cir. 1972).
12 505 F.2d 293, 87 L.R.R.M. 2733 (7th Cir. 1974).
13
 Id. at 298-300, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2736-38.
14 Id, at 297, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2736.
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terms of the 1971 National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement,
which provided that parties were obligated to arbitrate "any local
trouble of any kind aris[ing] at the mine." 15
The court characterized the issue as.
whether the defendant unions' conduct in honoring a
stranger union's picket line constituted an arbitrable issue
under the collective bargaining agreement in force between
the parties, and, if so, whether the duty to arbitrate gave
rise to an implied no-strike clause justifying the issuance of
a Boys Markets injunction.' 6
The court concluded that the broad language of the miscella-
neous clause and the terms of the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement encompassed a work stoppage honoring a stranger
union's picket line." The court reasoned that a sympathy strike is
"local trouble," 18 and that as a result of the broadly worded miscel-
laneous clause, the parties had agreed to arbitrate not only disputes
concerning the meaning and application of the provisions of the
agreement, but also disputes "about matters not specifically men-
tioned in [their] agreement." 19
Although the arbitrability of the dispute in Inland was not free
from doubt, the court noted that the strong policy in favor of
arbitration, announced in the Steelworkers Trilogy 20 and reaffirmed
in Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW 21 mandated that doubts be resolved
in favor of arbitration. 22 The court therefore concluded that even
where there is doubt as to the arbitrability of a particular dispute,
the district court has jurisdicition to issue an injunction if the other
conditions of the Boys Markets rule are met. 23 Basically, the court
was confronted by two antagonistic federal policies—one protecting
the rights of employees to engage in concerted activity free from
hostile court interference and the other encouraging employees to
15
 Id. See Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 374-76 (1974), for a discussion of
the terms of the 1971 National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement. The Gateway Coal
decision is discussed in the ;1973-74 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 15 B.C. Ind. &
Corn. L. Rev. 1105, 1182-86 (1974).
16
 505 F.2d at 295, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2734 (emphasis added).
'' Id. at 298-300, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2737-38.
t* Id. at 298, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2736.
19 Id.
2° Id. The Steelworkers Trilogy consists of United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564 (1960), United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960), and United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
21 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
22 505 F.2d at 298-99; 87 L.R.R.M. at 2737.
23 See 505 F.2d at 298-300, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2737-38. See note 4 supra for conditions
necessary for issuance of a Boys Markets injunction.
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restrict their use of strikes and other economic sanctions in favor of
arbitration. The court favored the policy encouraging arbitration
and stated that to "the extent that a dispute is arbitrable, there
exists [a concomitant] obligation not to strike over the dispute."24
The threshold question under the court's analysis is whether the
dispute is arbitrable. If so, an injunction will issue. 25 In the Inland
contract, there was no express clause limiting the union's right to
engage in sympathy strike activity, but the court found that a
limitation existed in the broad language of the miscellaneous
clause. 26 The court rationalized that the union had waived, sub
silentio, its statutorily protected right to honor a stranger union's
picket line by agreeing to the inclusion of the miscellaneous clause in
the contract. 27 As a result, where the contract does not expressly
contain a provision defining the extent of permissible sympathy
strike activity, a broad arbitration clause may be interpreted by a
court as a waiver of the union's statutorily protected right to engage
in sympathy strike activity. If the court interprets the contract as
making the legitimacy of a sympathy strike an arbitrable issue,
under the Inland rationale, an implied duty not to engage in a
sympathy strike is thereby created.
Under the guise of furthering the policies favoring arbitration,
the court in Inland has found a means to circumvent the labor
injunction proscriptions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. It has opened
the door to the type of judicial abuse of the injunctive process that
the Norris-LaGuardia Act was designed to prevent. Under Inland, a
court, without reaching the merits, can enjoin concerted union
activity because it "arguably" presents an arbitrable issue under the
contract. 28 The injunction will postpone the union's sympathy strike
until the arbirtrator has decided whether in fact the issue is an
arbitrable one. 29
Moreover, under the Inland rationale, once a court has deter-
mined that a union's right to engage in sympathy strike activity may
be arbitrable, an implied duty arises on the part of the union not to
engage in a sympathy strike. 3 °
The court in Inland did not consider the lack of an express
no-strike clause "of any consequence,"31 noting that the Supreme
24 505 F.2d at 299, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2738.
25 Id. at 299-300, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2738.
26 Id. at 297-99, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2736-38.
27 See id. at 298, 87 L.R.R.M. at 27, 36-37.
28 See id. at 299-300, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2738.
29 See id. at 300-01, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2738-39 (dissenting opinion).
3° See id, at 300, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2738.
31 Id.
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Court in Teamsters Local 741 v. Lucas Flour32 had held that a
contractual commitment to submit disagreements to final and bind-
ing arbitration gives,rise to an implied obligation not to strike over
such disputes." However, in Lucas Flour the arbitrability of the
dispute was explicitly covered by the contract; 34 in Inland, the court
construed the general language of the miscellaneous clause to in-
clude the duty to arbitrate the question of sympathy strikes."
In light of the Inland decision, it is suggested that unions will
find themselves unable to engage in sympathy strike activity unless
they have unequivocally reserved the right in the contract. Where
an arbitration provision does not specifically cover sympathy strike
activity, but does contain a broadly worded arbitration clause, a
court may now enjoin the sympathy strike without consideration of
the merits, pending resolution by the arbitrator as to whether the
contracts' arbitration provision does in fact incorporate sympathy
strike activity. Furthermore, union attempts specifically to reserve
the right to engage in sympathy strike activity may be ineffective in
light of the Third Circuit's decision in NAPA Pittsburgh v. Chauf-
feurs Local 926. 36 In NAPA, the court upheld the validity of a Boys
Markets injunction pending an initial determination by an arbitrator
as to whether the stranger union's picketing constituted primary
activity. 37 Failure to unequivocally reserve the right to engage in all
types of sympathy activity could conceivably result in a NAPA-type
situation, where the court would enjoin a sympathy strike until an
arbitrator has determined that a union's sympathy activity is spe-
cifically exempted from the no-strike provision of the contract.
Under the guise of furthering the policies favoring arbitration,
the circuit courts have begun to chip away boldly at the labor-
injunction proscriptions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. It is
suggested that no matter how beneficial the policy of encouraging
parties to settle their own disputes through arbitration might be,
that policy should not be used as a lever to force unions to give up
their statutory rights to honor another union's picket line, or to
permit federal courts to issue labor injunctions in contravention of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
32 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
33
 Id. at 104-05.
34 Id. at 105.
15
 505 F.2d at 297-300, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2736-38.
36
 505 F.2d 321, 87 L.R.R.M. 2044 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1975).
For discussion of the NAPA, decision and a more detailed treatment of the application of Boys
Markets to sympathy strike activity, see Axelrod, The Application of the Boys Markets Decision
in the Federal Courts, 16 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 893, 920-26 (1975).
37
 505 F.2d at 323-24; 87 L.R.R.M. at 2045-46.
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VI. SENIORITY—THE LAST HIRED, FIRST FIRED
SENIORITY SYSTEM:
Watkins; Waters; Jersey Central
The economic recession has given rise to the most significant
issue of the Survey year:• whether layoffs pursuant to a last hired,
first fired system are violative of Title VII. If a company with a past
history of discrimination has only recently begun to hire minority
employees, the last hired, first fired system inevitably leads to the
discharge of all or nearly all of the recently hired minority
employees. However, to conduct layoffs pursuant to any other sys-
tem is to ignore the hard earned seniority rights accumulated by
non-minority employees. Thus, few issues present such potentially
far reaching implications, as the courts must reconcile vital, compet-
ing interests of minority and non-minority employees.
The legal issue presented is twofold: is the last hired, first fired
seniority system violative of Title VII, and if so, what relief should
be ordered to correct the violation?' Proponents of the system con-
tend that even if the system does have a discriminatory impact, it is
nevertheless expressly authorized by the language and legislative
history of section 703(h) 2 as a bona fide seniority system, and is thus
not violative of Title VII. 3 Opponents, on the other hand, contend
that the system is violative of Title VII because it has a dispropor-
tionate impact on minority employees and it perpetuates the effects
of past discrimination.4
 The opponents further contend that under
these circumstances the last hired, first fired system is not authorized
by section 703(h) and that they are thus entitled to broad equitable
relief, including fictional seniority or separate seniority lists. 5 The
Supreme Court has not yet resolved these competing arguments and
at present the lower courts are divided. 6
The issue was first presented in Watkins v Steelworkers of
America, Local No. 2369, 7 where the district court held that layoffs
See analysis in Watkins v. United Steel Workers of America, Local No. 2369,
369 F. Supp. 1221, 1224-31, 7 FEP Cas. 90, 91-98 (E.D. La. 1974).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
3 See, e.g., Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of International Harvester Co., 502 F.2d
1309, 1317-18, 8 FEP Cas. 577, 583-84 (7th Cir. 1974).
Sec Watkins, 369 F. Supp. at 1224, 7 FEP Cas, at 91.
3 See Waters, 502 F.2d at 1319, 8 FEP Cas. at 585.
6
 At present two circuits have held that the last hired, first fired system does not violate
Title VII—the Seventh Circuit in Waters, 502 F.2d at 1318, 8 FEP Cas. at 584, and the Third
Circuit in Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Local Union 327 of IBEW, 508 F.2d 687, 710,
9 FEP Cas. 117, 132 (3d Cir. 1975). Several district courts have held that the system is
violative of Title VII. See Watkins, 369 F. Supp. at 1226, 7 FEP Cas. at 93; Schaefer v.
Tannian, 10 FEP Cas, 897, 898 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Delay v. Carling Brewing, 10 FEP Cas.
164, 165 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
7 369 F. Supp. 1221, 7 FEP Cas. 90 (E.D. La. 1974).
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pursuant to a last hired, first fired seniority system are prohibited by
Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 where the layoffs perpetuate the
effects of past discrimination' The court's reasoning was two-
tiered. First, two lines of related cases were cited to establish the
principle that employment preferences cannot be allocated on the
basis of seniority, where past discriminatory policies prevented
minority employees from accumulating seniority. 9
 Under the first
line of cases, departmental seniority systems which perpetuated the
effects of past discrimination were held unlawful under Title VII.'°
The second line of cases involved craft union referral rules which
granted referral priority to those employees with long service in the
craft union. These rules were also held violative of Title VII."
Thus, because the last hired, first fired system similarly predicated
layoffs on the basis of seniority, which minority employees had been
precluded from accumulating, the court concluded that the system
unlawfully perpetuated the effects of past discrimination."
The court next considered whether the system was nevertheless
permissible under section 703(h) as a bona fide seniority system.' 3
Defendants relied heavily on certain legislative history indicating
that Title VII has no effect on existing seniority rights and that the
last hired, first fired seniority system is bona fide." However, the
court reasoned that these statements were not conclusive, because
they were entered into the legislative record prior to the introduction
of the version of Title VII which was ultimately enacted and which
included, for the first time, specific language dealing with seniority
systems in section 703(h).' 5 Furthermore, the court noted, these
statements have been rejected by courts in numerous prior decisions
in which existing seniority rights have, in fact, been judicially
modified.' 6
Having thus rejected the proffered legislative history, the court
considered the langUage of section 703(h), relying on prior judicial
3 Id. at 1226, 7 FEP Cas. at 93.
9
 Id. at 1225-26, 7 FEP Cas. at 92-93,
1 ° Id., citing, e.g., Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States,
416 F.2d 980, 1 FEP Cas. '875 (5th Cir. 1969).
11
 369 F. Supp. at 1226, 7 FEP Cas. at 93, citing, e.g., United States v. Local 36, Sheet
Metal Workers, 416 F.2d 123, 2 FEP Cas. 127 (8th Cir. 1969).
12
 369 F. Supp. at 1226, 7 FEP Cas. at 93.
13
 Id. at 1227-29, 7 FEP Cas. at 94-95.
14
 Id, at 1227, 7 FEP Cas. at 94, citing comments of Senator Clark:
Seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill. If under a "last hired, first fired"
agreement a Negro happens to be the "last hired" he can still be the "first fired" as
long as it is done because of his status as "last hired" and not because of his race.
110 Cong. Rec. 7217 (1964) (questions and answers prepared by Senator Clark).
13 369 F. Supp. at 1228, 7 FEP Cas. at 94.
16
 Id. at 1228, 7 FEP. Cas. at 95, citing, e.g., Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F.
Supp, 505, 1 FEP Cas. 260 (E,D. Va. 1968).
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interpretations to conclude that one characteristic . of a bona fide
seniority system is the lack of discrimination." Since the court had
already found that the last hired, first fired system operated dis-
criminatorily, the system could not prevail under this standard."
Thus, the court held that the system unlawfully perpetuated the
effects of past discrimination and was not justifiable as a bona fide
seniority system."
On appea1, 2° the decision of the district court was reversed by
the Fifth Circuit which held that, within the facts presented in the
case, the defendant's last hired, first fired seniority system did not
violate either Title VII or 42 U.S.C. section 1981. 21 Of central
importance in the court's reversal was the fact that in the mid-1960's
the company had stopped all of its discriminatory hiring practices. 22
All the plaintiffs were relatively young and, due to this fact, none of
the plaintiffs was ever denied a job or deterred from applying for a
job because of prior discriminatory practices. Indeed, when the
company stopped its discriminatory practices, all but one of the
plaintiffs was below the minimum age of legal employment. Thus,
when each of the plaintiffs applied for a job, he was hired pursuant
to non-discriminatory policies and was afforded his proper seniority
status. 23 This fact was not only stated by the court as a proviso to
its holding, 24 but was also relied on by the court to reject each of the
arguments advanced by the plaintiffs. 25
The plaintiffs did not contend that the seniority system was a
per se violation of Title VII. Instead, they argued that the system,
though facially neutral, was violative of Title VII in that it per-
petuated or locked in the effects of past discrimination. 26 The court
rejected this argument, reasoning that the particular plaintiffs in the
present case had never experienced prior discrimination by the
defendant. Thus, as to these plaintiffs, there were no discriminatory
effects which could be either perpetuated or locked in. 27 To hold
otherwise, the court concluded, would be to grant preferential
treatment to employees who were hired on an equal basis with
17 369 F. Supp. at 1228, 7 FEP Cas. at 95, quoting Quarles: "Section 703(h) expressly
states the seniority system must be bona fide. . . . Obviously one characteristic of a bona fide
seniority system must be lack of discrimination." 279 F. Supp. at 517, 1 FE? Cas. at 270.
is See text at notes 6-10 supra.
16
 369 F. Supp. at 230-31, •7 FEP Cas. at 96,
23 Watkins v. Steelworkers, Local 2369, 516 F.2d 41, 10 FEP Cas. 1305 (5th Cir. 1975).
21
 Id, at 44-45, 10 FEP Cas. at 1300.
" Id. at 46, 10 FE? Cas. at 1301.
23 Id. at 44-46, 10 FE? Cas. at 1299-1301.
24 See id. at 44-45, 10 FEP Cas. at 1300.
23
 See id. at 45-48, 10 FE? Cas. at 1300-02.
26
 Id. at 45, 10 FE? Cas. at 1300,
27 Id. at 45-46, 10 FEP Cas. at 1300-01.
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whites and who were afforded their proper seniority status relative
to whites. 28
The court alternatively reasoned that even if the plaintiffs had
established that the system was discriminatory, it was nevertheless
exempted from being unlawful by section 703(h) as a bona fide
seniority system. 29 No contention was made that the system was
based on an intent to discriminate. Rather, the plaintiffs relied on
the interpretation of section 703(h) in earlier departmental seniority
system cases and argued that the defendant's last hired, first fired
system was not bona fide because it perpetuated the effects of past
discrimination. 30 The court rejected this argument, distinguishing
the departmental seniority system cases on the ground that, unlike
the present action, these cases involved employees who had not
attained their proper seniority status in the work force. 31 The court
then cited extensively from its prior decision in Local 189, United
Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 32
 in which the court
concluded that a job seniority system was not bona fide as to
employees who had been the subject of prior discrimination, but
was bona fide as to newly hired employees who had never been
subjected to the prior discrimination. 33 A contrary conclusion, the
court in Local 189 reasoned, would result in preferential rather than
remedial treatment. 34 Because the plaintiffs in Watkins had simi-
larly never experienced prior discrimination, the court concluded
that the reasoning in Local 189 was applicable and, as such, the
defendant's last hired, first fired system was bona fide under section
703(h). 35
 The court further supported this conclusion by noting an
express intent of Congress to preserve seniority rights between white
employees and minority employees who had never been discrimi-
nated against. 36
The court lastly considered the plaintiffs' claim based on 42
U.S.C. section 1981, noting initially that some employment prac-
tices which are lawful under Title VII may nevertheless be un-
lawful under section 1981. 37 However, the court concluded that the
seniority system did not violate this statutory provision. 38 The plain-
25 Id. at 46, 10 FEP Cas. at 1301.
59
 Id. at 46-47, 10 FEP Cas. at 1301.
3°
 Id. at 47, 10 FE? Cas. at 1302.
11 Id .
32 416 F.2d 980, 1 FEP Cas. 875 (5th Cir. 1969).
33 Id. at 995, 1 FEP Cas. at 886.
34 Id.
35 516 F.2d at 47, 10 FEP Cas. at 1302.
36 Id.
35 Id. at 49, 10 FEP Cas. at 1304.
38 Id. at 50, 10 FE? Cas. at 1304.
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tiffs had, in all respects, been afforded identical treatment as white
employees. Thus, the system neither presently discriminated nor
perpetuated the effects of past discrimination and, as such, there
was no violation of section 1 98 1. 39
The result reached by the Fifth Circuit in Watkins is in accord
with the result reached by the Seventh Circuit in Waters v. Wiscon-
sin Steel Works" and by the Third Circuit in Jersey Central Power
& Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW . 4 ' In Waters, the court upheld the
district court's finding that, prior to 1964, the defendant had en-
gaged in discriminatory hiring practices. 42 The plaintiff had applied
for a job with the defendant in 1957. 43 Thus, unlike the plaintiffs in
Watkins, the plaintiff in Waters had been subjected to the defen-
dant's prior discriminatory practices. Nevertheless, the court held
that the defendant's last hired, first fired seniority system violated
neither Title VII nor section 1 98 1. 44 In reaching this result, the
court made three important findings. First, the defendant's last
hired, first fired seniority system was not "of itself" racially dis-
criminatory, nor did it result in perpetuation of the effects of past
discrimination. 45 Second, the last hired, first fired system is bona
fide seniority system under section 703(h). 46 The court supported
this finding by citing extensively from the legislative history which
was expressly rejected by the district court in Watkins. Finally,
fictional seniority is not available as a remedy under Title VII. 47 In
support of this finding, the court cited prior case law to the effect
that fictional seniority results in preferential rather than remedial
treatment for minority employees and that it was the intent of Title
VII to prohibit such preferential treatment."
The Third Circuit applied a different analysis in a different
procedural context to reach the same result in Jersey Central Power
and Light Co. v. Local Union 327, of IBEW." Here the plaintiff
company sought a declaratory judgment as to whether, in conduct-
39
 Id.
40 502 F.2d 1309, 8 FEP Cas. 577 (7th Cir. 1974),
4t 508 F.2d 687, 9 FEP Cas. 117 (3d Cir. 1975).
43 502 F.2d at 1316-17, 8 FEP Cas, at 583.
43 Id. at 1313, 8 FEP Cas. at 580.
44 Id. at 1318-20, 8 FEP Cas. at 584-85.
43 Id. at 1318, 8 FEP Cas. at 584.
49 Id.
43 Id. at 1319, 8 FEP Cas. at 585.
49 Id., quoting Quarles, 279 F. Supp. at 519, 1 FEP Cas. at 272; and Local 189, 416
F.2d at 994-95, I FEP Cas. at 886-87. This discussion on the availability of fictional seniority
is clearly misplaced. The issue before the court was whether the defendant's seniority system
violated Title VII. A discussion of the remedies available once a violation has been shown is
irrelevant to this issue.
49 508 F.2d 687, 9 FE? Cas. 1117 (3d Cir. 1975).
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ing anticipated layoffs, the company should adhere to a collective
bargaining agreement embodying the last hired, first fired system, or
whether it was precluded from doing so by a conciliation agreement
made with the EEOC to retain among its workers a certain propor-
tion of minority employees. 5 ° From the court's statement of the
facts, it cannot be determined whether any of the employees to be
laid off were previously subjected to the company's past dis-
criminatory policies.
After concluding that the collective bargaining agreement and
the conciliation agreement were not in conflict," the court ad-
dressed the question of the validity of layoffs pursuant to the last
hired, first fired seniority system embodied in the collective bargain-
ing agreement. The court first considered this question under basic
contract principles, reasoning that it could modify the seniority
clause of the collective bargaining agreement only upon proof that
the resulting seniority system was contrary to public policy. 52 After
considering the applicable provisions of Title VII, particularly sec-
tion 703(h), the court found no expression of a contrary public policy
sufficient to invalidate the seniority clause. 53
The Third Circuit then considered whether the last hired, first
fired system would be valid under Title WI if the plaintiff showed
that the system perpetuated the effects of past discrimination. 54 On
this question, the court reasoned that where the challenged seniority
system qualifies as bona fide under section 703(h), evidence that it
perpetuates the effects of past discrimination is irrelevant." Thus,
the dispositive question became whether the last hired, first fired
system was bona fide under section 703(h). The court held that it
was, basing its holding on the legislative history accepted in Waters
and rejected by the district court in Watkins. S6
Three circuits have now decided, in different contexts, that a
last hired, first fired seniority system does not violate Title VII.
Nevertheless, district courts continue to hold the system violative of
Title VII." Moreover, it is reasonably arguable that the system does
violate Title VII, at least in those cases where the plaintiffs were
the subjects of prior discrimination.
Section 703(a) 58 prohibits employment discrimination. Under
56
 Id. at 691, 9 FE? Cas. at 118.
51 Id. at 701, 9 FEP Cas. at 125.
52
 Id. at 704, 9 FEP Cas. at 127-28.
53
 Id. at 704-05, 9 FEP Cas. at 128-29.
54
 Id. at 705-10, 9 FEP Cas. at 129-32.
55
 Id. at 706, 9 FEP Cas. at 129.
56
 Id. at 708-10, 9 FEP Cas. at 131-32.
57 See, e.g., Schaefer v. Tannian, 10 FEP Cas. 897, 908 (E.D, Mich. 1975); Delay v.
Carling Brewing, 10 FEP Cas. 164, 165 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
" 42 U.S.C.
	
2000e-2(a) (Supp. III 1973).
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two lines of traditional Title VII analysis, the last hired, first fired
system may constitute unlawful employment discrimination. First, the
system has a disproportionate impact on minority employees. This
analysis has often been applied to prohibit the use of certain criteria
in hiring and promotion decisions, including test scores" and di-
plomas. 6° There is no reason why the analysis should not also be
applied to prohibit the use of seniority in layoff decisions." Sec-
ondly, the system perpetuates the effects of past discrimination in
those cases where the plaintiffs were previously subjected to the
employer's prior discriminatory policies. This analysis has often
been applied to invalidate departmental seniority systems62 and
craft union referral rules." Again, there is no reason why this
analysis should not be applied to the last hired, first fired seniority
system. It is thus submitted that, in some instances, this seniority
system may create a prima facie violation of Title VII.
The more difficult legal problem is whether the last hired, first
fired system is nevertheless permissible as a bona fide seniority
sytem under section 703(h). Section 703(h) provides:
.. it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to apply different standards . . , pursuant to a
bona fide seniority or merit system . . . provided that such
differences are not the result of an intention to discrimi-
nate. . . . 64
This language disqualifies from bona fide status all seniority systems
which are based on an intent to discriminate. However, it does not
follow that all systems which are not based on an intent to discrimi-
nate are bona fide. This has been recognized in departmental senior-
ity cases. 65 Furthermore, as a general interpetation of Title VII, the
59 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971).
6° Id.
6
 One might argue that this traditional Title VII analysis should not be applied to the
seniority question because, unlike the use of test scores or diplomas, the seniority issue does
not involve a comparison of two people who are at the same level in terms of applying for
employment, but rather involves a comparison of two people who have already worked at a
job and who have built up different "equities" in their respective jobs. However, this greater
job equity should not be allowed to immunize employees from the prohibitions of Title VII
where, as here, the greater job equity was built up at the expense of minority employees who
were generally precluded from building up similar job equity due to past discriminatory
policies,
62
 See, e.g., Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 985-88, 1 FEP Cas. 875, 879-81
(5th Cir. 1969).
61
 See, e.g., United States v. Local 36 Sheet Metal Workers, 416 F.2d 123, 131 (8th Cir.
1969).
64 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
65 See Local 189: "We find unpersuasive the argument that whatever its operational
effects, job seniority is immune under the statute because not imposed with the intent to
discriminate." 416 F.2d at 995, 1 FEP Cas. at 887.
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Supreme Court has stated that employment policies should be
judged according to their consequences, not according to the moti-
vations behind them. 66 Thus, while the language of section 703(h)
references one category of seniority systems which are not bona
fide, 67 it does not answer the critical question of what systems are
bona fide.
The legislative history is not instructive on this question. As
evidenced by the district court's decision in Watkins" on the one
hand, and Waters 69 and Jersey Central" on the other, the applica-
ble legislative history is subject to conflicting interpretations.
It is submitted that the answer lies in the case law interpreting
section 703(h). The leading case is Quarles v. Philip Morris, Ine., 7 '
in which the court stated: "Section 703(h) expressly states that the
seniority system must be bona fide . . . Obviously one characteris-
tic of a bona fide seniority system must be lack of discrimination." 72
This interpretation effectively renders section 703(h) nugatory.
Under the general scheme of Title VII, any practice which discrimi-
nates is unlawful and any practice which does not discriminate is
lawful. For section 703(h) to have any meaning, it must create an
exception to this general scheme for bona fide seniority systems.
However, under the Quarles interpretation the section is rendered
meaningless because it is interpeted consistently with the general
scheme of Title VII; any system which discriminates is not bona fide
and any system which does not discriminate is bona fide. Neverthe-
less, the Quarles interpretation has been judicially accepted by the
district court decision in Watkins" and in cases dealing with de-
partmental seniority systems.74 Furthermore, Quarles was decided
in 1968. Therefore, Congress has had ample opportunity to amend
section 703(h) to preclude the Quarks interpretation. From its inac-
tion, Congressional acquiescence in the interpretation may be in-
ferred." Finally, the interpretation is consistent with the established
rule of construction that unclear provisions of a statute should be
construed in a manner consistent with the general purpose of the
66 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
67
 However, see interpretations of this language in Waters, 502 F.2d at 1318, 8 FEP
Cas. at 584; and Jersey Central, 508 F.2d at 708-10, 9 FE? Cas. at 131-32. See also Queries,
quoted at note 17 supra.
61 See text at notes 7-39 supra.
69
 See text at notes 40-48 supra.
79
 See text at notes 49-56 supra.
71
 279 F. Supp. 505, 1 FEP Cas. 260 (E.D. Va. 1968).
72 Id. at 517, 1 FE? Cas. at 270.
71 369 F. Supp. at 1228, 7 FE? Cas. at 95.
74 See, e.g., United Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 988, 1 FE?
Cas. 875, 880 (5th Cir.• 1969).
75 See Missouri v. Ross, 299 U.S. 72, 75 (1936); United States v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 298
U.S. 492, 500 (1935).
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statute. 76 For these reasons, it is suggested that the Quarks interpre-
tation represents a reasonable interpretation of section 703(h) which
gives content to the bona fide seniority system classification. Title
VII was designed to eliminate employment discrimination. To sanc-
tion a seniority system which has a disproportionate impact on
minority employees and which perpetuates the effects of past dis-
crimination is clearly contrary to this general intent of Title VII.
Therefore, based on the Quarks interpretation, it is submitted that in
cases where the effects of prior discrimination are perpetuated the
last hired, first fired seniority system is not bona fide under section
703(h).
A second argument by which the system might be justified is
business necessity. The test under the defense of business necessity
is whether the discriminatory policy is sufficiently related to success-
ful job performance. 77 It is submitted that the last hired, first fired
system cannot prevail under this standard. In many past decisions,
the courts have invalidated the use of intelligence test scores in
hiring decisions. 78 The use of these test scores was premised on a
general assumption of job relatedness: the more intelligent a worker
is, the better his job performance will be. However, the courts have
rejected this general assumption of job relatedness, requiring spe-
cific proof to discharge the business necessity burden. 79 The last
hired, first fired seniority system also rests on a general assumption:
the more years of service a worker has, the greater his morale and
expectation of security and the better his job performance. Thus, it
is submitted that this system is not generally justified by business
necessity because it rests on the same type of assumption which has
been rejected by the courts in other fact situations. Consequently, it
is further submitted that the last hired, first fired seniority system,
which is not justified as a bona fide seniority system under section
703(h) and which is rarely justified by business necessity, is violative
of Title VII.
It should be noted that this analysis considers the issue solely
from a legal standpoint. However, the issue also involves sig-
nificant human consequences which have in some cases influenced
judicial reasoning. If a court finds that the last hired, first fired
system violates Title VII, the result may be the loss of accumulated
seniority rights by non-minority employees. Due to the economic
76 Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, 412 U.S. 609, 631-32 (1973); Richards v.
United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1961).
77 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
78 See, e.g., id.; Walston v. County School Bd., 7 FEP Cas. 616, 622 (4th Cir. 1974);
Arnold v. Ballard, 10 FEP Cas. 1363, 1370 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
" Id. at 431-32.
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recession, this loss of seniority rights may ultimately cost the
employee his job. This equitable consideration was reflected in the
Waters decision where the Seventh Circuit stated: "To hold other-
wise would be tantamount to shackling white employees with a
burden of a past discrimination created not by them but by their
employer."" However, as noted above, the last hired, first fired
issue presents two questions: the violation question—whether the sys-
tem violates Title VII; and the remedy question—if a violation exists,
what remedy should be ordered by the court? While it is appropriate.
for a judge to consider equitable factors, it is submitted that they are
more properly considered under the remedy question than under the
violation question. The violation question presents a problem of
statutory interpretation and this interpretation will be diluted by the
injection of equitable considerations. The remedy question, on the
other hand, calls for the court to broadly exercise its equitable
powers." Here, such equitable considerations are more properly
taken into account.
The question of, what remedies should be ordered by the court
if it finds the seniority system violative of Title VII presents interest-
ing problems concerning the court's remedial powers under section
706(g). 82 Several possible remedies have been suggested.
The district court in Watkins, after finding a violation of Title
VII, suggested that layoffs might be apportioned between minority
and non-minority employees on the basis of the proportion of each
group to the total work force in the plant. 83 Within each group the
last hired, first fired principle would operate. Although the court
did not discuss how this remedy would be implemented, presumably
separate seniority lists would be used. The court did note, however,
that if adopted, this remedy should apply only to future layoffs, not
retroactively to past layoffs."
The district court also suggested that the company might be
ordered to rehire the displaced minority employees with a corre-
sponding adoption of work reduction techniques until normal attri-
tion reduced the work force to its most efficient level." Again, the
court did not discuss how this remedy would be implemented.
However, a four day, work week, or a six hour workday, or expanded
vacations for all workers might be appropriate. Finally, under a
third possible remedy suggested in Watkins, the company would be
8° 502 F.2d at 1320, 8 FEP Cas. at 585.
81 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. III 1973),
82 42 U.S.C.	 2000e-5(g) (Supp. III 1973).
43 369 F. Supp. at 1232, 7 FEP Cas. at 98.
84 Id.
85 Id.
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ordered to pay a lump sum or to grant expanded fringe benefits to
laid-off minority employees. 86 This remedy is based on the premise
that the company was responsible for creating the past discrimina-
tory policies which are presently perpetuated by the last hired, first
fired system, and should thus be responsible for bearing the present
burden of those past policies."
A fourth possible remedy is fictional seniority. Here the minor-
ity employee would be given seniority for layoff purposes starting
with some specified past date. Few requests for relief have provoked
such diverse responses as the request for fictional seniority.
One view was expressed by the Third Circuit in Jurinko v.
Wiegand Co., 88
 where the court held that fictional seniority is
mandatory to eliminate the effects of past discrimination. 89 Plain-
tiffs had been discriminatorily discharged because or sex and the
court agreed that they were entitled to an award of back seniority
from the date of the discharge. 9° A second view was expressed by
the Sixth Circuit in Meadows v. Ford Motor Co. 9 ' where the court
held that fictional seniority is discretionary in the trial judge. Here
plaintiffs had been denied jobs because of sex and the court held
that the district court could, in its discretion, order fictional seniority
after considering the interests of both the displaced workers in
employment and the employer in maintaining an experienced work
force. 92
 The court further noted, however, that sufficient evidence
to justify an award of back pay would not automatically compel an
award of fictional seniority. 93 Finally, a third view was expressed by
the Seventh Circuit in Waters where the court stated that fictional
seniority may not be awarded in employment discrimination cases. 94
Here, the court reasoned that under Title VII all workers should be
treated equally and that fictional seniority constitutes preferential
rather than remedial treatment. 95
It is submitted that fictional seniority is necessary to eradicate
the effects of past discrimination and that such seniority may be jus-
tified under the "but-for" rationale applied in back pay cases 96 and in
86 Id.
87 Id.
" 477 F.2d 1038, 5 FEP Gas. 925 (3d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S.
970 (1973).
89 477 F.2d at 1046, 5 FEP Cas. at 931.
90 Ed .
91 510 F.2d 939, 9 FEP Cas. 180 (6th Cir. 1975).
92 Id. at 948-49, 9 FEP Cas. at 188.
93 Id.
94 502 F.2d at 1319, 8 FEP Cas. at 585. See also Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co., 495 F.2d 398, 417-18, 8 FE? Cas. 66, 79-80 (5th Cir. 1974).
95 502 F.2d at 1319, 8 FE? Cas. at 585.
96 See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 252, 7 FEP Cas. 1115,
1147 (5th Cir. 1974).
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affirmative action hiring quota cases." "IU]nder Title VII . . . the
injured workers must be restored to the economic position in which
they would have been but for the discrimination . . . ."98 The real
issue presented by the fictional seniority question is whether this
rationale is overriden by the significant effect that fictional senior-
ity would have on the established seniority rights of non-minority
employees. The better view is that it should not. Minority
employees were prevented from accumulating seniority because they
were denied available jobs pursuant to discriminatory policies.
Non-minority employees, on the other hand, benefited from these
discriminatory policies because they were hired into jobs that would
not otherwise have been available, and were thus able to accumu-
late seniority rights from an earlier date than would have been
possible in the absehce of the discriminatory policies. To deny
fictional seniority to minority employees is to continue the inequita-
ble consequences created by the prior discrimination. Minority
employees should not be denied their full remedies simply to protect
the seniority rights of non-minority employees which would not
have been accumulated if it were not for the past discriminatory
policies of the employer. 99
An important question under the fictional seniority issue con-
cerns the date from which seniority should be created. The court in
Jurinko 10° suggested that seniority should be awarded from the date
that the plaintiffs applied for, and were discriminatorily denied,
jobs with the defendant company. This date seems appropriate. It is
submitted, however, that it is sufficient to establish by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that a plaintiff would have applied for a
job but for the discriminatory policy. The availability of the remedy
of fictional seniority should not depend on whether the plaintiff
went through the futile act of applying for a job which he knew he
would be denied. Under the suggested standard, young workers
who entered the labor force after the discriminatory policy was no
longer practiced would not be entitled to fictional seniority. This
should allay the only legitimate fears of non-minority workers.
It might be argued that in no case should seniority be awarded
to a date prior to the effective date of Title VII. This argument rests
on the fact that prior to the enactment of Title VII, companies had
no notice that their discriminatory practices were unlawful. One
response to this arguinent is that 42 U.S.C. section 1981 also pro-
91
 See Rios v. Steamfitters, Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 632, 8 FEE' Cas. 293, 301 (2d Cir.
1974).
" Pettway, 494 F.2d at 252, 7 FEP Cas. at 1147.
99
 See Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 8 FEP Cas. 778, 784 (E.D. Va. 1974).
'w 477 F.2d at 1046-47, 5 FEP Cas. at 931-32.
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hibits employment discrimination, and that statute was enacted in
1870. However, section 1981 was not applied in the private
employment area until 1970. 101 Thus, at least with regard to private
employees, this response is not persuasive. As a result, it is submit-
ted that fictional seniority, where awarded, should not be granted
from a date prior to March 24, 1964, the effective date of Title VII.
In conclusion, each of the four suggested remedies appears to
be an appropriate method of dealing with the discriminatory effect
of layoffs caused by the economic recession. Common to each is the
underlying principle that the burden created by the layoffs should,
as much as possible, be distributed over the entire work force rather
than concentrated on any one group of employees. Only by adhering
to this principle will the courts be able to adequately reconcile the
competing interests of minority and non-minority employees.
VII. SEX DISCRIMINATION—The Applicability of Aiello to
Title VII Cases
In Geduldig v. Aiello' the Supreme Court of the United States
held, by a 6-3 vote, that the exclusion of normal pregnancy from
coverage under California's disability insurance plan was rationally
related to the state's legitimate interest in maintaining a self-
sufficient disability insurance program, and thus was not violative
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 The
plan, which had been in operation for nearly 30 years, was designed
to provide benefits to private employees temporarily unable to work
because of disabilities not covered by workmen's compensation. 3
Funded entirely from employee contributions-1% of salary up to
an annual maximum of $85—the plan had been self-sufficient since
its inception. 4 However, not all disabilities were covered under the
plan. Specifically excluded were disabilities related to normal preg-
nancy. 5 .
Plaintiff,6
 a female employee temporarily disabled by a normal
pregnancy, applied for and was denied benefits under the plan
pursuant to this exclusion." Seeking to enjoin enforcement of the
101 Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of International Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476,
481-83 (7th Cir. 1970).
' 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
2 Id. at 496-97.
3 Id. at 486.	 .
4 Id. at 487, 492.
5 Id. at 489.
° Four plaintiffs originally filed the suit. However, the claims of three of these plaintiffs
were mooted when the state disability insurance plan was amended to include abnormal
disabilities relating to pregnancy. Id. at 489-92.
7 Id. at 490,
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exclusion, plaintiff filed suit in federal court contending that the
exclusion constituted discrimination on the basis of sex in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 8
The threshold question before the Supreme Court was whether
the stricter tests applied in Reed v. Reed9
 and Frontiero v.
Richardson," which involved sex-based classifications, or the more
easily satisfied rational relationship test traditionally applied to other
non-suspect classifications would be utilized)' This depended on
whether the plan's exclusion of normal pregnancy disabilities
created a classification based on sex. 12
 In footnote 20 of the opinion
the Court answered this question:
While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it
does not follow that any legislative classification concern-
ing pregnancy is a sex-based classification. . . Absent a
showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere
pretexts .. . lawmakers are constitutionally free to include
or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such
as this on any reasonable basis . . . ."
Concluding, therefore, that the pregnancy exclusion did not create a
sex-based classification under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court found the stricter tests of Reed and Frontiero inapplicable."
Instead, the Court treated the exclusion as creating a classifica-
tion based on pregnancy." Applying the principle that legislatures
may address a problem one step at a time, the Court held that
California was free to draw the line short of pregnancy disabilities
as long as its decision to do so was "rationally supportable." 18 Such
rational support was found in the state policy of limiting the cover-
age of the plan to that level of benefits which could be adequately
financed by the existing, easily administered 1% contribution rate. 17
The three dissenters, in an opinion written by Justice Brennan,
argued that the pregnancy exclusion did create a sex-based clas-
sification: "[D]issimilar treatment of men and women, on the basis
of physical characteristics inextricably linked to one sex, inevitably
constitutes sex discrimination." 18
 They reasoned that the stricter
Id.
9
 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
'° 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
13
 417 U.S. at 494-96.
12
 Id. at 494-95.
13
 Id. at 496 n.20.
14
 Id.
15 Id. at 494-95.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 496.
1 ° Id. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tests of Reed and Frontiero should have been applied' 9 and that the
pregnancy exclusion should have been upheld only upon a showing
by the state that the exclusion "serves overriding or compelling
interests that cannot be achieved either by a more carefully tailored
legislative classification or by the use of feasible, less drastic
means."2° The state's asserted interest in limiting the costs of the
program, the dissenters concluded, was not sufficient to satisfy this
standard. 2 I
Although Aiello was an equal protection case, the issue has
arisen during the Survey year as to whether Aiello's reasoning—that
pregnancy disability exclusions do not constitute sex discrimination
under the Fourteenth Amendment—mandates a similar finding of
no sex discrimination where similar pregnancy disability exclusions
are challenged under Title VII. The basic question presented to the
courts has been whether the scope of protection against sex dis-
crimination under Title VII is limited to the scope of protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
A negative answer was given by the Second Circuit in Com-
munication Workers v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., Long
Lines Department, 22
 where the court held that Aiello did not require
the dismissal of plaintiffs' Title VII action challenging the defendant
company's employee disability insurance plans which excluded preg-
nancy disabilities from coverage. 23
 The district court had held that
the decision in Aiello precluded a finding of sex discrimination under
Title VIL 24
 The lower court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that
sex-based classifications are more easily established under Title VII
than under the Fourteenth Amendment. 25
 Since the Supreme Court
in Aiello had held that such a pregnancy exclusion did not constitute
a sex-based classification under the Fourteenth Amendment, it fol-
lowed that a similar exclusion could not constitute a sex-based
classification under Title VII, 26
 This was true, the lower court
concluded, despite the fact that the plan presently under review was
a private employment insurance plan rather than a state welfare
statute as was involved in Aiello. 27
 As a result, the plaintiffs' claim
was dismissed. 28
 However, the district court certified the question of
19
 Id. at 502-03.
2° Id. at 503, citing Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357-58 (1974).
21
 417 U.S. at 503-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22
 513 F.2d 1024, 10 FEP Cas. 435 (2d Cir. 1975).
" Id. at 1032, 10 FEP Cas. at 441.
24
 Communication Workers v, American Tel. & Tel. Co., Long Lines Dept., 379 F.
Stipp. 679, 682, 8 FEP Cas. 529, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
23
 Id. at 682-83, 8 FEP Cas. at 531.
26
 Id. at 681-82, 8 FEP Cas. at 530-31.
21
 Id. at 682, 8 FEP Cas. at 531.
28
 Id. at 681, 8 FEP Cas. at 530.
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the interpretation and applicability of Aiello to the court of appeals,
admitting that upon this question "there is substantial ground for
difference of opinion." 29
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that Aiello was not dia-
positive of the plaintiffs' Title VII action. 3 ° Four reasons were cited
by the court to support its conclusion that Aiello should not be
applied in the Title VII area. First, Aiello was an.equal protection
case. The standards applied and the determinations made therein
were intended to be read as applicable only within the equal protec-
tion context. Nowhere in Aiello is there any reference to Title VII or
any suggestion that the decision was intended to be applicable to
cases arising under Title VII. 3 ' Second, the application of Aiello to
Title VII cases would not only circumscribe the reach of Title VII,
but it would also invalidate EEOC guidelines, promulgated pursuant
to Title VII, which mandate that pregnancy disabilities are to be
treated in the same manner as other disabilities for all job related
purposes. 32
 To conclude that the majority in Aiello had intended
such a result without ever mentioning Title VII or the EEOC
guidelines would be "inconceivable."33 Third, Aiello was decided
within the context of constitutional analysis, whereas the Title VII
issue is one of statutory interpretation. 34 Fourth, Title VII was
designed to prohibit a broader range of discriminatory evils than is
prohibited under the Fourteenth Amendment: "There is no require-
ment that the discriminatory practices forbidden by this statute
should be limited to practices violative of the Equal Protection
Clause. "35
The Second Circuit's decision in Communication Workers is
typical of the Survey year cases in which the applicability of Aiello
to the Title VII area has been discussed. In fact, every court which
has considered the issue, with the sole exception of the district court
in Communication Workers, has concluded that Aiello is not disposi-
tive of Title VII claims. 36 Nevertheless, it is at least arguable that
Aiello should be applied to such litigation.
The same two-step inquiry is followed in both Title VII and
29
 Id. at 684, 8 FEP Cas. at 532.
3°
 513 F.2d at 1031-32, 10 FEP Cas. at 441.
31
 Id. at 1030, 10 FEP Cas. at 439-40.
72 Id., 10 FEP Cas. at 440.
33 Id.
" Id. at 1031, 10 FEP Cas. at 440.
33 Id.
" See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 203-04, 9 FEP Cas. 227, 229-30
(3d Cir. 1975); Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Bd. of Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784, 787, 9 FEP Cas.
138, 139-40 (N.D. Iowa 1975); Vineyard v. Hollister School Dist., 8 FEP Cas. 1009, 1012
(N.D. Cal. 1974). See also Union Free School Dist. No. 6 v. New York State Human Rights
Appeal Bd., 35 N.Y.2d 371, 362 N.Y.S.2d 139, 141-42, 10 FEP Cas. 431, 432-33 (1974).
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Fourteenth Amendment sex discrimination cases. First, does the
challenged practice create a sex-based classification? Second, if so, is
the resulting sex discrimination prohibited?" This inquiry is based
on the conclusion that until the fact of a sex-based classification has
been established, there can be no sex discrimination under either
Title VII or the Fourteenth Amendment. Those cases of which
Communication .Workers is typical have focused on the second step
of this inquiry, reaching the conclusion that a practice which does
not constitute unlawful sex discrimination prohibited by the Four-
teenth Amendment may nevertheless constitute unlawful sex dis-
crimination prohibited by Title VII." Indeed, this conclusion is
reasonably supportable by the legislative history of Title VII. 39
Aiello, however, focused on the first step of the inquiry:
whether the exclusion created a sex-based classification. 40 This is a
factual determination which the Aiello Court answered in the nega-
tive. The question is the same for both Title VII and Fourteenth
Amendment cases; consequently, a determination on this question in
the context of a Fourteenth Amendment claim would seem equally
applicable to a Title VII case. Without a sex-based classification,
there can be no sex discrimination and without sex discrimination,
there can be no claim under Title VII.
This analysis has a reasonable foundation in the language of the
Aiello opinion.'" However, it is submitted that Aiello was incorrect
in its determination of no sex-based classification. Distinctions
which are based on physical characteristics unique to members of
37 See Communication Workers, 379 F. Supp. at 682, 8 FEP Cas. at 531.
36
 "There is no requirement that the discriminatory practices forbidden by [Title VII]
should be limited to practices violative of the Equal Protection Clause." Communication
Workers, 513 F.2d at 1031, 10 FEP Cas. at 440; accord, Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Bd. of
Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784, 787, 9 FE? Cas. 138, 140 (N.D. Iowa 1975); Vineyard v. Hollister
School Dist., 8 FEP Cas. 1009, 1012 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
39
 The broad power of Congress to prohibit discrimination extends beyond the existing
prohibition in the Fourteenth Amendment. The constitutional sources of this broad Congres-
sional power are section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which authorizes Congress to enact
broader and more specific legislation to implement the principles of the Amendment, Katzen-
bach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-51 (1966), and the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 8. See Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Bd. of Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784, 787, 9 FEP Cas. 138,
140 (N.D. Iowa 1975). The "affecting commerce" language of Title VII, 42 U.S.C, § 2000e-(b)
(Sum). II 1972), and its legislative history, see H. Rep. No. 92.238, 1972 U.S. Code Cong.
and Ad. News 2137, indicate that Congress exercised its power under both of these constitu-
tional sources in enacting Title VII:
Legislation to implement this aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment is long overdue,
and the committee believes that an appropriate remedy has been fashioned in the
bill.
Id. at 2154. Thus, it is entirely possible that Congress intended that sex discrimination under
Title VII should be a broader and more encompassing category than sex discrimination under
the Fourteenth Amendment.
4° See 417 U.S. at 496 n.20.
41
 Id. See text at note 13 supra.
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one sex clearly create sex-based classifications." Because the deci-
sion is incorrect, the lower courts have ample justification to refuse
to apply Aiello expansively into the Title VII area. Furthermore, as
the Second Circuit cautioned, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court
could have intended Aiello to have significant repercussions in the
Title VII area since the Court never mentioned this statute in the
decision. 43
 Thus, while a reading of Aiello suggests its applicability
to such claims, the lower courts should continue to interpret the
decision narrowly and reject its application in actions brought under
Title VII.
VIII. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION UNDER TITLE VII: Rios
At the present time, eight circuits have ordered affirmative
goals or quotas in order to eradicate the effects of past employment
discrimination) However, authority for many of these affirmative
awards has been found in 42 U.S.C. section 1981, 2 42 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1983, 3
 or Part III of Executive Order 11246. 4 Only four of the
eight circuits have ever ordered affirmative relief pursuant to Title
42 In the dissenting opinion in Aiello, Justice Brennan stated:
[A] limitation is imposed on the disabilities for which women may recover, while
men receive full compnsation for all disabilities suffered, including those that affect
only or primarily theirisex, such as prostatectomies, circumcision, hemophelia, and
gout. In effect, one set of rulei is applicable to females and another to males. Such
dissimilar treatment of men and women, on the basis of physical characteristics
inextricably linked to One sex, inevitably constitutes sex discrimination.
Id. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting). EEOC regulations promulgated pursuant to Title VII
reflect this same view. 29 C,F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1974). See also Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock
13d. of Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784, 787, 9 FEP Cas. 138, 141 (N.D. Iowa 1975); Note,
Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 Harv. I... Rev.
1109, 1170 (1971): "This definition [sex discrimination] would include those classifications
schemes which, rather than using the terms 'male' and 'female,' make the classification
contingent upon those characteristics which are physically possible in only one sex, such as
ability to become pregnant."
43 Communication Workers, 513 F.2d at 1030, 10 FEP Cas. at 440.
See Boston Chapter, N.A.A.C.P., Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1026-27 (1st Cir.
1974); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F,2d
1333, 1340-41 (2d Cir. 1973); Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159,
172 (3d Cir. 1971); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Local 212, IBEW, 472 F.2d 634, 636 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Carpenters & Joiners
Local 169, 457 F.2d 210, 220 (7th Cir, 1972); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d
354, 377 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 553 (9th Cir.
1971).
2 See, e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 318 (1971), aff'd and modified on
rehearing, 452 F.2d 327 (8th Cir. 1972).
3 See Vulcan Soc'y of New York City Fire Dept., Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d
387, 390 (2d Cir. 1973); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1337 (2d Cir. 1973).
4 3 C.F.R. 339 (Supp. 1964-65), 42 U.S.C. § 2000C(1970). See Contractors Ass'n of E.
Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 1106628-63 (3d Cir. 1971).
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VI1, 5 and these orders have often provoked vigorous dissents. 6 The
controversy involves the reconciliation of the general relief provi-
sions of section 706(g), 7 which authorize an award of "such affirma-
tive action as may be appropriate," with the specific limitation of
section 703(j)8 which prohibits preferential treatment on account of
minority status. Proponents of affirmative goals or quotas argue that
such relief is authorized by section 706(g) 9 while opponents argue
that goals and quotas have been exempted by section 703(j) from the
forms of relief available under section 706(g). 10
During the Survey year, the Second Circuit was presented with
this issue in Rios v. Steamfitters, Local 638) 1 Here, the court
attempted to reconcile the seeming conflict in Title VII provisions by
interpreting section 703(j) to prohibit affirmative goals only where
the underlying disparity or imbalance is caused by factors other than
unlawful discriminatory conduct. 12
The lower court found that Local 638 was the collective bar-
gaining agent for steamfitters in New York City and two surround-
ing counties. It had two branches, the higher paid "A" branch
whose members were journeymen engaged in construction work,
and the lower paid "B" branch whose members worked in shops or
performed repair work. Prior to 1967, there were no non-white
members in the A branch. By the end of 1971, less than one percent
of the A branch membership was non-white, and by the end of
1972, largely due to preliminary relief granted by the court, the
membership was 4.5 percent non-white. In addition, approximately
25 percent of the A branch members had secured their membership
through participation in a five-year apprenticeship program. How-
ever, since 1964, only 5.7 percent of the participants in this program
had been non-white, and at the time of the trial only 16 of 376
participants were non-white . 13
5
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970). See United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d
544, 546 (9th Cir. 1971); Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 631 (2d Cir. 1974);
United States v. Local 212, IBEW, 472 F.2d 634, 636 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Local
38, IBEW, 428 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1970); Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d
1047, 1053 (5th Cir. 1969).
6
 See, e.g,, Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 634, 8 FEP Cas. 293, 303 (2d
Cir. 1974).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970).
5
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970).
9
 See, e.g., Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir. 1969).
1° See, e.g., Boston Chapter, N.A.A.C.P., Inc. v, Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1027 (1st
Cir. 1974).
501 F.2d 622, 8 FEP Cas. 293 (2d Cir. 1974).
12
 Id. at 630-31, 8 FEP Cas. at 299-300.
'' See id. at 624-28, 8 FEP Cas. at 295-98. The opinion of the district court is found at
360 F. Supp. 979, 6 FEP Cas. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), sub nom. United States v. Steamfitters,
Local 638.
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Based on these findings, the district court concluded that Local
638 had violated Title VII by presently perpetuating the effects of
past discrimination.' 4 The court then imposed on the union a
minimum membership goal of 30 percent non-white membership in
the A branch by July 1, 1977, to be achieved by implementing a
series of interim goals."
Local 638 appealed the imposition of this goal, arguing that
such relief was not authorized under Title VII.' 6 The court of
appeals first noted that once unlawful discrimination is established,
broad equitable powers are vested in the court." These powers, the
court concluded, provide sufficient authority for the lower court's
imposition of a preferential membership goal." However, the more
troublesome question was whether these equitable powers are limited
by section 703(j), which provides in pertinent part:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to
require any . . . labor organization ... to grant preferen-
tial treatment to any individual or to any group . . . on
account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to
the total number or percentage of [non-whites] . . . admit-
ted to membership or classified by any labor organization
. . . in comparison with the total number or percentage of
[such non-whites] . . in any community . . . 19
The court conceded that, "at first blush," section 703(j) might
appear to prohibit court-ordered membership goals. 2 ° However, the
court avoided this problem by interpreting section 703(j) to prohibit
membership goals only where the imbalance or disparity was caused
by factors other than unlawful discrimination. 2 ' Three reasons were
advanced to support this interpretation: (1) where unlawful dis-
crimination has not been demonstrated, no justification exists for the
14
 Id. at 989, 6 FEP Cas. at 328.
15 See 501 F.2d at 625-26, 8 FEP Cas. at 296.
14
 Id. at 628, 8 FEP Cas. at 298. Local 638 also argued that the preferential goals
violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, the court dismissed these claims by referring to its own past decisions in which the
same claims were raised and rejected. Id.
'' The court found authority for the imposition of the membership goal in § 706(g), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970), which authorizes an award of such "equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate," in § 707(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1970), which authorizes the Attorney
General to seek in a patter]; and practice suit (such as the present case) such relief "as he
deems necessary to insure the full enjoyment of the rights herein described," and in the court's
equitable power to "eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like
discrimination in the future." 501 F.2d at 629, 8 FE? Cas. at 298-99.
'a 501 F.2d at 629, 8 FEP Cas. at 299.
19
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970).
20
 501 F.2d at 630, 8 FE? Cas. at 299.
21
 Id., 8 FEP Cas. at 300.
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imposition of membership goals;22 (2) where unlawful discrimination
has been demonstrated the mere prohibition of future discrimination
is an illusory and inadequate remedy; 23 and (3) any other interpreta-
tion of section 703(j) would completely nullify the stated purposes of
Title VII. 24
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Hays argued that the majority's
interpretation was without basis in either the text or the legislative
history of section 703(j). 25
 The text of this provision, he maintained,
prohibits all preferential treatment without exception. 26 It thus re-
moves goals and quotas from the category of relief otherwise avail-
able under Title VII. Furthermore, the legislative history of this
provision, Judge Hays continued, reveals that section 703(j) was
specifically added as an amendment to the original version of Title
VII to placate those opponents who contended that Title VII would
lead to preferential hiring or membership goals." Judge Hays thus
concluded that section 703(j) barred all preferential goals whether or
not past discrimination had been demonstrated. 28
Judge Hays' interpretation has substantial support in the legis-
lative history of Title VII. 29 The interpetation of the majority, on
the other hand, has substantial judicial support." Nevertheless, it is
submitted that under the majority's interpretation, section 703(j) has
been effectively written out of Title VII. While recognizing that
section 703(j) creates a prohibition on the court's power to order
affirmative goals or quotas, the majority would apply this prohibi-
tion only where no unlawful discrimination can be shown. This
interpretation is highly questionable. Where no violation of Title
VII is shown, the court is without power to order any relief under
that statute. Thus, by ascribing to Congress a meaningless purpose
in enacting section 703(j), the majority has completely and improp-
erly erased that section from Title VII.
Rios is equally significant in another respect—the court of
appeals' modification of the 30 percent figure chosen by the district
court as its membership goal. In choosing this figure, the lower court
relied heavily on certain census statistics and a percentage (28 per-
cent: the percentage of "minority" residents in New York City)
22 Id. at 631, 8 FEP Cas. at 300.
23 Id.
24
 Id.
25
 Id. at 634, 8 FEP Cas. at 303 (dissenting opinion).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 634-37, 8 FEP Cas. at 303-05.
26
 Id. at 637, 8 FEP Cas. at 305.
29 See id, at 634-37, 8 FEP Cas. at 303-05.
30 See, e.g., United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 553-54 (9th Cir. 1971);
Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 172-73 (3d Cir. 1971);
United States v. Local 38, MEW 428 F.2d 144, 149-50 (6th Cir. 1970).
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proposed by a city official. 31 However, the Second Circuit con-
cluded that this 30 percent figure was inaccurate in that it did not
necessarily reflect the percentage of non-whites who would have
been hired as steamfitters but for the Union's discrimination. Three
reasons were advanced: (1) the figure proposed by the city official
was based on a definition of the term "minority" which included all
non-whites, while the present suit involved only Black and
Spanish-surnamed persons; 32 (2) the figure proposed by the city
official was based on the non-white population of New York City,
while the present suit involved not only New York City, but also
two surrounding counties in which the non-white population is
significantly smaller than that of the city; 33 and, most importantly,
(3) the census figure's relied on by the lower court showed the
percentage of non-whites in the entire population of New York City
and the two surrounding counties, while the Union does not draw
its membership from the entire population, since women had never
sought to be steamfitters and persons under 18 years of age were not
allowed to be steamfitters. 34 Thus, the court concluded that the
more accurate statistic upon which the membership goal should be
based was the percentage of non-whites in the male work force over
18 years of age in the Union's jurisdiction:3 s
[W]e believe that reliable statistics with respect to the labor
force provide a more accurate basis for arriving at an
appropriate non-white percentage goal than does the in-
formation relied upon by the district court, which included
not only males forming the labor force, but females, chil-
dren, retired persons and others who would not, absent
discrimination, have been the source of Union members or
apprentices. 36
In closing, the Second Circuit hinted that a figure closer to 20
percent would be more accurate in restoring non-whites to the
position in which they would have been but for the unlawful dis-
crimination. 37 However, the case was remanded to the lower court
for final determination of a percentage figure."
The common sense approach of the Second Circuit has great
appeal. If non-whites have been unlawfully discriminated against
31 501 F.2d at 632, 8 FEP Cas. at 301.
32 Id.
33 Id.
3° Id.
35
 Id. at 633, 8 FEP Cas. at 302.
3° Id.
.17
38 Id.
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and if remedial goals are to be imposed to restore these non-white
employees to the position in which they would have been but for the
unlawful discrimination, then it is entirely proper that the degree of
later restoration should, as closely as possible, equal the degree of
earlier discrimination. It is thus submitted that, in the future, fed-
eral courts should follow the Second Circuit's approach of basing
preferential hiring or membership goals on the percentage of avali-
able non-white workers in the labor force.
IX. PROCEDURE
A. Notice In Title VII, (b)(2) Class Actions:
Alexander; Freeman; Wetzel
Before a class can be certified by the district court under Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it must first satisfy the
four prerequisites of Rule 23(a), 1 plus one of the three prerequisites
of Rule 23(b): 2 either (b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3). Most Title VII class
actions are certified as (b)(2) actions because the requirement of
section (b)(2)—that "the party opposing the class has acted or re-
' Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) provides:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (a) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claim or defenses of the respresentative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) provides:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if
the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as
a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to
the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corre-
sponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A)
the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirabil-
ity or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular
forum; (13) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
action.
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fused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class . . ."—is
ideally sited to employment discrimination claims.'
Injunctive and declaratory relief are the standard remedies
sought in Title VII, (b)(2) class actions, although back pay may also
be awarded provided the request for back pay does not predominate
over the request for injunctive and declaratory relief. 4
 In addition,
the final judgment in (b)(2) actions is res judicata as to each member
of the designated cla.4s whether or not the member is a named party,
specifically represented at trial, or even given notice of the suits
Indeed, notice in (b)(2) actions is within the trial court's discretion 6
as compared to the mandatory notice requirement of (b)(3) class
actions.' Notice in Title VII, (b)(2) class actions was a recurring
issue in Title VII litigation during the Survey year as federal courts
divided over the problem of whether "discretionary" notice should
always be required in Title VII, (b)(2) class actions, and if so, what
type of notice should be required and upon whom the cost should be
imposed.
The district court in Alexander v. Avco Corp. 8 required notice
as a general prerequisite to all Title VII, (b)(2) class actions. 9 Plain-
tiffs, three employees of the defendant Avco Corp., filed a class
action to challenge defendant's employment practices as racially
discriminatory in violation of Title VII. The suit was originally
certified as a (b)(2) class action." However, defendant Avco later
argued that the suit could not continue as a class action because
notice had never been given by the plaintiff to any absent members
of the class."
The court agreed with the defendant, holding that notice was
3
 Indeed, the Advisory Committee illustrated the use of Rule 23(b)(2} in civil rights
litigation. See Advisory Committee's Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966).
4
 Although the "predominates over" test was applied several times during the Survey
year, the courts, in general', did not elucidate the standard. For example, in Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 8 FEP Cas. 66 (5th Cir. 1974) the court simply stated
the test and concluded that the damages request did not predominate. Id. at 422, 8 FEP Cas.
at 83-84. However, in Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 9 FEP Cas, 211 (3d
Cir. 1975) the court did state that in Title VII class actions the damages request could never
predominate since back pay is an equitable remedy and hence, not considered damages. Id. at
250-51, 9 FEP Cas. at 219.
5
 See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 248-49, 9 FEP Cas. 211, 218-19 (3d
Cir. 1975) where the res judicata impact of Rule 23(c)(3) is explained. See generally Hansberry
v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-42 (1940).
6
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). See also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175
(1974). See generally Note, 16 B.C. Ind. & Corn. 254 (1975).
° 380 F. Supp. 1282, reported sub nom, Newman v. Avco Corp., 8 FEP Cas. 714 (M.D.
Tenn. 1974).
9
 Id. at 1286, 8 FEP Cas. at 718.
1 ° Id. at 1283-86, 8 FEP Cas. at 716-18.
n Id. at 1285, 8 FEP Cas. at 717,
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required as a matter of due process in all Title VII, (b)(2) class
actions; because no notice had been given in the present suit, the
original certification had to be withdrawn.' 2 In support of its hold-
ing, the court cited a "growing body of authority," all non-Title VII
cases, which espouses the general principle that due process requires
notice in all class actions where the judgment would bind absent
members of the class." The court's reliance on these cases to sup-
port its notice requirement suggests that in the future the Alexander
court and courts which follow the Alexander decision will not deal
with the issue of notice in Title VII, (b)(2) class actions on a
case-by-case basis, but rather will automatically require notice in all
Title VII, (b)(2) class actions as a mandatory requirement."
Because no notice at all had been given in Alexander, the court
did not reach the issue of what specific type of notice should be
given in Title VII, (b)(2) class actions and who should bear the cost
of such notice. This question was addressed in Freeman v. Motor
Convoy, Inc., 15 where the district court ordered the defendant com-
pany to post notice of the pending class actions at its business offices
and terminals. 16 Freeman involved a class action brought under
Title VII and 42 U.S.C. section 1981 to challenge the defendant
company's employment practices as racially discriminatory. De-
claratory and injunctive relief were sought, as well as an award of
back pay."
The court first held that, because of the "circumstances in this
case," discretionary notice must be provided to all potential class
members." Then, in specifying the nature of the required notice,
the court ordered that a formal notice (set forth in an appendix to
the court's opinion) be posted at the terminals and trucking offices of
the defendant employer." The responsibility for, and presumably
the costs of, posting this notice were imposed upon the defendant
company. 20
The "circumstances of this case" which prompted the court to
invoke its discretionary power to order notice were based largely on
12 Id. at 1286, 8 FEP Cas. at 718.
11 Id. Specifically cited by the court were Schrader v. Selective Serv. Sys. Loc. U. No.
76, 470 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1972) (right to fatherhood classification under Military Selective
Service Act); Zeilstra v. Tarr, 466 F.2d Ill (6th Cir. 1972) (same); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) (odd-lot investors, buyers, and sellers suing two
brokerage firms and New York Stock Exchange); and Pasquier v. Tarr, 318 F. Supp. 1350
(E.D. La. 1970) (right to fatherhood classification under Military Selective Service Act).
14 See 380 F. Supp. at 1286, 8 FEP Cas. at 718.
18 9 FEP Cas, 89 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
16
 Id. at 94.
17 Id. at 90.
' 8 Id. at 94 & n,6.
19
 Id. at 94.
211 Id.
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plaintiff's request for back pay. 21 This request created visible
similarities between plaintiff's (b)(2) action and the standard (b)(3)
action in which monetary relief predominates and in which notice is
a mandatory requirement. Thus, while the court was willing to
certify the suit as a (b)(2) class action, the request for the type of
relief customarily awarded in (b)(3) class actions convinced the court
to invoke its discretionary authority to order notice to the absent
class members. 22
In contrast to the results of the Alexander and the Freeman
decisions, the Third Circuit held in Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insur-
ance Co. 23
 that notice was not required in a Title VII, (b)(2) class
action because no unfairness would result to the parties from a lack
of notice. 24 Plaintiffs; two female claims representatives employed
by defendant Liberty Mutual, alleged that the company violated Title
VII by selecting predominantly males for the higher paying job of
claims adjuster. 25 The district court certified plaintiffs suit as a
(b)(2) class action and held that notice was not required. 26 Defen-
dant appealed to the circuit court, arguing that the suit should have
been certified as a (b)(3) class action 27 in which notice would be
mandatory, and in the alternative, that if the suit was properly
certified under section (b)(2), the court should require discretionary
notice either as a requirement of due process or pursuant to its
general supervisory powers over the district courts within the cir-
cuit. 28
The Third Circuit first held that the suit could properly proceed
as a (b)(2) class action. 29 Then, on the issue of notice, the court
stated that it was "reluctant" to impose any notice in Title VII, (b)(2)
class actions pursuant to its general supervisory powers over the
district courts, and would not do so unless either required by Rule
23, or unfairness would result to the parties. 3 ° The court's reluc-
tance arose from the fact that private class actions are "the cutting
edge of the Title VII sword" and that the "imposition of notice and
the ensuing costs often discourage such suits."31
The court concluded that it was not required by Rule 23 to
21
 See id. at 92-94.
22 Id.
23
 508 F.2d 239, 9 FEP Cas. 211 (3d Cir. 1975).
2• Id. at 254-56, 9 FEP Cas. at 222-24.
25
 Id. at 243-44, 9 FEP Cas. at 214.
26
 See id. at 244, 9 FEP Cas. at 214.
23
 Id. at 248, 254, 9 FEP Cas. at 215, 217.
" Id. at 254, 9 FEP Cas. at 222.
29
 Id. at 248, 9 FEP Cas. at 217.
3 ° Id. at 254, 9 FEP Cas. at 222.
31 Id.
1076
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
impose notice in Title VII, (b)(2) class actions. 32 The court further
concluded that unfairness would not result to the parties in this
particular case from the lack of notice, since the plaintiff class was
cohesive and was adequately represented by competent counsel."
Thus, the class action was permitted to continue in the absence of
any notice."
Two questions arise from the Alexander, Freeman, and Wetzel
cases: is notice a mandatory requirement in Title VII, (b)(2) class
actions? If so, what are the implications for employers and
employees where such notice is imposed?
Notice is certainly not a mandatory requirement of Rule 23
(b)(2) itself. This fact, which is reiterated in the Advisory Commit-
tee's Notes on Rule 23, 35 was recognized by both the Wetzel36 and
Freeman 37 courts. However, the more interesting question, which
was raised by both the Wetzel 38 and the Alexander" courts, is
whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may
be invoked as a source of law above and beyond Rule 23 to impose a
notice requirement in all Title VII, (b) (2) class actions. As noted in
Alexander, there is a growing body of authority which has applied
this reasoning to (b)(2) actions outside of the Title VII area" and
Alexander has now become the first case to apply the reasoning
within the Title VII area. As noted earlier, these cases are based on
the premise that any time absent class members may be bound by
the final judgment in a class action, they are entitled, as a matter of
due process, to be notified of that action. 4 '
This reasoning embodies the assumption that the notice re-
quirements of Rule 23 and the notice requirements of the due
process clause are not co-extensive. This assumption appears to be
contrary to the intent of the Advisory Committee as stated in its
Notes on Rule 23: "This mandatory notice [in (b)(3) actions], together
with any discretionary notice which the court may find it advisable
to give [in (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions] is designed to fulfill requirements
of due process to which the class action procedure is of course
32 Id.
33 Id. at 256, 9 FEP Cas. at 224.
34 See id. at 257, 9 FEP Cas. at 225.
35 Advisory Committee's Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 106-07 (1966).
36 508 F.2d at 254, 9 FEP Cas. at 222.
33 9 FE? Cas. at 94 n.6.
38 508 F.2d at 256-57, 9 FEP Cas. at 223-25.
39 Alexander, 380 F. Supp. at 1286, 8 FE? Cas. at 718.
4° See note 13 and accompanying text supra. However, because of the "confused pro-
cedural history" of these cases, the court in Wetzel questioned their precedential value on the
issue of notice. 508 F.2d at 255 n.36, 9 FE? Cas. at 223 n.36.
4' See 380 F. Supp. at 1286, 8 FE? Cas. at 718.
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subject."42 Thus, it appears that the opinion of the circuit courts
upon which the Alexander decision is based and the opinion of the
Advisory Committee are directly opposite. This conclusion might be
avoided if the Advisory Committee's statement is interpreted to
mean that Rule 23 is designed to fulfill only the minimum require-
ments of due process and that in some cases more than the
minimum requirements will be necessary. However, no court has
yet adopted this interpretation of the statement.
The central question thus becomes whether due process re-
quires mandatory notice in all (b)(2) class actions despite the dis-
cretionary language of Rule 23. The leading case on due process
notice is Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co.," in which the
Supreme Court, presented with a question as to the particular type
of notice required, held that personal notice rather than notice by
publication was required by the due process clause to be given to
easily found beneficiaries in the judicial settlement of a trust." In so
holding, the Court stated: "An elementary and fundamental re-
quirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded
finality is notice reasonably calculated . . . to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity
to present their objections."45 This language was quoted with ap-
proval in the subsequent case of Schroeder v. City of New York, 46 in
which the Court was again presented with a question as to the type
of notice required. 47 In addition, the Mullane opinion has been
relied upon by several lower courts which have held that notice is
required in all (b)(2) class actions as a matter of due process."
At the outset, however, it is important to note that the broad
language of Mullane is dicta. It was also dicta as subsequently
applied in Schroeder. This is true because both cases involved a
question as to the type of notice required, rather than whether any
notice at all was required. 49 Furthermore, both cases were decided
prior to the effective date of Rule 23, in which the (b)(1), (b)(2), and
(b)(3) distinctions were made for the first time among different types
of class actions. 5 ° Therefore, the broad dicta in both cases was not
42 Advisory Committee's Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 107 (1966).
43
 339 U.S. 306 (1949).
44 Id. at 320.
45 Id. at 314.
46 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
47
 Id. at 211.
45 See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 491 F.2d 555, 565 (2d Cir. 1968); Pasquier v.
Tarr, 318 F. Supp. 1350, 1353 (E.D. La. 1970). See also Symposium—The Class Action, 10
B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 496, 559-61 (1969).
49 339 U.S. at 307; 371 U.S. at 208-09.
5° Rule 23 became effective on July 1, 1966. 39 F.R.D. 69 (1966).
1078
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
made with reference to these major distinctions. In addition, the
drafters of Rule 23 were fully aware of the Mullane and Schroeder
opinions and nevertheless drafted Rule 23 to require only discretion-
ary notice in (b)(2) actions. 51 This fact gives rise to an inference
that the drafters did not consider the broad dicta of Mullane and
Schroeder as conclusive on the question of notice in all class actions.
Finally, this position is reinforced by subsequent decisions holding
that notice is not mandatory in (b)(2) actions under the Due Process
Clause. 52 For these reasons, it is submitted that Mullane and
Schroeder do not enunciate a due process requirement of mandatory
notice in all class actions. Consequently, it appears that the dis-
cretionary notice requirement of Rule 23(b)(2) is constitutionally
adequate.
The final question which remains concerns the implications for
employees and employers where notice is imposed. The Third Cir-
cuit in Wetzel suggested that the imposition of such notice would
often discourage plaintiff employees from maintaining their suits as
class actions. 53 However, this is not always true. Employees will not
be deterred where the costs of notice are imposed on the employer, as
was apparently done in Freeman. 54 Nor will employees be deterred
even in those cases where they must bear the costs of notice, as long
as the court orders some form of low-cost notice. Requiring plaintiff
employees to post a notice at the place of employment is a prime
example. In these cases, the imposition of notice will not discourage
class actions and the final result will be that more employees will be
made aware of their potential rights to back pay awards in pending
class actions.
Accordingly, notice generally adds up to greater costs to
employers. Not only may the employer sometimes have to pay the
costs of notice, as in Freeman, but the employer will also have to
pay greater back pay awards, where such awards are computed on
the basis of the number of employees who assert and establish their
51 Indeed, the Advisory Committee cited both Mullane and Schroeder in support of its
statement regarding the interplay of (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) with the Due Process Clause. 39
F.R.D. at 107.
52 See, e.g., Wetzel, 508 F.2d at 257, 9 FEP Cas. at 225: "We thus agree with the
framers of the rule, several district courts that have expressly considered the question, and
several of the commentators that notice to absent members of a (b)(2) class is not an absolute
requisite of due process." See also Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Sum), 619
(D. Kan. 1968): We think that the essential requisite of due process as to absent members of
the class is not notice, but the adequacy of representation of their interests by named parties."
Id. at 636; Doglow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 493-501 (E,D.N.Y. 1968).
53 508 F.2d at 254, 9 FEP Cas. at 222,
54 9 FE!' Cas. at 94. However, it should be noted that in the context of a (b)(3) class
action, the Supreme Court recently stated: "The usual rule is that a plaintiff must initially
bear the cost of notice to the class." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974).
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right to back pay. 55
 This is likely to be a direct function of the
amount and type of, notice required.
B. Proof in Title VII Litigation: The Applicability
of McDonnell Douglas
The Supreme Court has decided two major cases concerning
the burden of proof in Title VII litigation, Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.' and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 2 In Griggs, the earlier
of the two decisions, the Court held that under Title VII a company
could not, in making initial employment and subsequent transfer
decisions, utilize educational requirements which disqualify a dis-
proportionate number of blacks unless the company could show that
the requirements were sufficiently related to successful job perfor-
mance. 3
 Griggs was a class action, and in the lower courts the
plaintiff class had already established a past history of discrimina-
tion against blacks which was presently being perpetuated by the
disproportionate impact of the educational requirements. Thus,
when the case reached the Supreme Court, the primary issue for
consideration was the company's burden in justifying the challenged
practice. 4
 The Court first rejected the company's contention that if it
could show either good intent or the lack of discriminatory intent in
using the educational requirements, the practice was not violative of
Title VII. 5
 Instead, the Court held that the requirements could be
justified only upon a showing of business necessity: "RN an employ-
ment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown
to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited." 6 Apply-
ing this test to the educational requirements used by the Duke
Power Co., the Court concluded that the company had failed to
satisfy its burden of demonstrating job relatedness.'
In the subsequent case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
the Court was presented with the issue of the burden of proof in a
private, non-class action under Title VII. 8 Plaintiff, a black former
33 See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 261-62, 7 FEP Cas.
1115, 1154-55 (5th Cir. 1974).
1 401 U.S. 424 (1971), Although Griggs was a race discrimination case, it has been
applied to other forms of discrimination. See, e.g., Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 468 F.2d
346 (6th Cir. 1972) where the court stated, "Justice Burger's discussion of the business
necessity' test clearly extended to other forms of discrimination than race. . . ." Id. at 350.
2
 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
3 401 U.S. at 431.
4
 Id. at 429.
5 Id. at 432.
6 Id. at 431.
' Id.
411 U.S. at 800.
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employee of the McDonnell Douglas Corporation, alleged that the
company had unlawfully refused to rehire him because of his race.
The company, on the other hand, responded that it had refused to
rehire the plaintiff because he had recently engaged in certain illegal
conduct directed against the company. 9
The court discussed at length the burdens of proof to which the
two parties were subject. This discussion culminated in the enunicia-
tion of a three-step procedurel° defining the "order and allocation of
proof in a private, non-class action challenging employment dis-
crimination."" Under Step I of this procedure, the burden is ini-
tially upon the employee to prove a prima facie case of racial
discrimination by showing:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he
was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek appli-
cants from persons of complainant's qualifications."
It should be noted, however, that in a footnote, which has since
been relied upon by lower courts to distinguish McDonnell Doug-
las, 13 the Court stated: "The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII
cases, and the specification above of the prima facie proof required
from [the plaintiff] is not necessarily applicable in every respect to
differing factual situations." 14
Under Step II of the Court's procedure, if the employee has
satisfied his initial burden of proving a , prima facie case of racial
discrimination, the burden then shifts to the employer to advance
"some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" to justify the com-
pany's refusal to hire the plaintiff.' 5 Finally, if the employer ad-
vances such a reason, then under Step III of the Court's procedure,
the burden shifts back to the employee who must demonstrate that
9 Id. at 801.
I° Id. at 802-04.
II Id. at 800.
12 Id. at 802.
13 See, e.g., Rodriquez v. East Tex. Motor Freight, 8 FEP Cas. 1246, 1257 (5th Cir.
1974); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of IM. Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309, 1317 n.3, 8
FEP Cas. 577, 583 n.3 (7th Cir. 1974).
14
 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
13 Id. at 802. The Court did not provide guidelines as to what constitutes a "legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason." In addition, during the Survey year little light was shed on the
meaning of this defense. However, see Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 492 F.2d 292, 7 FEP
Cas. 416 (9th Cir. 1974), where the Ninth Circuit held that the employer's promotion-from-
within policy did not constitue a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason." Id. at 296, 7 FEP
Cas. at 419.
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the employer's asserted reason is merely pretextual." Although the
case was remanded on other grounds, the Court did suggest that on
the facts before it the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of
racial discrimination, but that the defendant had sufficiently rebut-
ted the plaintiff's showing by advancing a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason. 17 Thus, on remand, the plaintiff would have
to establish pretextuality."
McDonnell Douglas was decided one year prior to the present
Survey year. Because of the marked difference between the burden
of proof under Griggs and the burden of proof under McDonnell
Douglas, the lower federal courts were often confronted during the
Survey year with the question of whether Griggs or McDonnell
Douglas applied to the fact situation at hand." On this question, the
McDonnell Douglas opinion itself has been of central importance
because therein the Court distinguished Griggs on two grounds.
First, Griggs concerned the legality of a general company policy
which was applicable to all employees and which had the effect of
excluding many blacks. 2 ° McDonnell Douglas, on the other hand,
involved the legality of a single decision not to hire a particular
individua.I. 21 Secondly, the Griggs educational requirements oper-
ated to exclude applicants on the basis of "childhood deficiencies in
the education and background of minority citizens," a factor beyond
the applicant's control. 22 However, the plaintiff in McDonnell
Douglas was excluded because of his illegal conduct against the
company, a voluntary act. 23
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Rodriquez v. East Texas Motor
Freight24
 is a Survey year case which relied, at least in part, on the
first of these two distinctions cited by the McDonnell Douglas Court.
Here, the court held that Griggs and not McDonnell Douglas was
applicable in a class action challenging certain transfer policies
which were utilized by the defendant company. 25
 However, as
evidenced by the companion case to Rodriquez, Herrera v. Yellow
19 411 U.S. at 804.
17 Id. at 807.
' Id.
19
 For factually similar cases applying McDonnell Douglas, see, e.g., Franklin v. Troxel
Mfg. Co., 501 F.2d 1013, 1014-15, 8 FEP Cas. 654, 655-56 (6th Cir. 1974) (black female
applicant denied employment by company with past history of racial discrimination); Gates v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 492 F.2d 292, 295, 7 FEP Cas. 416, 419 (9th Cir. 1974) (black female
applicant denied employment because of promotion-from-within policy).
29 See 401 U.S. at 427-28.
21
 411 U.S. at 806.
22 See 401 U.S. at 427-28.
" Id.
24
 8 FEP Cas. 1246 (5th Cir. 1974).
25 See id. at 1257.
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Freight System, 26 the procedural fact of whether the suit is main-
tained as a class action is not the crucial factor in determining
whether Griggs or McDonnell Douglas is applicable. Unlike Rod-
riquez, Herrera was a private non-class action by a small group of
individual plaintiffs who challenged the same transfer policies which
were involved in Rodriquez. 27 Nevertheless, the court once again
held McDonnell Douglas distinguishable and Griggs applicable. 28
Both Rodriquez and Herrera cited two additional grounds upon
which McDonnell Douglas is distinguishable. First, the qualifica-
tions of the plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas were undisputed, since
he had previously held the same job for which he later applied. 29
However, because they had never taken the prerequisite road test,
the plaintiffs in Rodriquez and Herrera had not yet demonstrated
that they were qualified for the more skilled job which they now
sought. 3° Second, in both of the Fifth Circuit cases there was a
history of past discrimination which would deter potential
employees from ever applying for employment, whereas McDonnell
Douglas involved no such history of past discrimination. 31 Related
to this latter distinction is the Seventh Circuit's decision in Waters v.
Wisconsin Steel Works. 32 Here the court held that McDonnell Doug-
las was not applicable on the issue of whether the plaintiff had
established a prima facie case of past discrimination. 33 Thus, while
the Fifth Circuit stated in Rodriquez and Herrera that McDonnell
Douglas is not applicable if a history of past discrimination is shown
which would have discouraged potential employees from applying
for a job, the Seventh Circuit went further and stated in Waters that
McDonnell Douglas is inapplicable on the initial question of whether
the plaintiff has, in fact, established such a history of past discrimi-
nation.
At the same time, it is important to note several significant
circumstances which, although different from those presented in
McDonnell Douglas, have nevertheless been held insufficient to
distinguish the McDonnell Douglas case. The first of these is the
statute under which the discrimination claim is brought. In McDbn-
nell Douglas, the employee's claim was based on Title VII. 34 How-
ever, the decision has been applied during the Survey year to claims
26 8 FEP Cas. 1266 (5th Cir. 1974).
27 Id. at 1267.
21
 Id. at 1268.
29
 411 U.S. at 794.
3° Rodriquez, 8 FEP Cas. at 1257; Herrera, 8 FEP Cas. at 1268.
3 ' Rodriquez, S FEP Cas. at 1257; Herrera, 8 FEP Cas. at 1268.
32
 502 F.2d 1309, 8 FEP Cas. 577 (7th Cir. 1974).
33
 Id. at 1317, 8 FEP Cas. at 583.
34 411 U.S. at 793-94.
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based on 42 U.S.C. section 1981, 35 42 U.S.C. section 1982, 36 and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 37
 The second of these
circumstances is the type of discrimination which is asserted.
McDonnell Douglas was a race discrimination case. 38 Nevertheless,
during the Survey year the decision was also applied to claims of age
discrimination, 39 religious discrimination" and sex discrimination.'"
Finally, the specific'type of employer action which is challenged has
also not been significant. While McDonnell Douglas involved a
hiring decision, the case has been applied to discharge42 and promo-
tion43
 decisions. Also noteworthy is the fact that at least once during
the Survey year McDonnell Douglas was applied outside the
employment area to a claim that contractors and vendors of new
homes in Chicago were unlawfully maintaining separate and dis-
criminatory housing markets for blacks and whites."
In summary, during the Survey year the lower courts con-
stantly sought to clarify the fact situations to which McDonnell
Douglas applies as compared to the fact situations to which Griggs
applies. It has emerged that where a general employer policy or
practice is challenged in a class action, Griggs and not McDonnell
Douglas applies. 45 This is also true where an individual employee
challenges a single employer action as based on a general dis-
criminatory policy." Furthermore, in the opinion of the Fifth Cir-
cuit, if in addition the challenged policy is part of a past and
continuing history of discrimination, the applicability of Griggs is
strengthened. 47 On the other hand, where the employer has acted
discriminatorily towards only one employee, and that action is not
35
 Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500, 505 n.11, 7 FEP Cas. 1053, 1057 n.11 (6th
Cir. 1974).
36
 Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 334 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1070 (1975).
37
 29 U.S.C. § 621-34 (1970). Wilson v. Sealtest Foods Div. of Kraftco Corp., 501 F.2d
84, 86, 8 FEP Cas. 749, 750 (5th Cir. 1974). In this case, the court did not actually apply
McDonnell Douglas as direct precedent. Instead, the court formulated its own prima facie test
based on "analogous McDonnell factors." Id.
38 411 U.S. at 796.
39
 Wilson v. Sealtest Foods Div. of Kraftco Corp., 501 F.2d 84, 86, 8 FEP Cas. 749, 750
(5th Cir. 1974).
4°
 Slamon v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 386 F. Supp. 174, 176, 8 FE? Cas. 1325, 1327
(E.D. Pa. 1974).
43
 Kohn v. Royal], Koegel & Wells, 496 F.2d 1094, 1100-01, 7 FEP Cas. 994, 999 (2d
Cir. 1974).
42
 See, e.g., Wilson v. Sealtest Foods Div. of Kraftco Corp., 501 F.2d 84, 86, 8 FEP
Cas. 749, 750 (5th Cir. 1974).
43
 Pettit v. United States, 488 F.2d 1026, 1033 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
44
 Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 334 (7th Cir. 1974).
45 See, e.g., Rodriquez, 8 FE? Cas. at 1257.
" See, e.g., Herrera, 8 FEP Cas. at 1268. See also Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works,
582 F.2d 1309, 1317, 8 FEP Cas. 577, 583 (7th Cir. 1974).
47 Rodriquez, 8 FEP Cas. at 1257; Herrera, 8 FE? Cas. at 1268.
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based on a policy of general application but rather is based on facts
peculiar to the individual, then McDonnell Douglas governs. 48 This
pattern is underscored by the fact that McDonnell Douglas has been
applied almost exclusively to individual hiring, firing, promotion or
demotion decisions. While there is at least one case applying
McDonnell Douglas in a manner inconsistent with these general
rules, 49 it is submitted that it represents an improper application of
the McDonnell Douglas decision.
The final question for consideration is the implications for
employers and employees of the application of McDonnell Douglas
rather than Griggs. First, where McDonnell Douglas is applicable,
the employee's burden in establishing a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation is easier to satisfy than under Griggs. The general rule in
Title VII cases is that the employee must establish the existence of
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. 50 McDonnell
Douglas does not abrogate this rule. However, McDonnell Douglas
aids the employee in satisfying his burden under this rule by setting
forth a series of easily established facts and declaring that upon
proof of these facts the employee satisfies his burden of establishing
a prima facie case of discrimination. 51 Furthermore, a close exami-
nation of the required facts reveals that the employee does not have
to introduce any direct evidence of discrimination. Rather, the exis-
tence of discrimination arises by inference. Griggs, on the other
hand, did not specifically consider the employee's burden in estab-
lishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Therefore, in cases
where Griggs is applicable, the employee must establish his prima
facie case without the help of any aid such as that created in
McDonnell Douglas. This distinction is especially important where
the employer moves for a judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the
grounds that the employee has failed to establish a prima facie case
under Title VII. Employees will be in a better position to defeat this
motion where McDonnell Douglas rather than Griggs is applicable.
48 See, e.g., Wilson v. Sealtest Food Div. of Kraftco Corp., 501 F,2d 84, 86, 8 FE? Cas.
749, 750 (5th Cir. 1974); Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500, 505-06, 7 FEP Cas. 1053,
1057 (6th Cir. 1974); Slamon v. Westinghouse Elec. Cbrp., 386 F. Supp. 174, 176, 8 FEP
Cas. 1325, 1327 (E.D. Pa. 1974). See also cases cited at note 18 supra.
49 In Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1070 (1975), the court applied McDonnell Douglas to define the burden placed upon
certain land companies and building contractors to rebut a prima facie case of racial discrimi-
nation. Id. at 334. This application was erroneous. Because the suit was a class action
brought to challenge discriminatory policies affecting all blacks in a particular housing
market, Griggs, not McDonnell Douglas, should have been applied.
5° Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 422 F.2d 324, 328 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 689
(1971); Ochoa v. Monsanto Co., 335 F. Supp. 53, 59 (S.D. Tex, 1971), aff'd, 473 F.2d 318
(5th Cir. 1973).
51 411 U.S. at 802.
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However, the employer's burden in rebutting that prima facie
case is also more easily sustained under the McDonnell Douglas
decision. Here, the employer need only allege any legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason and the burden of rebuttal has been
satisfied. 52 Thus, not only does the employer have a broad range of
available defenses, since any legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
will suffice, but his burden in establishing that reason has been
reduced to a mere allegation. In contrast, under the Griggs decision,
the employer's burden of rebuttal is much more difficult to sustain.
Here the employer has only one defense available: business neces-
sity. 53 Furthermore, it appears that the employer must establish this
defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 54
In conclusion, it is submitted that, where applicable, the
McDonnell Douglas decision has significantly reduced both the
employee's burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion and the employer's burden of rebuttal. As a result, the ultimate
burden in many Title VII cases under McDonnell Douglas rests with
the employee when he seeks to establish pretextuality. It should be
noted, however, that in establishing pretextuality, the employee
does not have to show that the employer acted discriminatorily.
Instead, the employee only has to show that the reason asserted by
the employer to justify the challenged action is not the actual reason
upon which the action was originally based. 55 Therefore, under
McDonnell Douglas, the employee can win his employment dis-
crimination case without ever having introduced any direct evidence
of discrimintion if he can show: (1) those facts under the prima facie
test which create the inference of discrimination; and (2) that the
challenged personnel action was not based on the reason asserted by
the employer.
C. Implementation of Class-wide Back Pay Awards:
Johnson; Pettway
Despite some judicial reluctance to award class-wide back pay
in Title VII actions,' it is now established in the Third, 2 Fourth, 3
52 Id. See also Taylor v. Safeway Stores, 365 F. Supp. 468, 6 FEP Cas. 556 (D. Colo.
1973).
53
 401 U.S. at 431.
54 Id.
55 411 U.S. at 805-05.
1 See, e.g., United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 464 F.2d 301, 311 (8th Cir.
1972) where the Eighth Circuit denied, with little discussion, a request for back pay. In a
subsequent decision, the Eighth Circuit adopted the concept of back pay. United States v.
N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378-80 (8th Cir. 1973). The court also noted that prior to this
decision, the law was unclear in the Circuit on the propriety of back pay awards. Id. at 380.
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Fifth, 4 Sixth, 5 Seventh, 6 and District of Columbia? Circuits that
back pay may be awarded in Title VII class actions despite the fact
that many members of the class have not exhausted their adminis-
trative remedies with the EEOC. 8 In fact, several circuits have gone
one step further by providing that, absent "special circumstances,"
the district court must award back pay if a prima facie case of
class-wide discrimination has been established. 9 However, in fash-
ioning such relief, significant problems have arisen concerning both
the mechanics of calculating class4ide back pay awards, and the
burden of proof imposed on individual members of the class who
seek to establish their right to a portion of the back pay award.
During the Survey year, the Fifth Circuit provided insight into
both of these problems in two factually similar cases, Johnson v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber 0). 1 ° and Pettway v. American Cast Iron
Pipe Co. '' Both cases involved private class actions brought under
Title VII and 42 U.S.C. section 1981, 12 in which the plaintiffs (1)
revealed a history of past discrimination against blacks by the
defendant companies" and (2) challenged certain present policies of
the defendant companies as perpetuating the effects of the dem-
onstrated past discrimination." The court in Johnson found that the
company's departmental seniority system unlawfully carried for-
2
 Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90, 94-96 (3d Cir. 1972).
3
 Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134, 140-42 (4th Cir. 1973); Robinson v.
Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 803-04 (4th Cir. 1971).
Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 495 F.2d 442, 444, 8 FEP Cas. 84, 87-88 (5th
Cir. 1974); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 251-52, 7 FE? Cas. 1115,
1147 (5th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1375, 7 FEP
Cas. 627, 634-35 (5th Cir. 1974).
5
 Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.21 870, 876, 7 FEP Cas. 987, 988 (6th Cir.
1973).
6 Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1197, 1201-02 (7th Cir. 1971); Bowe
v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719-21 (7th Cir. 1969).
' Watkins v. Washington, 472 F.2d 1373, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
8
 The general relief provision of Title VII is found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. III
1973). See generally Davidson, "Back Pay" Awards Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 26 Rutgers L. Rev. 741 (1973); Comment, Back Pay in Class Actions and Pattern or
Practice Suits Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 23 Emory L.J. 163 (1974);
Comment, Equal Employment Opportunity: The Back Pay Remedy under Title VII, 1974 U.
Ill. L.F. 379 (1974).
9
 Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 252-53, 7 FEP Cas. 1115, 1148
(5th Cir. 1974); Moody v, Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134, 142 (4th Cir. 1973). See Head
v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 876-77 (6th Cir. 1973). Cf. Newman v. Piggie
Park Enterps. Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1967) (per curiam).
I° 491 F.2d 1364, 7 FE? Cas. 627 (5th Cir. 1974).
494 F.2d 211, 7 FE? Cas. 1115 (5th Cir. 1974).
12
 Pettway, 494 F.2d at 216, 7 FE? Cas. at 1119; Johnson, 491 F.2d at 1368, 7 FEP
Cas. at 629.
13
 Pettway, 494 F.2d at 218-20, 7 FEP Cas. at 1121-23; Johnson, 491 F.2d at 1368-69, 7
FEP Cas. at 629-30.
14 Pethooy, 494 F.2d at 222-24, 236-41, 7 FEP Cas. at 1124-26, 1135-39; Johnson, 491
F.2d at 1373-74, 7 FE? Cas. at 633.
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ward the effects of past discrimination in violation of Title VII. 15 In
Pettway the court similarly held violative of Title VII defendant's
departmental seniority system, its posting and bidding procedure
and its age requirement in apprenticeship programs." In both
Johnson and Pettway the court authorized an award of class-wide
back pay and remanded to the district court for determination and
implementation of the award." However, because of the enormous
complexities involved in this relatively new task, the court provided
guidance to the district court in both cases on alternative methods of
calculating class-wide back pay awards," and on the burden of
proof on individual, members of the class."
After defining the goal of class-wide back pay as the restoration
of injured employees "to the economic position in which they would
have been but for the discrimination," 20 the court enunciated two
general principles useful in computing back pay awards. 21 As a
result of the uncertainties involved in trying to determine which
employees would have secured which jobs had it not been for the
defendant company's discriminatory policies, the court explained
that: "(1) unrealistic exactitude is not required, [and] (2) uncer-
tainities in determining what an employee would have earned but
for the discrimination should be resolved against the discriminating
employer."22
The court then discussed alternative methods of calculation.
Where the class is small, the time period is short, or the effect of the
discrimination is straightforward, the court stated that a class-wide
approach was not necessary and suggested an individual-by-
individual approach whereby the employment history of each class
member would be reconstructed to determine if, and to what extent,
a particular class member was injured by the discriminatory
policies. 23
 The total of these individual awards would be the
amount of the class-wide award. 24
However, where the class is large, the time period is long, or
the effect of the discrimination is ambiguous, the court suggested a
is 491 F.2d at 1370-74, 7 FEP Cas. at 631-33.
16 494 F.2d at 234-38, 7 FEP Cas. at 1134-36.
17
 Pettway, 494 F.2d at 251, 7 FEP Cas. at 1147; Johnson, 491 F.2d at 1382, 7 FEP
Cas. at 640.
Pettway, 494 F.2d at 260-63, 7 FEP Cas. at 1153-56.
14
 Pettway, 494 F.2d at 259-60, 7 FEP Cas. at 1152-53; Johnson, 491 F.2d at 1374-75,
1379-80, 7 FEP Cas. at 634-35, 638-39.
Pettway, 494 F.2d at 252, 7 FEP Cas. at 1147.
21
 Id. at 260-61, 7 FEP Cas. at 1153-54.
22
 Id. at 260-61, 7 FEP Cas. at 1154 (citations ommitted).
23
 Id. at 261, 7 FEP Cas. at 1154.
24 Id.
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class-wide approach." Two formulas were specifically discussed.
The first was the Stamps formula; so named because it was initially
applied in Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co. 26 There, the court first
defined the class and the back pay period. The court then deter-
mined the average earnings of the five groups of jobs from which
members of the plaintiff class had been excluded, and awarded each
member of the class the amount of the average earnings "computed
for pay grade progression purposes according to the number of years
of employment, less the amount of interim earnings." 27 Secondly,
the court in Pettway discussed the "comparability" or "representa-
tive employee earings" formula." Under this formula, after deter-
mining the class and time period, a court compares the plaintiff
class to a group of employees who are comparable 'in size, ability,
and length of employment but who have not been hindered by the
unlawful employment discrimination. The amount of back pay
awarded becomes the difference, if any, between the amounts
earned by the plaintiff class and the group of comparable employees
within the defined time period. 29 In closing, the court noted that in
addition to "straight salary," back pay awards should also include
interest, overtime, shift differentials and fringe benefits, including
vacations and sick pay. 3 °
In Johnson, the court primarily addressed the issue of the
burden of proof placed on an individual employee who seeks to
establish his right to a portion of the class-wide back pay award."
Noting that "individual circumstances vary and not all potential
discriminatees are entitled to recovery," 32
 the court stated that once
a prima facie case of discrimination against the class is established,
an initial burden of proof is placed on the individual employee to
demonstrate that he is, in fact, a member of the recognized class
which was subjected to the discrimination. 33
 In satisfying this bur-
den of proof, the employee would not be required to recreate with
exactitude what his employment situation would have been in the
absence of the discrimination. Instead, the court suggested, the
burden of proof should be based on "ascertainable and provable"
25
 Id, at 261-62, 7 FEP Cas. at 1154-55.
26
 365 F. Supp. 87, 6 FEP Cas. 612 (ED Mich. 1973), rev'd sub nom. EEOC v. Detroit
Edison Co., 10 FEP Cas. 239 (6th Cir. 1975).
27
 365 F. Supp. at 121-22, 6 FEP Cas, at 640-41.
28
 494 F.2d at 262-63, 7 FEP Cas. at 1155-56.
29
 Id. The court noted that in the instant action the latter method, the comparability
formula, was more realistic than an individual-by-individual approach because of the size of
the plaintiff class. Id. at 263, 7 FEP Cas. at 1156.
38
 Id. at 263, 7 FEP Cas. at 1156.
31
 491 F.24 at 1379, 7 FEP Cas. at 638.
32
 Id. at 1375, 7 FEP Cas. at 635.
33
 Id. at 1379, 7 FEP Cas, at 638.
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objective factors, concluding that if the employee could prove that
he was hired by the company into a predominantly black, low
paying position and that he was frozen into that position by virtue of
the company's discriminatory policies, then he had satisfied his
burden of proof. 34
It is submitted that the second part of this test is illusory, at
least in those cases where the class is defined narrowly in terms of
the discrimination alleged. The burden of proof in establishing
class-wide back pay awards is a two step process. 35 First, the
plaintiff class must establish that, as a class, it has been frozen into
the lower paying jobs due to the employer's discriminatory policy. 36
Secondly, the individual employee must prove that he is entitled to a
share of the class-wide award. 37 However, in many instances, the
same evidence which initially was admitted to prove that the class
was frozen into lower paying jobs may also later serve to show that
a particular employee was frozen into a lower paying job. Thus,
once the employee has demonstrated that he is a member of the
plaintiff class, he will be able to rely on the evidence already
introduced by the class to prove that he too was frozen into a lower
paying job, thus satisfying his burden under the second part of the
Johnson test.
In Pettway, the court elaborated on the burden of proof stan-
dard which was established in Johnson. "[Iit is clear that the burden
of proof formulated by the court conceives an initial lighter burden
on the back pay claimant with a heavier weight of rebuttal on the
employer."38 The court further stated that the "maximum" burden39
which could be imposed on an individual in the instant action was
to require a statement setting forth: (1) the employee's current job
and pay rate, (2) the jobs he was discriminatorily denied and their
pay rates, (3) evidence that he was qualified, including a record of
his employment history with the company, and (4) an estimate of the
requested back pay. 4 ° By providing such a statement, the individual
employee would satisfy his initial burden of proof. In closing, the
court noted that both the employer's records and the employer's aid
shall be available to the plaintiff in satisfying his initial burden.'"
Once an employee has met the initial burden of demonstrating
34
 Id. at 1379-80, 7 FEP Cas. at 638.
35
 See Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 495 F.2d 437, 443, 8 FEP Cas. 84, 88 (5th
Or. 1974).
36
 Id. at 443-44, 8 FEP Cas. at 88.
37
 Id. at 444, 8 FEP Cas. at 88-89.
38 494 F.2d at 259, 7 FE? Cas. at 1153.
39
 Id. at 259-60, 7 FEP Cas. at 1153.
4° Id.
4 ' Id. at 260, 7 FEP Cas. at 1153.
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that he is a member of the class which has been discriminated
against, the burden shifts to the company to establish by "convinc-
ing evidence" that factors other than the discriminatory policies
would have prevented the member from advancing beyond his low
paying position. 42 The court provided little insight into exactly what
type of factors would be sufficient to discharge the employer's bur-
den. The court did state, however, that the employer can discharge
his burden as to a particular employee by showing that the employee
was not qualified to advance from the lower paying job to a higher
paying job.'" However, it should be noted that this defense must be
established by "clear and convincing evidence," whereas all other
defenses are subject to a lesser "convincing evidence" standard."
It is submitted that another available defense would be the lack
of available jobs. 45 If the employer can establish that there were no
higher paying jobs available during the alleged discriminatory
period, and that this is the reason why the class member did not
advance, then the employer has satisfied his burden as to each
member of the class. Moreover, if the employer can establish that
there were only a few jobs available, fewer than the number of
members in the class, then he has discharged his burden as to the
aggregate number of class members for which no jobs were avail-
able. In effect, the burden then shifts back to the individual class
member who must establish that, because of superior qualifications
or greater seniority, he would have been selected to one of those jobs
"but for" the employer's discriminatory policy. However, regardless
of which defense the employer asserts in rebuttal, the court should
resolve "any doubts in proof . . . in favor of the discriminatee giving
full and adequate consideration to applicable equitable principles." 46
The final question for consideration, which was not specifically
addressed in either the Pettway or the Johnson decisions, is whether
an employee must actually have applied for a higher paying job
before he is entitled to a portion of the back pay award. The court
in Pettway did state that the employee must specify "the jobs he was
denied because of discrimination." 47 One could argue that under
this requirement, the employee must have actually applied for the
job which he claims he was discriminatorily denied. However, the
court in Pettway further stated, in discussing the need for flexibility
in calculating class-wide awards, that "there is no way of determin-
42 491 F.2d at 1380, 7 FEP Cas. at 638.
•3 Id .
44 Id.
45
 See Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 495 F.2d 437, 444, 8 FEP Cas. 84, 89 (5th
Cir. 1974).
46 Johnson, 491 F.2d at 1380, 7 FEP Cas. at 638.
47
 494 F.2d at 259, 7 FEP Cas. at 1153.
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ing [precisely] which jobs the class members would have bid on, and
have obtained if discriminatory [policies] had not been in existence.
. . [However] it does not follow that back pay claims based on
promotions cannot be awarded. Unrealistic exactitude is not re-
quired."48 Furthermore, the Pettway court quoted with approval
from the Seventh Circuit's decision in Bowe v. Colgate, Palmolive
Co. 49
 wherein the court stated, "[i]n each case the problem was to
.determine in some reasonable fashion 'the highest rate of pay for
such jobs as [the employee] would have bid on and qualified for if a
non-discriminatory seniority scheme would have been in exis-
tence.' "50
Therefore, based on these statements, it is submitted that the
individual employee need not have actually applied for a higher
paying job before he is entitled to an award of back pay. Moreover,
this conclusion is consistent with the general duty of a court in
calculating back pay awards, which is to reconstruct, as nearly as
possible, what the 'employment situation would have been but for
the discriminatory policy.'" Because the mere existence of a dis-
criminatory policy often deters employees from applying futilely for
a better job, 52
 it is arguable that absent the discriminatory policy
more employees would have applied for and acquired higher paying
jobs.
X. EEOC ENFORCEMENT POWERS UNDER SECTION 706:
Sanchez-Raymond Metal Products-General Electric
Whenever a charge of unlawful employment discrimination is
presented to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(hereinafter "Commission" or "EEOC"), the Commission must pro-
ceed in one of two fashions. First, if the state in which the alleged
discriminatory act occurred has a law which both prohibits the
discriminatory act and establishes an authority with the power to
grant or seek relief, then the EEOC must notify that state authority,
which may then proceed under state law.' Second, if no such state
law exists, the EEOC must, within 10 days, notify the employer
and, shortly thereafter, conduct an investigation to determine if
reasonable cause exists to believe that the allegation is true. 2 If
49 Id. at 260, 7 FEP Cas. at 1153-54.
49
 489 F.2d 896, 6 FEP Cas. 1132 (7th Cir. 1973).
5° 494 F.2d at 262, 7 FEP Cas. at 1155, quoting Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 489
F.2d 896, 902, 6 FEP Cas. 1132, 1136 (7th Cir. 1973).
Pettway, 494 F.2d at 261-62, 7 FEP Cas. at 1155.
52
 Cf. id. at 260, 7 FEP Cas. 1153.
I 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(c) to (d) (Supp. III 1973).
2 See id.	 2000e-5(b).
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reasonable cause is found, the Commission must seek to remedy the
discriminatory act through the informal methods of conference,
conciliation and persuasion. 3 If these methods prove unsuccessful,
the EEOC may then file a civil action against the employer in
federal district court. 4
 In addition, the aggrieved employee may file
a civil action against the employer either within 90 days of notifica-
tion by the EEOC that the Commission has dismissed his charges or
that the Commission has failed to file a civil action within 180 days
of the employee's initial filing of the charge. 6
During the Survey year, one issue concerning the proper scope
of the enforcement powers granted to the EEOC by section
706(0(1)7 of Title VII frequently arose in the federal courts: What is
the relationship required by section 706(f)(1) between the scope of
the initial employee's charge filed with the EEOC and the scope of
the EEOC complaint subsequently filed in district court?
In resolving this issue, the courts have often relied on Sanchez
v. Standard Brands, Inc. 8 Plantiff, a female employee of Standard
Brands, filed a charge with the EEOC alleging sex discrimination. 9
3 Id. §§ 2000e-5(b).
4 Id. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1), (3).
5 Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
Id.
7 Section 706(t)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. III 1973) provides as follows:
If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission or within thirty days
after expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) or (d) of this section,
the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation
agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action
against any respondent not a government, governmental agency, or political sub-
division named in the charge. . .. The person or persons aggrieved shall have the
right to intervene in a civil action brought by the Commission . . . . If a charge filed
with the Commission pursuant to subsection (b) of this section is dismissed by the
Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days from firing ofsuch charge or
expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) or (d) of this section,
whichever is later, the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section
. . . or the Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the
person aggrieved is a party, the Commission ... shall so notify the person aggrieved
and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought
against the respondent named in the charge (A) by the person claiming to be
aggrieved or (B) if such charge was filed by a member of the Commission, by any
person whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employment
practice. Upon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the
court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for such complainant and
may authorize the commencement of the action without the payment of fees, costs,
or security. Upon timely application, the court may, in its discretion, permit the
Commission ... to intervene in such civil action upon certification that the case is of
general public importance, Upon request, the court may, in its discretion, stay
further proceedings for not more than sixty days pending the termination of State or
local proceedings described in subsection (c) or (d) of this section or further efforts of
the Commission to obtain voluntary compliance.
8 431 F.2d 455, 2 FEP Cas. 788 (5th Cir. 1970).
9 Id. at 458, 2 FEP Cas. at 790.
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The subsequent EEOC investigation revealed that there was no
reasonable cause for , the charge of sex discrimination, but that there
was reasonable cause for a discrimination charge based on national
origin. As a result of the EEOC's findings, plaintiff filed a civil
action alleging the latter form of discrimination. 10 The district court
dismissed this action since it was not included in the orginal
chargell of sex discrimination.
The Fifth Circuit reversed. 12
 In upholding the plaintiff's right
to assert the national origin claim, the Fifth Circuit applied the
following standard: "the 'scope' of the judicial complaint is limited
to the 'scope' of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be
expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination." 13
 Thus, the
court focused on the scope of the EEOC investigation, which it
stated should be construed liberally, as defining the proper relation-
ship between the employee's initial charge and subsequent judicial
complaint." While 'Sanchez dealt with the relationship between an
employee charge and a subsequent judicial complaint filed by the
same employee, the standard applied therein has nevertheless been
used to define the relationship between an employee charge and the
subsequent judicial complaint filed by the EEOC.' 5
During the Survey year, the issue of this relationship between
an employee charge and an EEOC complaint arose in EEOC v.
General Electric Co." Two black male employees of General Elec-
tric filed charges of racial discrimination with the EEOC. However,
in investigating the two charges, the Commission determined that
there was probable, cause to believe that General Electric discrimi-
nated not only against blacks, but also against women. The EEOC
judicial complaint subsequently filed included allegations of both
forms of discrimination."
The district court held that the EEOC could not maintain the
claim of discrimination based on sex." After citing the Sanchez
standard, 19
 the court added a further caveat which ultimately
proved fatal to the EEOC's sex discrimination claim: "[title dis-
crimination uncovered must at least have had the potential of prej-
udicing the charging party in order to be the subject of a later suit
1 ° Id. at 459, 2 FEP Cas, at 790.
11 Id. at 460, 2 FEP Cas. at 791.
11 Id. at 466, 2 PEP Cas. at 796.
13 Id.
14
 Id. at 466-67, 2 FEP Cas. at 796-97.
' 5
 See, e.g., EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 10 FE? Cas. 38, 48 (6th Cir. 1975).
16
 376 F. Supp. 757,' 8 FE? Cas. 47 (W.D. Va. 1974).
17
 Id. at 758-59, 8 FEP Cas. at 47-48.
I° Id. at 762, 8 FEP Cas. at 50.
19 Id. at 760-61, 8 FEP, Cas. at 49.
1094
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
growing out of the charge." 2° Since the two employees who origi-
nally filed the charges against General Electric were both males,
neither could be potentially prejudiced by the defendant's discrimi-
nation against women. Summary judgement was granted as to the
EEOC's sex discrimination claim. 2 ' Thus, under the General Elec-
tric standard, a crucial factor in determining the relationship be-
tween the employee charge and the EEOC judicial complaint is the
race, color, religion, sex or national origin of the original charging
party. 22
In contrast to the General Electric decision, the district court in
EEOC v. Raymond Metal Products Co. 23 held that an EEOC judi-
cial complaint based on an employee charge could properly include
any type of discrimination for which the jurisdictional prerequisites
of Title VII had been satisfied. 24 While in the process of investigat-
ing an employee charge of discrimination based on national origin,
the EEOC found reasonable cause for charges of discrimination
based not only on national origin, but also on sex and race. When it
was unable to secure a conciliation agreement with the defendant as
to any of the discrimination claims, the EEOC filed a complaint in
the district court. 25
The court held that the EEOC judicial complaint could prop-
erly include all three forms of discrimination. 26 After citing the
Sanchez standard that "the scope of the judicial complaint is limited
to the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be
expected to grow out of the charges of discrimination," 27 the court
applied a much broader standard based on the policy considera-
tions28 underlying the Sanchez decision. "[A]n EEOC civil action
may properly embrace, in addition to those allegations contained in
the initial charge, any allegation of other discriminatory practices for
which there has been an investigation, a determination of reason-
able cause, and a genuine attempt at conciliation." 29 In fashioning
2° Id. at 761, 8 FEP Cas. at 50.
21 Id. at 763, 8 FEP Cas. at 51.
22 Id. at 761, 8 FEP Cas, at 50.
23 8 FEP Cas. 1199 (D. Md. 1974).
24 Id. at 1204.
25 Id. at 1201, 1205.
26 Id. at 1204.
27 Id. at 1204, quoting Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 466, 2 FEP Cas. at 796.
28 The policy considerations referred to by the court in Raymond Metal Products arise
from the statutory scheme of Title VII. Under this scheme a charge is not filed to directly
initiate a civil action. Instead, the charge initiates an investigation. Only if the investigation
reveals reasonable cause, and only if conciliation efforts are unsuccessful is a civil action
commenced. Thus, the investigation and the civil action are more directly connected than the
charge and the civil action and, as such, the investigation and not the charge should define the
proper scope of the EEOC judicial complaint. 8 FEP Cas. at 1204.
29 8 FEP Cas. at 1204.
1095
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
this standard, the court considered and rejected the standard
applied in General Electric—that the EEOC complaint may prop-
erly include only allegations which have the "potential of prejudic-
ing the charging party." 3 ° This standard• was rejected, first, because
it had no statutory basis in Title VII, 31 and second, because the
standard becomes unmanageable where the EEOC is the charging
party, since it would be absurd to require that the discriminatory
practice have the potential of prejudicing the EEOC. 32
These criticisms are not well founded. Section 706(f)(1) requires
at least some relationship between the EEOC judicial complaint and
the original employee charge. This general requirement, which was
expressly recognized in General Electric, 33 arises from both the
language34
 and the scheme 35 of Title VII. However, Congress was
silent as to the particular relationship required. No indication ap-
pears in either the language or the legislative history of Title VII.
Due to this congressional silence, there is no particular standard
which can be said to have a statutory basis in Title VII. Thus, it is
illogical to criticize the General Electric standard as being without
such statutory basis.
The second criticism—that the General Electric standard be-
comes unmanageable when the EEOC is the charging party—is also
unpersuasive. In such cases, a different procedural context is in-
volved. Here, the EEOC judicial complaint is based on the previ-
ously filed EEOC charge whereas in General Electric and Raymond
Metal Products the EEOC judicial complaint was based on a charge
filed by an employee. Certainly the General Electric standard should
not be rejected in one procedural context just because it would be
unmanageable in another, different procedural context.
In fashioning a proper standard to define the relationship re-
quired between the scope of the employee charge and the scope of
the subsequently filed EEOC judicial complaint, two factors must
be accomodated: the standard must properly take account of the
requirements of section 706(f)(1) and it must be practical. The
Raymond Metal Products standard does not properly take account
3°
 Id at 1206, quoting General Electric, 376 F. Supp. at 761, 8 FEP Cas. at 50.
31 8 FEP Cas. at 1206.
32 Id.
33 376 F. Supp. at 760, 8 FE? Cas. at 49.
348. Section 709(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1970) provides that, in investigating an
employee charge, the EEOC shall have access to any evidence "relevant to the charge."
Furthermore, section 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1970) authorizes the EEOC to file a
civil action "thirty days after a charge is filed" against the company "named in the charge."
35
 Section 706(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. III 1973) provides that notice of an
employee charge shall be given to the company and that efforts toward informal conciliation
shall be made by the EEOC. These provisions would be rendered meaningless if the EEOC
could subsequently file a civil complaint unrelated to the employee charge.
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of the requirements of section 706(f)(1) and, for this reason, the
standard should be rejected. While section 706(f)(1) is ambiguous as
to the precise relationship required, it is clear that the section
requires at least some relationship. The Raymond Metal Products
standard entirely ignores this requirement.
The General Electric standard does take account of section
706(f)(1) requirements. However, the standard is arguably impracti-
cal and, for this reason, it should also be rejected. If, in the course
of a reasonably limited investigation of an employee charge, the
EEOC discovers discriminations not alleged in the charge, practical-
ity requires that the EEOC be allowed to include this discrimination
in a subsequent judicial complaint. Otherwise, the EEOC will be
forced to "start over" with respect to the newly discovered discrimi-
nation, either by encouraging another employee to file a charge or
by filing a new charge itself. 36
 This will not only cause fragmenta-
tion of the EEOC's case against an employer into a series of, separate
claims, but it will also cause unnecessary duplication and delay."
This result should not be occasioned by the fortuitous fact that the
newly discovered discrimination does not have the potential of prej-
udicing the employee whose charge initiated the investigation.
It is submitted that the standard which best accommodates the
need for practicality and the requirements of section 706(0(1) is the
original Sanchez standard that "the scope of the judicial complaint
is limited to the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reason-
ably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination." 38
Two competing interests are at stake. First, the EEOC should not
be hampered by an overly restrictive standard which results in
unnecessary delay, fragmentation, and duplication of EEOC en-
forcement proceedings. Second, the EEOC should not be permitted,
on the basis of a single employee charge, to launch a full-scale
investigation of all policies and practices of a defendant company.
The Sanchez standard is practical because it properly accommodates
both of these interests. On the one hand, the standard permits the
inclusion of any discrimination discovered in the normal course of
investigating an employee charge. 39
 On the other hand, the stan-
dard excludes any discrimination which is the product of an un-
reasonably broad investigation, thus preventing the EEOC from
conducting a "fishing expedition" under the guise of investigating an
employee charge.
The Sanchez standard also satisfies the requirement of section
36 Raymond Metal Products, S FEP Cas. at 1205.
37 Id .
3g 431 F.2d at 466, 2 FE? Cas. at 796. See text at notes 12-15 supra.
39 Id.
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706(i)(1) that there be at least some relationship between a sub-
sequent EEOC judicial complaint and the original employee
charge. Under the Sanchez standard, the relationship is provided in
the requirement that an investigation be reasonably limited to the
discrimination alleged in the employee charge and that only dis-
crimination discovered during the course of such a reasonably lim-
ited investigation be included in the subsequent judicial corn-
plaint. 40
 Therefore,' it is submitted that the Sanchez standard both
satisfies the requirements of section 706(f)(1) and provides a practical
and workable rule to guide EEOC enforcement proceedings.
XI. FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT—JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF
SECTION 717
Under section 717(a) of the 1972 Amendments,' the protections
of Title VII were extended to federal employees and applicants for
federal employment. The primary authority to enforce these protec-
tions is vested in the Civil Service Commission under section
717(b). 2
 Pursuant to section 717(b), the Civil Service Commission
must promulgate rules and regulations, 3
 annually review and ap-
prove national and regional equal employment opportunity plans, 4
review and evaluate the operation of equal employment opportunity
programs, 5
 and solicit information and recommendations from in-
terested individuals and groups. 6
 In addition, section 717(c) grants
to any federal employee who believes that he has experienced dis-
crimination the right to file a civil action in district court.' How-
ever, before filing such an action, the employee must first satisfy
certain jurisdictiotial requirements set out both in section 717(c) and
in the rules and regulations promulgated by the Civil Service Com-
mission.° Within 30 days of the alleged discriminatory action, the
employee must discuss the matter with the agency Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Counselor. 9 Within 15 days of the date of his final
interview with the Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor, he
may file a complaint with his employer agency" which is then
49 Id.
' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (Supp. III 1973).
2
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b) (Supp. III 1973).
Id.
• 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(bX1) (Supp. III 1973).
' 42 U.S.C: § 2000e-16(b)(2) (Supp. HI 1973).
• 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(bX3) (Supp. III 1973).
7
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. III 1973).
▪ The rules and regulations promulgated by the Civil Service Commission pursuant to §
717(b) are found at 5 C.F.R. § 713 (1975).
9 5 C.F.R. § 713.214(a)(1)(1) (1975).
'° 5 C.F.R. § 713.214(aX1)(ii) (1975).
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required to conduct an investigation of the employee's complaint."
Upon completion of this investigation, the agency shall provide an
opportunity for an adjustment of the complaint on an informal
basis. 12 If no such adjustment is reached, the employee may proceed
in one of four ways. He may, within 15 days, request a hearing and
decision by the agency head." He may, within 15 days, request a
decision by the agency head without a hearing." He may, within 15
days, appeal the decision to the Civil Service Commission.'s If
dissatisfied with the decision of the Civil Service Commission, he
may, within 30 days of such decision, file a civil action in the district
court." Finally, he may, within 30 days of notice of final action
taken by an agency, file a civil action in the district court," without
resort to the Civil Service Commission. The employee may also file
a civil action in the district court if either the agency or the Civil
Service Commission fails to take final action on the employee's
complaint within 180 days of receipt of the complaint." In any civil
action brought under section 717(c) the head of the employer agency
is the defendant. 19
" 5 C.F.R. § 713.216 (1975).
12 5 C.F.R. §§ 713.217(a), (b) (1975).
13 5 C.F.R. § 713.217(h) (1975).
14 Id.
15 5 C.F.R. §§ 713.231, .233 (1975).
16 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. III 1972).
17 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. II 1972).
IS id .
19 Id. The procedure governing private employee discrimination claims outlined at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(a) to (1) (Supp. III 1973) is not fully analyzed in this Survey. However, this
procedure is basically as follows. If the state in which the alleged violation occurred has a
state law which prohibits the challenged practice and authorizes a state agency to grant relief,
then the employee must initially file his complaint with the state agency. Id. § 2000e-5(c). If
no solution is reached within 60 days, or within 120 days if the state law was only enacted in
the preceding year, id., then the employee may file a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, within 300 days of the alleged violation. Id. § 2000e-5(e). If there is
no applicable state law, the employee may initiate his claim by filing a charge with the EEOC
within 180 days of the alleged violation. Id. Upon receiving an employee charge, the EEOC
must notify the employer within 10 days and conduct an investigation of the charge to
determine if there is reasonable cause to believe the charge is true. Id. § 2000e-5(b). If no such
reasonable cause is found, then both parties must be promptly notified. Id. If the EEOC does
find reasonable cause, then it must seek to informally eliminate the alleged violation through
conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Id, If no conciliation agreement is reached within 30
days of the filing of the employee charge, the EEOC, or the Attorney General in appropriate
cases, may bring a civil action against the employer. Id. § 2000e-5(f). Alternatively, if either
reasonable cause is not found, or reasonable cause was found but no conciliation agreement or
civil action has been forthcoming from the EEOC within 180 days of the filing of the charge,
then the employee shall be so notified. Id. § 2000e-(t). The employee then has 90 days from
the receipt of such notice to file a civil action in the district court. Id. See also note 7 at
pp. 1093 supra.
For a general discussion of the private employee procedure and some of the problems
which have arisen under that procedure, see 1973-1974 Annuai Survey of Labor Relations
Law, 15 B.C. Ind. & COM. L. Rev. 1105, 1203-65 (1974).
1099
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
During the Survey year, two issues concerning the judicial
application of section 717 received considerable attention in the
federal courts: (1) does section 717 apply retroactively to employee
claims which were pending administratively on March 24, 1972, the
effective date of section 717, and (2) is the employee automatically
entitled to a trial de novo in the district court after having exhausted
his administrative remedies, and if not, what is the nature of the
. more limited judicial review to which the employee is entitled?
A. Retroactive Application of Section 717: Koger; Place
The majority of the district courts2 ° and courts of appeals 2 '
have held that section 717 should be applied retroactively. In gen-
eral, these courts have focused on two issues: (1) whether section 717
creates new substantive rights for federal employees or whether it
merely creates a new remedy to enforce previously existing rights,
and (2) whether an inference may be drawn that Congress intended
section 717 to apply prospectively from the fact that, in section 14 of
the Act, 22
 Congress specifically authorized the retroactive applica-
tion of certain provisions of the 1972 Amendments, though not
section 717. 23
The issue of retroactivity was first raised during the Survey
year in Koger v. Ball, 24
 where the Fourth Circuit held that section
717 applies retroactively to cases pending administratively on the
effective date of section 717. 25
 Plaintiff, a black employee of the
Social Security Administration, initiated the administrative griev-
ance procedure on February 22, 1972 by writing a letter to his
director charging racial discrimination. Unable to secure relief from
the director, the employee filed a formal complaint on April 28, 1972
with the Secretary, of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare. When the Secretary failed to take final action on the
See, e.g., Walker v. Kleindienst; 357 F. Supp. 749, 750-51, 5 FEP Cas. 1007, 1008
(D.D.C. 1973); Henderson v. Defense Contract Admin. Serv. Region, 370 F. Supp. 180, 183,
7 FEP Cas. 241, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). But see, e.g., Hill-Vincent v. Richardson, 359 F.
Supp. 308, 309, 5 FEP Cas. 973, 974 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Mosely v. United States, 6 FEP Cas.
462 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
21 See Sperling v. United States, 515 F.2d 464, 10 FEP Cas. 654 (3d Cir. 1975); Brown
v. General Serv. Adm'n, 507 F.2d 1300, 8 FEP Cas. 1298 (2d Cir. 1974); Womack v. Lynn,
504 F.2d 267, 8 FEP Cas. 844 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Koger v. Ball, 497 F.2d 702, 7 FEP Cas.
1111 (4th Cir. 1974). But see Place v. Weinberger, 497 F.2d 412, 7 FE? Cas. 1176 (6th Cir,
1974).
22
 Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 14 (March 24, 1972).
23
 Section 14 of Pub. L. No. 92-261 (March 24, 1972) provides: "The amendments made
by this Act to section 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shall be applicable with respect to
charges pending with the Commission on the date of enactment of this Act and all charges
filed thereafter."
24
 497 F.2d 702, 7 FEP Cas. 1111 (4th Cir. 1974).
25
 Id. at 704, 7 FEP Cas. at 1111.
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complaint within 180 days, the plaintiff filed a civil action in the
district court pursuant to section 717, which had become effective
while he was pursuing his administrative remedies. 26
The court held that section 717 applies retroactively, conferring
subject matter jurisdiction on the district court to hear the plaintiff's
complaint. 27 Three reasons were advanced by the court in support
of its holding. First, section 717 is a procedural statute creating no
new substantive rights, but merely providing a new remedy for the
enforcement of a previously existing right. As such, the application
of section 717 is governed by the general rule that procedural
statutes are applicable to cases pending at the time of their enact-
ment as long as such application does not result in manifest injus-
tice. 28 Second, section 717 is based on the policy that the courts
should be the final tribunal for the resolution of federal employee
discrimination cases. This policy applies with equal force to claims
pending administratively at the effective date of section 717. 29
Third, section 717, read literally, applies to claims pending adminis-
tratively on the date of its enactment. 3° This was true, the court
stated, because:
1) his "complaint of discrimination based on race . . . [wasj
brought pursuant to . . . Executive Order 11478 . ."; 2) he
waited "one hundred and eighty days from the filing of the
initial charge with the department, agency, or unit ... "
before filing suit; and 3) he was "aggrieved . . . by the
failure to take final action on his complaint."31
The court expressly rejected the argument that, because Con-
gress did not include section 717 among those provisions to be
applied retroactively, the inference may be drawn .that Congress
intended that section 717 apply only prospectively. 32 The court
rejected this inference, relying first on the general rule that pro-
cedural statutes are to be applied retroactively to cases pending at
the time of their enactment33 and, second, on the absence of legisla-
tive history to support the inference that Congress intended section
717 to apply only prospectively. 34
However, within a few days of the Fourth Circuit's decision in
26 Id. at 704, 7 FEP Cas. at 1112.
23 Id. at 704, 7 FEP Cas. at 1111.
28 Id. at 705-06, 7 FE? Cas. at 1113.
29 Id. at 706, 7 FE? Cas. at 1113.
3° Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 707-08, 7 FEP Cas. at 1114-15.
33 Id. at 707, 7 FE? Cas. at 1114.
34 Id, at 707-08, 7 FE? Cas. at 1114-15.
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Koger, the Sixth Circuit reached a contrary result in Place v. Wein-
berger. 35
 Plaintiff, a female employee of the Pure Food and Drug
Administration, had filed a complaint of discrimination based on sex
with the EEOC on September 24, 1971. After an unfavorable dis-
position of her complaint by the EEOC, the plaintiff appealed to the
Civil Service Commission, which affirmed the EEOC decision.
Plaintiff then filed a civil action in the district court pursuant to
section 717(c) on September 13, 1972. 36
The court held that the suit was barred by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity since the consent embodied in section 717 did
not apply retroactively to this claim. 37 In so holding, the court relied
on two general rules: waivers of sovereign immunity are to be
strictly construed," and statutes are presumed to operate prospec-
tively in the absence of a clear expression to the contrary. 39 How-
ever, the linchpin of the Sixth Circuit's decision was its acceptance
of the "inference of congressional intent" argument rejected in
Koger: "Congress clearly intended certain portions of the Act to
operate retroactively and so indicated. We therefore conclude that
by its silence as to other sections Congress intended such sections to
have prospective application only."4° The Sixth Circuit further re-
jected the characterization of section 717 as a procedural statute
creating no new substantive rights. 41
. It should be noted that during the Survey year the Second, 42
Third,43
 and District of Columbia44 Circuits were also presented
with the •retroactivity issue. All agreed with the Fourth Circuit's
determination that section 717 should be applied retroactively to
claims pending administratively on the date of its enactment. 45
It is submitted that section 717 should be so applied. While the
35
 497 F.2d 412, 7 FEP Cas. 1176 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1975).
36
 Id. at 413, 7 FEP Cas. at 1177.
37
 Id. at 414, 7 FEP Cas. at 1177.
3 ' Id. at 414, 7 FEP Cas. at 1178, citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584
(1941).
39
 497 F.2d at 414, 7 FEP Cas. at 1178, citing Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303 (1938).
4°
 497 F.2d at 414, 7' FEP Cas. at 1178.
41
 Id. at 414, 7 FEP Cas. at 1178.
42
 Brown v. General Serv. Adm'n, 507 F.2d 1300, 8 FEP Cas. 1298 (2d Cir. 1974).
'3
 Sperling v. United States, 515 F.2d 464, 10 FEP Cas. 654 (3d Cir. 1975).
44
 Womack v. Lynn, 504 F.2d 267, 8 FEP Cas. 844 (D.C. Cir. 1974). There is a
distinction between Womack on the one hand and Koger, Place, and Brown on the other. The
latter three cases involved employee claims that were pending administratively on the effec-
tive date of § 717. Womack, however, involved an employee claim that was pending in .the_
district court on that date. However, the court in Womack ignored this distinction and
considered the applicability of § 717 on the same principles as the courts in Koger, Place, and
Brown.
43
 Sperling v. United States, 515 F.2d 465, 474, 10 FEP Cas. 654, 660-61 (3d Cir. 1975);
Brown v. General Serv. Adm'n, 507 F.2d 1300, 1305-06, 8 FEP Cas. 1298, 1303 (2d Cir.
1974); Womack v. Lynn, 504, F.2d 267, 269, 8 FEP Cas. 844, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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inference of prospectivity accepted by the Sixth Circuit is not per se
unreasonable, it is suggested that there are sufficient countervailing
considerations which undermine its acceptance.
First, any substantive rights embodied in section 717 al-
ready existed in various statutes, 46 Civil Service Commission regula-
tions, 47 and Executive Orders," the most significant of which is
Executive Order No. 11,478 which provides:
It is the policy of the United States Government to provide
equal opportunity in Federal employment on the basis of
merit and fitness and without discrimination because of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . This
policy of equal opportunity applies to and must be an
integral part of every aspect of personnel policy and prac-
tice in the employment and treatment of civilian employees
of the Federal Government. 49
Thus, section 717 should be viewed as a procedural statute, the
applicability of which is governed by the general rule applied in
Koger. 5° The inference of prospectivity accepted by the Sixth Cir-
cuit is inconsistent with this general rule. Second, there is no legisla-
tive history whatsoever to support the inference. Third, as noted by
the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court recently stated the following
in upholding the retroactive application of a federal statute authoriz-
ing the award of attorney's fees in school desegregation cases:
We anchor our holding in this case on the principle that a
court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its
decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice
or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the
contrary.'"
The inference accepted by the Sixth Circuit is contrary to the policy
embodied in this statement. Fourth, as the court stated in Koger,
section 717 evinces a Congressional policy that the courts should be
the final tribunal for employment discrimination claims. 52 This pol-
" See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7151 (1970), which provides:
It is the policy of the United States to insure equal employment opportunities for
employees without discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. The President shall use his existing authority to carry out this policy.
47 5 C.F.R. § 713.201-.521 (1975).
49 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 207 (1974), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970);
Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
49 3 C.F.R. 207 (1974), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
5° 497 F.2d at 705-06, 7 FEP Cas. at 1113.
s 1
 Brown, 507 F.2d at 1305-06, 8 FEP Cas. 1302-03, quoting Bradley v. School Bd., 416
U.S. 696, 711 (1974).
52 497 F.2d at 706, 7 FEP Cas. at 1113.
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icy applies with equal force to claims arising before the effective
date of section 717. These four considerations are logical and per-
suasive and, as such, totally undermine the acceptability of the
inference that Congress intended section 717 to apply prospectively
because it did not include section 717 among those provisions made
expressly retroactive.
There is arguably a fifth consideration, accepted by the Fourth
Circuit in Koger—that a literal reading of section 717 authorizes its
retroactive application to claims pending at the time of its enact-
ment." This is true, the court concluded, because if the employee
has filed a civil action pursuant to Executive Order No. 11,478
within 30 days of notification of final agency action, then all the
jurisdictional requirements of section 717 have been satisfied and
the suit may thus be maintained." However, it is submitted that
this analysis is erroneous. Whether an employee has satisfied the
technical jurisdictional requirements to maintain a suit is irrelevant
to the underlying question of whether the statute which authorizes
that suit is to be retroactively applied. The application of a statute is
solely a matter of congressional intent, and only after the retroactiv-
ity issue has first been decided should the court then consider
whether the employe6 has satisfied jurisdictional requirements. It is
significant to note that in no case since the Koger decision has the
"literal language" argument been adopted.
B. Trial De Novo Under Section 717:
Hackley; Salone; Sperling
The second issue which has arisen during the Survey year
concerning section 717 is whether, after exhausting administrative
remedies," the federal employee is automatically entitled to a trial
de novo in federal district court, and if not, what is the nature of the
more limited judicial review to which he is entitled. On this issue
the statute is silent, 56
 the legislative history is contradictory, 57 and
the federal courts are divided."
5 ' Id.
54 Id.
55
 A private employee is entitled to trial de novo after exhausting procedures before the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 798-800 (1973). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has also held that a private
employee is entitled to a trial de novo after exhausting arbitration proceedings pursuant to a
collective bargaining agreement. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60
(1974).
56
 While 42 U.S.C. § '2000e-16(c) (Supp. III 1973) confers jurisdiction on the federal
courts to hear federal employee discrimination cases, the statute makes no mention of how the
courts are to exercise this jurisdiction.
57
 For example, Senator Williams stated: "[W]ritten expressly into the law is a provision
enabling an aggrieved Federal employee to file an action in U.S. District Court for a review of
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During the Survey year the Tenth Circuit, presented with this
issue in Salone v. United States, 59
 that a federal employee is
not initially entitled to a trial de novo after exhausting administra-
tive remedies, but is rather entitled only to a more limited review of
the administrative record. 6° Plaintiff, a civilian employee of the
U.S. Air Force, filed a complaint of racial discrimination with the
Commander of the Air Force base at which he worked in April,
1972. After an adverse decision on his complaint by the Air Force,
plaintiff appealed to the Civil Service Commission which affirmed
the Air Force decision without comment. Plaintiff then filed a civil
action in district court pursuant to section 717, requesting a trial de
novo on his racial discrimination claim. 61
 The district court denied
the request. 62
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiff was
initially entitled only to a review of the administrative record. 63 The
court recognized that its decision created a disparity in the judicial
treatment of private and federal employees. 64
 A private employee
who files a civil action after proceedings before the EEOC is entitled
to a trial de novo on his employment discrimination claim. How-
ever, a federal employee who files a civil action after proceedings
before the Civil Service Commission is entitled only to a review of
the administrative record. Nevertheless, the court concluded that
this disparity was justified. 65
First, the court cited the leading case of Hackley v. Johnson 66
and stated that the disparity was justified for the reasons provided
in Hackley. 67 In Hackley, where the trial de novo issue was pre-
sented to a federal court for the first time; the district court held
that, initially, the federal employee was entitled to a review of the
administrative record. 68
 The Tenth Circuit,' in accord with Hackley,
concluded that an automatic trial de novo would burden the federal
judiciary with an increased case load, duplicate administrative fact
finding proceedings, hamper the need for prompt, consistent deci-
the administrative proceeding record . . ." 118 Cong. Rec. 4922 (Feb. 22, 1972). However,
Senator Cranston stated: "As with other cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, Federal District Court review would not be based on the agency and/or CSC record
and would be a trial de novo." 119 Cong. Rec. 4929 (Feb. 22, 1973).
" See notes 76 and 78 infra.
59
 511 F.2d 902, 10 FEP Cas. 1 (10th Cir. 1975).
68 Id. at 904, 10 FEP Cas. at 2.
61
 Id. at 902-03, 10 FEP Cas, at I.
62
 Id. at 903, 10 FEP Cas. at 1.
63
 Id. at 904, 10 )FEP Cas. at 2.
64 Id.
63 Id.
66
 360 F. Supp. 1247, 6 FEP Cas. 79 (D.D.C. 1973).
67
 511 F.2d at 904, 10 FEP Cas. at 2.
68
 360 F. Supp. at 1252, 6 FEP Cas. at 83.
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sions in employment discrimination matters, and represent an ex-
treme departure from past federal employment cases in which re-
view has been limited to the administrative record. 69 These reasons,
the Tenth Circuit concluded in Salone, in part justified the disparity
created between private and federal employees. 7 ° Further justifica-
tion was found by the Tenth Circuit in the fact that decisions of the
Civil Service Commission which are appealed to the district court
are generally governed by the Administrative Procedure Ace' which
provides for a limited review of the administrative record. 72
A contrary result was reached by the Third Circuit in Sperling
v. United States, 73 where the court held that a federal employee
who files a civil action in district court pursuant to section 717 is
entitled to a trial de novo in all cases. 74 Plaintiff was a white civilian
employee of the U.S. Army at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. At the
fort, he also served as the union representative. In this capacity,
plaintiff successfully represented a black employee in grievance pro-
ceedings which extended from 1965 to 1967. Shortly thereafter, after
being denied a prothition, plaintiff filed his own claim, contending
that the denial was in retaliation for his successful representation of
the black employee. Extensive administrative proceedings followed,
culminating in an adverse decision by the Civil Service Commission
in 1972. Plaintiff then filed a civil action in federal district court. 75
In holding that the plaintiff was entitled to a trial de novo on
his employment discrimination claim, the court adopted the follow-
ing reasoning: section 717(0 76 authorizes the employee to file a civil
action; section 717(d) 77
 states that this civil action is governed by
sections 706(1) through (k), 78
 as applicable; sections 706(f) through
(k), which apply to private employee civil actions, have been held
by the Supreme Court to require a trial de novo; 79 thus, federal
employees are also 'entitled to a trial de novo in section 717(c) civil
actions." The court expressly rejected the argument, adopted by
some lower courts," that the applicability of sections 706(f) through
69 511 F.2d at 903-04, 10 FEP Cas. at 2.
7° 511 F.2d at 904, 10 FEP Cas. at 2.
71 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970).
72 511 F.2d at 904, 10 FEP Cas. at 2.
73
 515 F.2d 465, 10 FEP Cas. 654 (3d Cir. 1975).
74 Id. at 481, 10 FEP Cas, at 667.
75
 Id. at 467-68, 10 FEP Cas. at 655-56.
76 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. III 1973).
77 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d) (Supp. III 1973) provides: The provisions of section 2000e-
5(f) through (k) of this title, as applicable, shall govern-civil actions brought hereunder."
7° 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f) to (k) (Supp. III 1973).
79 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-800 (1973).
515 F.2d at 474-75, 10 FEP Cas. at 661-62.
s' See, e.g., Guilday v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 8 FEP Cas. 1015, 1016 (D. Del. 1974).
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(k) is discretionary since, under section 717(d), these provisions
govern federal employee civil actions only "as applicable." 82
The court further reasoned that if section 717(c) was interpreted
to require only a limited review of the administrative record, the
law concerning judicial review of federal employment decisions
would be exactly the same as it was prior to the enactment of section
717(c) because, at least in those circuits which did not recognize
sovereign immunity as a bar to judicial review, the record of such
decisions was already being reviewed. 83 Thus, the law would re-
main unchanged for all civil actions in which an administrative
record was developed below, a result which Congress could not
have intended through a new enactment.
Finally, the court argued, in disagreement with Hackley," that
the legislative history of section 717(c) indicated a Congressional
intent to require a trial de novo in civil actions filed by federal
employees. 85
 Recognizing contrary statements by Senator Williams,
a co-sponsor of the 1972 Amendments, to the effect that only judi-
cial review of the administrative record is necessary under section
717(c), 86
 the court nevertheless concluded67 that the following
statements of the Senate Committee Report were more reflective of
Congressional intent: "Aggrieved employees or applicants will also
have the full rights available in the courts as are granted to indi-
viduals in the private sector under title VII," 88
Having thus decided that the federal employee is entitled to a
trial de novo in all cases, the court then considered the role of the
administrative record in such de novo proceedings, concluding that
the record is reviewable on a motion for summary judgment to
determine whether any material issue of fact exists. 89 If no material
issue of fact is found to exist, summary judgment may be granted on
the record. However, if a material. issue of fact is foUnd to exist,
then a de novo trial is held and the employee must establish his
claim by a preponderance of the evidence. The administrative rec-
ord is admissible in evidence at this trial."
As evidenced by the conflict between the Third and Tenth
Circuits, the trial de novo issue has spawned considerable litigation
in the federal courts. At present, the majority of courts have inter-
12 515 F.2d at 475-76, 10 FEP Cas. at 662.
83
 Id. at 476-77, 10 FE? Cas. at 663.
84
 360 F. Supp. at 1251-52, 6 FEP Cas. at 82.
85
 515 F.2d at 477-81, 10 FE? Cas. at 663-66.
66
 118 Cong. Ftec. 4922 (1972).
67
 515 F.2d at 480-81, 10 FE? Cas. at 666.
61
 S. Rep. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1971).
69 515 F.2d at 484, 10 FEP Cas. at 669.
9° Id.
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preted section 717(c) to initially require only a review of the ad-
ministrative record. 9 ' If the agency decision is not sustained by the
evidence in the record, then the trial court may, in its discretion,
remand, take supplemental testimony, or grant relief. 92 However,
there is still a significant minority of decisions in which the court has
held that a trial de novo is required in all cases. 93
The question is initially one of Congressional intent. The prob-
lem, however, is that the legislative history, a standard indiCator of
Congressional intent, is conflicting. 94
 It is submitted that the answer
does not lie, as argued by the Third Circuit, 95 in an ascertainment
of the most persuaiive statements within the conflicting legislative
history. This approach simply does not lend itself to a convincing
result.
The solution may be found in the language of the statute itself.
The statute provides:
The provisions of [section 706] (f) through (k) of this title,
91
 Cases decided during the Survey year holding a federal employee entitled only to
review of the record: Fisher v. Brennan, 384 F. Supp. 174, 177, 10 FEP Cas. 685, 687 (E.D.
Tenn. 1974); Smith v. Snyder, 381 F. Supp._1083, 1087, 10 FEP Cas. 645, 648 (E.D. Pa.
1974); Brooks v. Lynn, 65 F.R.D. 78, 79, 10 FEP Cas. 638, 639 (W.D. Okla. 1974);
Richerson v. Fargo, 64 F.R.D. 393, 395, 10 FEP Cas. 644, 645 (E.D. Pa. 1974); McGowan v.
U.S. Information Agency, 10 FEP Cas. 618, 620 (D.D.C. 1974); Robinson v. Warner, 10 FEP
Cas. 609, 612 (D.D.C. 1974); Cates v. Johnson, 377 F. Supp. 1145, 1146, 10 FEP Cas. 564,
565 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Allen v. Veterans Administration, 10 FEP Cas. 195, 197 (W.D. Pa.
1974); Ficldin v. Sabatini, 9 FEP Cas. 70, 72 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Eastland v. Tenn. Valley
Authority, 8 FEP Cas. 1226, 1231 (N.D. Ala. 1974); Guilday v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 385 F.
Supp. 1096, 1098-99, 8 FEP Cas. 1015, 1017 (D. Del. 1974); Evans v. Johnson, 8 FEP Cas.
1013, 1015 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Baca v. Butz, 376 F. Supp. 1005, 1010, 8 FEP Cas. 116, 120
(D.N.M. 1974); Spencer v. Schlesinger, 374 F. Supp. 840, 844, 8 FEP Cas. 848, 850-51
(D.D.C. 1974). See also McLaughlin v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 885, 890, 10 FEP Cas. 135,
138 (S.D. Ala, 1974) where the court held that a trial de novo is not automatically required,
but nevertheless granted such a trial de novo under the specific facts of the case.
For pre-Survey year decisions holding that a federal employee is not automatically
entitled to a trial de novo, see, e.g., Pointer v. Sampson, 62 F.R.D. 689, 696, 7 FEP Cas.
905, 910 (D.D.C. 1974); Thompson v. United States Dept. of Justice, 372 F. Supp. 762, 764,
7 FEP Cas. 347, 348 (N.D. Cal, 1974); Handy v. Gayler, 364 F. /Supp. 676, 679, 6 FEP Cas.
597, 598 (D. Md. 1973).
92 See, e.g., Guilday, 385 F. Supp. at 1098, 8 FEP Cas. at 1017.
93
 For Survey year cases holding that the federal employee is entitled to a trial de novo,
see Boston v. Naval Station, 10 FEP Cas. 649, 652 (E.D. Va. 1974); Hunt v. Schlesinger, 389
F. Supp. 725, 728, 10 FEP Cas. 52, 54 (W.D. Tenn. 1974); Robinson v. Klassen, 9 FEP Cas.
84, 85 (E.D. Ark. 1974).
For pre-Survey year decisions holding that the employee is entitled to a trial de novo, see
Griffin v. U.S. Postal Serv.', 7 FEP Cas. 303, 304 (M.D. Fla. 1973); Jackson v. U.S. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 379 F. Supp. 589, 594, 7 FEP Cas. 575, 578 (S.D. Tex. 1973); Henderson v.
Defense Contract Admin. Serv. Region, 370 F. Supp. 180, 184, 7 FEP Cas. 241, 244
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Thompson v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 360 F. Supp. 255, 258, 6 FEP Cas.
581, 583 (N.D. Cal. 1973), reconsidered and rev'd, 372 F. Supp. 762, 7 FEP Cas. 347 (1974).
94 See note 46 supra.
95
 Sperling, 515 F.2d at 480, 10 FEP Cas. at 666.
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as applicable, shall govern civil actions brought hereun-
der. 96
Because sections 706(f) through (k) have been held to require a trial
de novo, the central question is the interpretation of the words "as
applicable." One view, supported by some lower courts, 97 is that
these words create discretion in the trial judge to refuse to apply any
of the provisions in sections 706(0 through (k) to federal employee
cases. This view was expressly rejected in Sperling. 98 A better view
appears to be that the words "as applicable" were added to the
statute in recognition of the fact that some of the private employee
provisions in sections 706(f) through (k) are not capable of being
applied to federal employee cases. Thus, Congress intended that
these provisions should be inapplicable. However, those private
employee provisions which are capable of being applied to federal
employee cases must be applied under section 717(d). For example,
section 706(i) provides:
In any case in which an employer, employment agency, or
labor organization fails to comply with an order of a court
issued in a civil action brought under this section the
[Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] may com-
mence proceedings to compel compliance with such or-
der. 99
This provision is not capable of being applied to federal employee
cases because the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has
no jurisdiction over such cases. However, the remaining provisions
of sections 706(f) through (k) are capable of being applied to federal
employee cases. Thus, it is submitted that Congress intended in
section 717(d) to make these remaining provisions applicable where
a federal employee files a civil action in district court. Since these
provisions have been held to require a trial de novo in private
employment cases, it is submitted that a trial de novo is also
required in federal employment cases.
This procedure will undoubtedly result in judicial waste in
those cases which are not decided on a motion for summary judg-
ment based on the record. The court will have to hear testimony
and take evidence which has already been compiled at the adminis-
trative level. However, as noted by the Third Circuit in Sperling,'"
96 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d) (Supp. III 1973).
" See, e.g., Guilday, 385 F. Supp. at 1097, 8 FEP Cas. at 1016.
911
 515 F.2d at 840, 10 FEP Cas. at 662-63.
99
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(i) (Supp. III 1973).
1 °° 515 F.2d at 484, 10 FEP Cas. at 668.
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this problem is more properly one for legislative concern. Thus, it is
submitted that judicial waste and duplication are not sufficient
reasons to ignore what appear to be the statutory requirements of
section 717. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recently allowed
such judicial duplication of pre-judicial proceedings in an analogous
fact situation in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,'°' where the
Court concluded that a private employee was entitled to a trial de
novo on his employment discrimination claim even though the
employee had already enjoined full arbitration proceedings pursuant
to a collective bargaining agreement. 1 °2
 This conclusion applies
even to those cases in which a record has been developed in the
arbitration proceedings.
One final matter must be considered. The majority of courts
have held that federal employees are initially entitled to only a
review of the administrative record. 104
 Under this procedure, the
standard by which the administrative record is reviewed is of cen-
tral importance. However, there is widespread confusion as to what
standard should be applied. During the Survey year the following
standards were applied: "clear weight of evidence;" 105 "affirmatively
established by clear weight of evidence;"'" "substantial evi-
dence;" 1 " "clearly supported by substantial evidence;"° 8 "prepon-
derance of the evidence;" and "arbitrariness." 110 This confusion is
underscored by the fact that even within a case different standards
are sometimes cited. For example, in Hackley, the court stated that
the applicable standard was "affirmatively established by the clear
weight of the evidence in the record."'" However, in reviewing the
record, the court applied the "preponderance of the evidence" stan-
dard." 2
It is submitted that the proper standard is the preponderance of
the evidence standard. A major concern of those courts which have
1 ° 1
 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
1 °2 Id. at 59-60.
103
 Id. at 57.
1 " See note 76 supra.
10
 Brooks v. Lynn, 65 F.R.D. 78, 79, 10 FEP Cas. 638, 639 (W.D. Okla. 1974).
1 °6 Pointer v. Sampson, 62 F.R.D. 689, 695, 7 FEP Cas. 905, 909 (D.D.C. 1974);
Eastland v. Tenn. Valley Authority, 8 FEP Cas. 1226, 1231 (N.D. Ala. 1974); McLaughlin v.
Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 885, 890, 10 FEP Cas. 135, 139 (S.D. Ala. 1974).
1°7 Smith v, Snyder, 381 F. Supp. 1083, 1088, 10 FEP Cas. 645, 649 (E.D. Pa. 1974);
Cates v. Johnson, 377 F. Supp. 1145, 10 FEP Cas. 564 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Evans v. Johnson, 8
FEP Cas. 1013, 1014 (c.p. Cal. 1974).
108
 McGowan v. U.S. Information Agency, 10 FE? Cas. 618, 620 (D.D.C. 1974).
1 °9
 Haire v. Callaway, 9 FEP Cas. 168, 170 (E.D. Mo. 1974); Guilday, 385 F. Supp.
1096, 1101-02, 8 FEP Cas. 1015, 1020 (D. Del. 1974).
11 ° Tomlin v. Air Force Medical Center, 369 F. Supp. 353, 357, 7 FEP Cas. 238, 240
(S.D. Ohio 1974).
"' 360 F. Supp. at 1252, 6 FEP Cas. at 83.
112
 Id. at 1253, 1255, 6 FEP Cas. at 84, 85.
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denied a trial de novo has been that such a trial would duplicate
administrative fact finding proceedings." 3 However, once the facts
are before the court, whether presented in a trial de novo, as in
private employee cases, or through an administrative record, as in
federal employee cases, fairness requires that these facts be accorded
the same judicial treatment. Since a preponderance of the evidence
standard is applied in private employee cases, the same standard
should be applied to federal employee cases. It is true, however,
that in a trial de novo, facts are developed before the judge who can
assess the credibility of any witnesses who testify. This is not pos-
sible where the facts below are presented through an administrative
record. Therefore, it is further submitted that in those cases where a
judge believes that an assessment of credibility is essential to a fair
determination of whether the employee has satisfied his burden by a
preponderance of the evidence, the judge should expand the hear-
ing, taking supplemental testimony or requiring the witness to tes-
tify before him in court.
ROBERT PHILIP LOMBARDI
ALAN S. POLACKWICH
RICHARD J. SHEA
113 See, e.g., Guilday, 385 F. Sapp. at 1099, 8 FEP Cas. at 1017.
